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Abstract 
The dissertation explores the intricate relations between landscape, race/ethnicity, and 
urban economy and politics in American Chinatowns. It focuses on the landscape changes and 
spatial struggles in the Chinatowns under the forces of urban redevelopment after WWII. As the 
world has entered into a global era in the second half of the twentieth century, the conditions of 
Chinatown have significantly changed due to the explosion of information and the blurring of 
racial and cultural boundaries. One major change has been the new agenda of urban land 
planning which increasingly prioritizes the rationality of capital accumulation. The different 
stages of urban redevelopment have in common the deliberate efforts to manipulate the land uses 
and spatial representations of Chinatown as part of the socio-cultural strategies of urban 
development. A central thread linking the dissertation’s chapters is the attempt to examine the 
contingent and often contradictory production and reproduction of socio-spatial forms in 
Chinatowns when the world is increasingly structured around the dynamics of economic and 
technological changes with the new forms of global and local activities. Late capitalism has 
dramatically altered city forms such that a new understanding of the role of ethnicity and race in 
the making of urban space is required.  
Using a methodology that combines field observation, personal interviews, and archive 
research, the research uses the case studies of three Chinatowns located in the metropolitan cities 
San Francisco, Chicago, and New York. The regional differences of the three Chinatowns reveal 
that there is no single Chinatown model but rather multiple Chinese American communities with 
difference experiences of urban redevelopment and spatial evolution. The comparison of these 
Chinatowns contributes both theoretically and empirically to our understanding of regionally-
specific variations to the widespread processes of urban redevelopment and spatial apparatus 
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based on ethnic/racial differentiations. It also reveals varying modes of landscape in staging and 
performing racial/ethnic identity and social activism.    
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Chinatowns, as ports-of-entry for immigrant Chinese in the United States, have played a significant 
role in Chinese immigration history in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Chinatowns have 
endured a century of hostile immigration laws and racism. In response, the communities that lived there 
relied on their internal institutions and informal ethnic economy to actively organize and provide job 
opportunities and housing to the Chinese immigrants, protecting them from racial exclusionism and job 
discrimination. This protective role developed from a specific set of social conditions. But as the world 
enters into a global era in the twenty-first century, those conditions have changed: with the explosion of 
information, fast communication networks, and the blurring of racial and cultural boundaries, will the 
classic Chinatown turn into an anachronism that is destined to wither away like so many other ethnic 
enclaves in the last century? How will Chinatown evolve to situate itself in a world that is now 
increasingly structured around the dynamics of economic and technological changes with the new forms 
of global and local activity?  
Many important studies have contributed to the contemporary conceptualization of Chinatown as a 
metaphor of the racialization processes or the unequal economic and labor relations in Western countries.1 
This dissertation contributes to that body of scholarship by exploring empirically the spatial evolution of 
Chinatown from a constellation of social relations both outside and inside the community, and a 
conscious linkage to the wider world that integrates the global and the local.2 More specifically, using the 
case studies of three Chinatowns located in metropolitan cities – San Francisco, Chicago, and New York 
– the study examines the various ways that city and land formation in Chinatown has responded to the 
forces of urban redevelopment, ideological changes, and highly differentiated local economic and 
political dynamics in the second half of the twentieth century.3  
As sites of explicit difference, Chinatowns rupture the urban fabric of global cities. The ruptures are 
made visible through the exotica of the built landscape and the noticeably distinct social and cultural 
practices of the community (figure 1).  Perhaps because Chinatown has reterritorialized the city with 
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special identities, cultures, and practices that disrupt the established histories and norms of social life, the 
 
Figure 1: A view of Grant Avenue in San Francisco’s Chinatown. The exotic built environment, bilingual 
signboards, and colorful decorations rupture the urban fabric of the city (Photo by author, 2007).  
 
ethnic enclave has been perceived as “foreign” and disjunctive to the national category of space.4 In the 
modern era, the dramatically altered socio-economic order creates a situation in which the discourse of 
race and ethnicity is increasingly organized to fix identity and address the contested interests of the local 
and the global. Thus a central thread linking the chapters of the dissertation is the examination of the 
contingent and often contradictory regeneration of social and spatial forms in Chinatown in a period when 
cities have increasingly become effective machines for capital accumulation. The monotony of late 
capitalism has created dramatically altered city forms that require a new understanding of the role of 
ethnicity and race in the making of urban space and norms. I formulate the conceptual framework of the 
dissertation within the context of urban transformation, globalization, and economic restructuring. 
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Specifically I focus on the following questions: 1) How do the rhetoric of urban renewal and the various 
forces of urban redevelopment shape the landscape changes in Chinatown? 2) What are the similarities 
and differences among the spatial formations of various Chinatowns in different urban contexts and local 
conditions? 3) How are liberal notions of multiculturalism productively unsettled through an engagement 
with the politics of difference? 4) How do Orientalized and ahistorical forms of landscape affect the 
political and cultural representation of Chinese Americans? 5) How does the management of heritage and 
ethnicity mediate between the official claims of urban redevelopment and the local forms of social 
reproduction? 6) Finally, how does thinking about Chinatown’s landscape changes in terms of social 
relations facilitate a better understanding of the interconnection between place-bound identity, landscape, 
race, and a broader process of socioeconomic transformation?  
These questions are pursued by investigating two themes pertinent to spatial transformations in 
Chinatown: land-use changes and reinventing neighborhood. The theme of land-use changes looks 
consciously beyond the micro-level schemes of community transformation and connects the analysis to 
macro-level political-economic and social changes at regional and global scales. It examines the various 
forces of exclusion and growth that changed land use in Chinatown amidst a shift in governance from 
classical liberalism to neoliberalism. The second theme of neighborhood reinvention focuses on the 
cultural identity and discourses about Chinatown. It explores the new fields of power that emerge as a 
result of various political, cultural, and economic interests that were in turn generated by the attempt to 
reinvent a landscape imagery of “Chineseness” in Chinatown. Both themes are linked to particular 
changes of landscape imageries and forms in response to city strategies of urban redevelopment. The 
ways that neighborhood landscapes changed from 1950 to 2000 will be shown in the dissertation. These 
reveal the struggles over land use caused by exclusionary urban planning and the refusal to acknowledge 
cultural, social, and political differences on the one hand, contrasted with the symbolic inclusion of ethnic 
culture to represent the city as multicultural, democratic, and diverse, on the other. The different strategies 
of urban redevelopment have in common the deliberate efforts of the city government and local 
institutions to manipulate the representations of Chinatown as part of their plans for urban redevelopment. 
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The two themes are not strictly arranged in chronological order, and neither are they clearly divided. 
Instead, they represent two different processes of urban redevelopment that are interactive, intermingled, 
and interdependent.  
 
The Idea of Chinatown 
Early studies of Chinatown emphasize a “natural” bond between the Chinese settlements and 
ethnicity. The emergence of Chinatown in North America was associated with the kinship migration 
network and internal ethnocentricity of the Chinese immigrants.5 According to this line of scholarship, 
Chinese immigrants found it very difficult to merge into the mainstream American society due to their 
inassimilable difference and the lack of verbal and written communication skills. As a result, the ethnic 
enclave was a natural choice for them because they found security living among people of their own 
culture, speaking their own language (figure 2). Once the ethnic enclave was established as a located  
  
Figure 2: Open air display of Chinese goods at Stockton Street of San Francisco’s Chinatown indicates 
the particular life-style of the Chinese immigrants (Photo by author, 2007).  
 
place, a distinct ethnic identity was then inscribed into the place.6 In David Lai’s description, “Chinatown 
in North America is characterized by a concentration of Chinese people and economic activities in one or 
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more city blocks which forms a unique component of the urban fabric. It is basically an idiosyncratic 
oriental community amidst an occidental urban environment.”7 Lai’s assertion is typical of the kind of 
scholarship that perceives Chinatown as “a colony of the East in the West.”8   
However, since the late 1980s, numerous studies in human geography, cultural anthropology, 
history, and urban sociology point to the weakness of these previous studies. Instead of seeing Chinatown 
as a neutral place of ethnicity, their later studies interpreted it as a racial, social, and cultural category 
resting on the distinct immigration experiences of the Chinese. These studies highlight the salient role of 
the Western institutions in shaping the space and place of Chinatown. They denaturalize the relationship 
between the ethnic ghetto and ethnicity, and emphasize the external forces such as anti-Chinese legal 
regulations, governmental actions, racial politics, and capitalism in producing Chinatown as a space of 
“Otherness.” 9 John Kuo Wei Tchen and Kay Anderson, for instance, draw from Edward Said’s 
conception of Orientalism and write that the existence and development of Chinatown was not so much 
about the actual lived experience of the Chinese immigrants, but the systematic definition and 
construction of the racial category of “Chinese” by the White institutions in the U.S. society.10 Examining 
the history of public health in San Francisco, Nayan Shah similarly demonstrates how strategies of 
regulation, surveillance, and knowledge control informed the racialization of San Francisco Chinese and 
the production of Chinatown’s space as deviant and foreign. Shah complicates the argument by exploring 
how the constructed categories of the respectable domesticity of White society served to justify the racial 
hierarchy and discriminatory practices toward the Chinese immigrants.11 The racialization process by 
which the Chinese were categorized as “inferior” others, according to Nicholas De Genova, is analogous 
to the logic of racializing American Indians and Latinos which has historically been central to consolidate 
the U.S. nation-building and nation-state formation.12 While racialized blackness was considered 
subordinate to the Whiteness within the border of the United States, the Native Indians were identified as 
“outsiders” whose “savagery,” “cultural inferiority,” and “hostility” were believed to be inassimilable into 
the White American society. And so they were condemned to extinction, displacement, and 
colonization.13 Demonstrating the analogies between the racialization of Latinos and Asians in the U.S. 
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and that of Native Americans, the author points out that the practice of racializing non-Whiteness was 
constitutive to and entangled with the hegemonic formulation of White supremacy and the national 
identity of “American”-ness.14 The construction of a morality of “them” vs. “us,” and self vs. “other,” 
inspired a collective sense of cultural identity within the White population and secured a “White” cultural 
and institutional hegemony of the nation-state. The identification of ethnic minority was thus useful 
because it reified the social category of “outsider”: “otherness” was at once conceptually and spatially 
located. 
In addition to the scholarship on discourse that produces Chinatown as a racial and social category, 
another stream of study examines Chinatown in the larger space of capitalism. Lisa Lowe, for instance, 
argues that the liberation of immigration policy in 1965 occurred for economic reasons. . With the 
development of global capitalism, immigrants were admitted into the U.S. to renew the domestic labor 
supplies.15 In this perspective, the development of Chinatown resulted from the U.S. society’s desire to 
promote economic production and to reshape the domestic relations of production.16 Chinatown became a 
nodal space interconnected with the unevenly distributed spaces of production, ranging “from worldwide 
networks of markets of capital, labor, and commodities to national, regional, and local markets.”17 By 
examining the social struggles in New York’s Chinatown, Peter Kwong also argues that Chinatown is a 
locus where the labor and capital relations have been structured and restructured to enhance production, 
testifying to the unequal power relations within the national markets.18 While Kwong’s work primarily 
focuses on intra-ethnic conflicts in terms of class and labor relations, Jan Lin incorporates a global 
perspective to examine the impact of globalization on the structural changes in New York’s Chinatown. 
He highlights the impact of overseas Asian investment, especially from Taiwan and Hong Kong, on the 
bank industry and real estate development in Chinatown. The transnational and global connections make 
Chinatown a nexus of capital and labor.19  
Despite these important studies that examine Chinatown within the context of local and global 
processes, there is a lack of scholarly attention to the actual space and built environment of the Chinatown 
– that is, the cultural landscape – as a kind of text encoded with ideological representation through which 
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contested power relations are signified, naturalized, and reconstructed. 20 This dissertation thus draws on 
the critical theories in cultural landscape studies to examine the formative processes and patterns of ethnic 
landscape in American Chinatowns and their underlying meanings and power relations. The following 
sections describe the theoretical literature pertinent to this work.  
 
Conceptualizing Cultural Landscape 
In North America, the academic study of cultural landscapes is associated with the geographer Carl 
Sauer. His classic essay, “The Morphology of Landscape,” offered the following definition: “The cultural 
landscape is fashioned from the natural landscape by a cultural group. Culture is the agent, the natural 
area is the medium, the cultural landscape the result.”21 Sauer’s conceptualization of landscape came from 
the German idea of landschaft, which situates landscape within a particular kind of social formation, 
bounded in space and time. In contrast with the earlier scholarship that viewed landscape primarily from a 
spatial perspective, Sauer viewed landscape as a temporal expression and a dynamic, changing, 
interrelated entity that was shaped by human activities in a particular way. 22 He associated landscapes 
with coherent and stable cultures, sustained community life, ideas of the folk, and the careful stewardship 
of nature.23 After Sauer, J. B. Jackson, the writer, editor, and landscape philosopher also played a seminal 
role in developing the concept of cultural landscape. While sharing Sauer’s vision of landscape as the 
material transformation of nature by particular cultural groups, Jackson provided new insights into “un-
aesthetic” and everyday landscapes such as strip highway developments and trailer parks, observing that 
landscape serves “as infrastructure or background for our collective existence.”24 He noted that despite 
the absence of a formal organization of space, vernacular landscape shows a degree of mobility and 
flexibility that reflects their creators’ adjustments to the societal changes.25 Jackson’s argument was in 
part a rebuke to what he considers the prejudices and deficiency of modernist architecture and planning 
for neglecting the importance and meaning of popular American settings.26  
Cultural landscape scholars from a range of fields such as cultural and human geography, 
architectural history, and etc., have continued to develop new ideas about the method, theory, and 
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philosophy of landscape studies. In the 1960s and 1970s, their philosophical debates revolved around the 
relationship between agency and structure, in which individual experience and action is located at the 
center of analysis and emphasizes “‘sense of place’ as a way of putting individual experience back into 
the agency side of the agency-and-structure debate.”27 D.W. Meinig also explored how people view the 
landscape subjectively and create their own meanings from what they see. He suggested that we can view 
landscape from the standpoint of nature, habitat, artifact, system, problem, wealth, ideology, history, 
place, and aesthetic.28 Yi-Fu Tuan has emphasized that human perception, as well as socio-cultural 
affiliation, influences how we perceive in the world. He has illuminated how we view landscapes 
subjectively based on our aesthetic sensibilities and cultural influences.29 This vision of landscape can 
also be found in John Stilgoe’s Common Landscape of America, which documents the transformation of 
rural landscape during the mid-nineteenth century from a form linked to sustained community life, 
husbandry, and nature to a practice based on commodification, production, and alienation of labor from 
the land.30 By emphasizing ethnicity as a medium of shaping the landscape, Dell Upton contributes to this 
discourse by examining the vast array of built environments and landscapes associated with ethnic groups 
in North America.31   
A theme that unites all these scholars is the perception of landscape as a material entity that 
demands to be studied through direct observation and first-hand empirical experience.32 The emphasis on 
materiality has led to research that examines the “verbal, narrative, or historical” elements of landscape 
and the embedded “transcendental consciousness.”33 The approach of investigating what to “read” in a 
landscape led to a greater emphasis on the discursive and symbolic roles of landscape that was incurred 
by thinking of landscape as both an object to be seen and a particular “way of seeing.”34 Taking its cues 
from the statements revealing the subjective nature of vision, the discussion of landscape as “a way of 
seeing” is associated with a cultural Marxist interpretive tradition and the emerging post-structuralism 
that examine  “the complicity of artistic and literary genres with evolving capitalist systems of production 
and property ownership.”35 As Denis Cosgrove noted in Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape, 
landscape is closely associated with human perspective, and is therefore a metaphor of specific social, 
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political, or cultural tensions and struggles within any society at any given time and place.36 In this vein, 
W. J. T. Mitchell highlights the European colonization of landscape way of seeing, placing great 
emphasis on the imperial power relationships implicated in the colonized landscape. Understood not as a 
purely cultural image that reveals ideological values embedded within it, landscape is also a cultural 
practice that belongs to a larger socio-political process of naturalizing, reproducing, and transforming 
social and cultural relations in human society.37 This concept of cultural practice has enriched the 
theoretical perspective of my own work as it sees Chinatown not simply as a culturally produced emblem, 
but as a living entity that undergoes constant changes.   
In the 1980s and 1990s, Marxist and post-Marxist analysis has provided new theories in landscape 
studies. Accordingly, the production of landscape has been understood in terms of the axioms of classical 
Marxism, focusing on capitalist production and reproduction, the need for surplus value or profit, and 
contestations between labor and capital.38 Extending the definition of landscape as visual ideology, Don 
Mitchell examines landscape within the material processes of labor, capitalism, and production. He 
perceives landscape as both a “work” produced by human practice and thought and the contested relations 
among social actors, and as something that “does work,” that actively engages in the production and 
reproduction of capitalist social and economic relations.39 Landscape analysts who study landscape under 
a Marxist/materialist approach emphasize landscape as a dynamic process that should be studied in the 
context of social difference and conflict, unequal power relations, and social change. They open the 
discipline to broader debates of class, gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, colonization, and globalization, 
all of which are shared by many other humanistic disciplines.40   
Adopting the theoretical position that perceives landscape as a discourse – that is, an ideological 
expression that actively engages in the production and reproduction of social relations – this dissertation 
draws heavily on the scholarship focusing on the relationships between space and the social construction 
of race. Idea about race and space figures prominently among the formation of identity and social 
relations within the contemporary society. The critical studies of Whiteness reveal the privileged status of 
the White against which racialized identities are considered as “Others,” and the invisibility of this 
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epistemology as it has been naturalized as a system of meanings and values rooted in the hegemonic 
culture of the White.41 Human geographers have contributed to this scholarship by examining the role of 
race in politicizing and manipulating the representation and (re)production of space. They consider the 
discourse of race as a significant category for spatial analysis, and vice versa, space as central apparatus 
to inform and articulate the process of racial and social constructions.42 Race studies have also been 
introduced into the discipline of landscape architecture, albeit more slowly. In 2007, Landscape Journal 
dedicated a theme issue to examining the built form not only as mirror, but also as active agent that 
reinforce and create racial identity and racially-based practices of exclusion, minoritization, 
subordination, and privilege.43 Going beyond the binary of Black and White, the issue includes studies of 
Latino/a and Asian American space. Lynne Horiuchi, for instance, provides a good account of how the 
racial covenants, real estate market, and urban planning policy jointly enforced a segregated living pattern 
of Asian Americans in San Francisco in the first half of the twentieth century. Her study demonstrates the 
centrality of racial ideology in the formation of Asian American settlement and space.44  
This dissertation advances existing scholarship by focusing on the ethnic landscape of three 
important American Chinatowns. The intention of the study is not to “generate another good theory,” in 
the words of Stuart Hall, but to “reproduce the concrete in thought.”45 More specifically, it tries to 
provide a better theorized account of the landscape history of Chinatown to understand the embedded 
tensions among power, racial ideology, and the formation of space. The theoretical framework of this 
work extends beyond those studies of Chinatown that tend to view the formation of landscape space as a 
passive response to outside forces. Instead, my approach is to regard landscape as an instrument that can 
disguise or reinforce the socioeconomic relations of Chinatown with the larger society. Thus this study 
juxtaposes the empirical work of Chinatown with the philosophical debates of landscape, to ask how 
space is insinuated in the constitution, communication and reproduction of social life in general, and 
contested power relations in particular.   
 
Urban Segregation and the Politics of Difference 
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In the 1950s and 1960s, the first wave of urban renewal was initiated in American cities. It was 
characterized by the state-sponsored bulldozer that remade the downtown, encouraging scattered private-
market gentrification. Federal and city governments played a crucial role in the process of urban 
regeneration.46 During that time, the Keynesian model of public housing reached an apex in the U.S, 
while the machine of city growth aggressively pushed to revitalize the downtown to create a landscape of 
consumption, leisure, and luxury housing. Federal funds were largely allocated to downtown commercial 
development, construction of transportation networks, and cityscape beautification, while few grants were 
used for community development and neighborhood rehabilitation. In the context of American-style 
Keynesian administration, the rhetoric of “blight” was employed as a convenient excuse for the state and 
the local government to execute demolition for the public goal of “healthy” cities. But the effect was 
disastrous.47 In that heyday of social liberalism and Keynesianism, a redistributive nation-state 
aggressively intervened to provide basic economic conditions that were needed for political equality and 
the individual pursuit of pleasure. The nation-state’s role was perceived to be the protection of freedom as 
well as welfare rights.48 Though difference was promoted as necessary and positive for national unity and 
coherence, many critics of liberalism point out the inherent and fundamental system of exclusion that is 
embedded in the rhetoric of liberalism. Katharyne Mitchell, for instance, argues “the central ‘civil rights’ 
tenets of liberalism – individualism, individual choice, dignity, freedom and rationality – are premised on 
a form of reason and rational behavior which is culturally inscribed and can never be completely 
accessible to the outsider.”49 Holston and Appadurai similarly argue that the right to difference as an 
integral part of the foundation of liberal citizenship is factually premised on an ideology of a particular 
referent group that is a “white, European, propertied, male,” while the excluded partake of a passive form 
of citizenship which “is managed… by an unelected bureaucracy.” 50 Scholars such as Lisa Lowe and 
John Friedmann also emphasize the unrealistic premise of dissolving material particularities of citizen 
into equal political representations as promised by national citizenship.51 Thus, the failure of liberalism to 
fully engage with the unfamiliar is at the heart of the early urban renewal movement that used the 
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category of “slum” and “degraded site” to limit claims of equal political representations of the racial 
minority and accord priority to the logic of capital accumulation.  
In many Western cities, Chinatown – historically perceived as one of the notorious slums – housed 
a community that saw clearly how urban renewal might become an aggressive force to evict and dislocate 
them. But this community was no match for the powerful coalition of city officials, real estate developers, 
and other interest groups of urban growth, and thus Chinatown residents were constantly threatened with 
the loss of their homes. Meanwhile, large numbers of Chinese flowed into the U.S. following the 
Communist takeover of Mainland China in 1949 and the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 
signed by President John Kennedy. Especially after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 that 
abolished discriminatory national-origin quotas and allowed Asian immigrants to unite with their 
families, Chinatown experienced a major boom of population. The burgeoning population worsened the 
long-existing problems of housing shortage and lack of necessary community infrastructures. The politics 
of difference and immigrants’ struggle over city-imposed norms of what constituted a good and proper 
life in the public sphere points to a crucial theme of Part I – land-use changes – which considers how the 
rhetoric of urban renewal impacted the physical and social space of Chinatown, and how the Chinatown 
community actively engaged in the contested processes of urban transformation.  
Saskia Sassen has argued that there are two forms of urban development in the global cities. One is 
a homogenization of the urban forms of advanced economic sectors that represent “technological advance 
and cosmopolitan culture,” while the other urban form is represented by the immigrant communities or 
the informal economies that are “economic and cultural backwaters” in the cities.52 The two seemingly 
divergent forms of urban development are mutually dependent, but also mutually exclusive. Their 
relationship is historical and can be traced through various stages of urban development in modern urban 
history. The duality of urban forms is also discussed in Holston’s essay “Spaces of Insurgent 
Citizenship,” in which he criticizes the modernist planning as utopian because of its pervasive ideal of 
transforming “an unwanted present” into “an imagined future.” 53 The model of the modernist planning is 
to forge a subjective appropriation of the new social order through the means of architectural and urban 
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design. The utopic paradigm that was intended to create an egalitarian and cosmopolitan urban culture, 
however, tends to generate a dystopic version of urban life that encourages a privatization of public space, 
which invariably exaggerates social stratification and hierarchy.54 This spatial logic of modernism has 
been employed by developers and other proponents of urban growth who use the vocabulary of urban 
renewal to create new lines of segregation between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the 
disenfranchised. The increasingly fragmented and divided urban form has been analyzed by many 
scholars. According to Mike Davis, the debates concerning the city of Los Angeles are polarized so that it 
either has “ultimate world-historical significance” or it is “the nightmare at the terminus of American 
history.”55 He argues that the urban forms in the city are fragmented and dispersed according to a division 
between “fortified cells” and “place of terror.”56 Urban planning, architectural design and policing 
apparatus have unprecedentedly allied with each other in a common effort of exclusion, while urban 
public space has been destroyed through socio-spatial strategies such as privatization of the architectural 
public realm, redevelopment through the framework of gentrification or re-colonization, and making 
public facilities “unliveable” for  the homeless and poor.57 The narrative of the spatial strategies of 
segregation and walled enclaves reveals the systematic operation of socio-spatial control imposed on the 
marginal populations to intensify social disparity and realize capitalist interests.  
The pattern of urban segregation based on the rhetoric of urban renewal represents a new spatial 
strategy to get access to and command over the resources belonging to the unprivileged groups. David 
Harvey perceives the appropriation of assets as a form of capital accumulation that rests upon 
dispossession of the surpluses of others, “to absorb them into the circulation of capital but to have the 
power to devalue them and even destroy them.”58 Such a way of conceptualizing the uneven geographical 
development is inherently linked to the politics of urban renewal and the undergirded relations of 
inequality between race, class, and gender. On the one hand, in most Chinatowns, revitalization projects 
continued to marginalize the ethnic enclave by constraining it with physical barriers or encroaching upon 
it with the uncontrolled expansion of downtown commercial and financial sectors. On the other hand, a 
productive economy caused rents to rise, which led to the eventual dislocation of low-income populations. 
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The influx of oversea Chinese capital into Chinatown, partly facilitated by the political uncertainty of the 
East and South-East Asian countries, was encouraged by the neoliberal urban policies of the American 
cities that were determined to “upgrade” and “beautify” Chinatown through market forces. However, 
unlike the actual Chinatown residents, the overseas Chinese developers had hardly any commitment to 
maintaining the community and its cultural identity. In response, the former engaged in various forms of 
resistance to contest the process of gentrification.  
Exclusion by race and by class was integral to urban redevelopment, in which profit was made from 
dispossession of the unprivileged through imposing the category of rationality, order, and normality in the 
discourse of urban planning.59 But the disadvantaged social groups with distinct identities demanded 
difference-specific citizenship that would respect their interests and their rights to equal opportunity. By 
demanding “substantive citizenship” to pursue their ideology of equality, the marginalized groups 
challenged – and continue to challenge – the basic premise of liberal citizenship and debunk the limited 
definitions on the kinds of good individuals can pursue.60  
 
Reinventing Neighborhood and Marketing “Chineseness” 
A second wave of urban renewal occurred in the 1970s and 1980s when the political support for 
gentrification waned. The state intervened less directly in the process of urban renewal, and instead 
“federally inspired, locally implemented laissez-faire governance” became prevalent through re-
regulating public policies for providing incentives for urban redevelopment.61 The fiscal crisis of 1973 
prompted a major shift in urban policy as cities faced the difficulties of trying to revive declining 
neighborhoods, improve devalued land, and control violence. The strategy for dealing with these 
problems was economic restructuring and the search for new sources of wealth.62 In the process, the 
Keynesian model of welfare proved unable to contain the inherent conflicts of capitalism. Neoliberalism 
that promotes “market-resolution” and less governmental intervention within the marketplace replaced 
Keynesianism and became the dominant form of governance in the U.S. In this new mode the market was 
perceived as the essential way to revive the urban economy.63 The political and economic restructuring 
 15 
caused urban form and city landscape to change significantly. Starting in the 1970s, the inner core of the 
cities experienced fast growth, and increasing reinvestment in the downtown led to rising real estate 
values. City governments encouraged growth in service economies and developed consumption-based 
infrastructure to attract investments. The urban landscape was reshaped to accommodate the capital shift 
to a secondary circuit, of which real estate, finance, insurance, tourism, and other “soft” industries 
constitute an important part.64 
The new agenda for urban land planning prioritizes the global circulation of capital and other 
resources in urban space, all for the sake of capital accumulation. In a sense, urban land is treated as a 
pure commodity that is “spaceless” and “timeless” without local particularities of social reproduction and 
urban consumption.65 This is especially true in the so-called “global cities” or “world cities,” which, 
according to Sassen, play a strategic role in the management of the global economy by providing the 
states a major competitive advantage on a world scale through increasing the “global control capability” 
in the global system of production.66 The discourses in which “places are not so much presented as foci of 
attachment and concern, but as bundles of social and economic opportunity competing against one 
another in the open market for a share of the capital investment cake” reveal how places are commodified 
as a central way to facilitate urban growth.67 With the market-based notion of pursuing competitive 
advantages, the cities are eager to embrace the place-selling ethnos, while the regeneration policies 
emphasize marketing the image of the city to build positive perceptions amongst tourists, entrepreneurs, 
and investors.68  
By internalizing the idea of place commodification and consumption to foster free market 
competition, the city institutions manage to mobilize their local cultural, social and capital resources in 
building attractive and distinct place images. One particular important means of doing this has been 
through “a conscious and deliberate manipulation of culture in an effort to enhance the appeal and interest 
of places.”69 Sharon Zukin asserts that there are many different cultural strategies of urban economic 
development, among which “the symbolic economy of cultural meanings and representations implies real 
economic power.”70 In such a context, cultural industries that include music, publishing, tourism and the 
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arts play an essential role in urban transformations, while the development or refurbishment of cultural 
attractions such as art museums, restaurants, theatres, and sports stadiums is particularly important to 
realize the re-invention of the cities.71 In the trend toward visual consumption, urban strategies such as 
gentrification, historic preservation, and theme parks have also been employed to improve the visual 
appeal of cities.72 Thus, culture becomes a powerful tool for urban redevelopment in many post-industrial 
cities.73 The manipulation of culture that depends on promoting locally-rooted traditions and customs 
capitalizes the city as a source of images and memories.74 It also greatly influences the ways that we 
create place and see landscape. Such processes of producing space through cultural strategies are 
commonly incorporated in the global market competition by converting cultural capital into visual images 
and circulating them in the global scale.75 Especially given modernity’s tendency to homogenize urban 
environments, it appears that local distinctiveness is a strategy that, because it resists homogenization, 
becomes a key tool in the global selling of places.  
Since the attempts to attain cultural uniformity and homogeneity within the urban environment of 
modernity ultimately failed, the shift towards a postmodern culture offers a greater tolerance of diversity 
and cultural presence of others.76 Different communities have always produced powerful visual imageries 
that contribute to the construction of a coherent vision of the city.77 As well, with the increase of 
immigrant and racially diverse population in the global cities, the narrative of multiculturalism becomes 
central to the assertion of American urban culture as a democratic terrain to which racial and ethnic 
minorities have equal access.78 As the United States will soon become a “minority-majority” society in 
which the minority groups will constitute more than half of the population, the immigrant effects on urban 
landscape are profoundly important. Major cities such as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco have 
benefited from the positive economic effects brought by its new immigrants. The places that these people 
inhabited – ethnically defined neighborhoods – not only figure significantly in the cultural imagination of 
the cosmopolitan cities, but also form a key component of a city’s marketing campaign.79 The market-
driven efforts of translating diverse cultural products into marketable difference has appropriated and 
transformed symbols and images of the once inferior and deviant ethnic culture into global commodities. 
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Multiculturalism, according to Morgan and Pritchard, “holds many implications for tourism marketing.”80 
In global cities, a packaged construction of cultural symbols is conducted to articulate multiple and 
manufactured place identities. In the process, the symbolic cultures that address ethnic identity and 
history are linked together in a narrative that encourages the consumption of ethnic products and mediates 
the impressions of the ethnic places for the Western public.  
For these reasons, ethnic neighborhoods have been managed as part of the cultural strategies of 
urban redevelopment. A confluence between commercial culture and ethnic identity has a particular 
impact upon the construction of landscape imagery in ethnic enclaves as built form is increasingly 
becoming a tool of community marketing. In particular, since the 1970s, ethnic themes have been used to 
market American Chinatowns. Orientalist architectures such as Chinese-style gateways and pagoda-tiered 
restaurants have prevailed as signature elements that enhance the exoticism of the enclave (figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: A view of Chicago’s Chinatown shows the efforts to exoticize the built environment of 
Chinatown (Photo by author, 2008) 
The early examples of exoticizing Chinatown can be traced back to the 1906 earthquake in San 
Francisco, after which its Chinatown was rebuilt on an Orientalist theme of faux-Chinese architectures. 
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Similarly in the 1930s, with the demolition of the old Chinatown in Los Angeles, a China City replicating 
a Chinese village was developed by non-Chinese developers.  The project, complete with rickshaw rides 
and faux-Chinese facades, aimed to create a theme park not for the residents but for the tourists. Though 
the imposition of stereotypical ethnic character on the built environment of Chinatown has a long history 
in North America, it was not until the 1970s that a systematic and sweeping operation of Oriental themes 
dominated architecture and landscape design of American Chinatowns. The city officials and Chinatown 
elites have turned to image making and experience manipulation to boost local distinctiveness and attract 
tourist dollars. The intentional creation of cultural-historical package to produce marketable environments 
entails “performative” dimensions of cultural and historical elements.81 While such marketing strategies 
may have immediate financial benefits in the tourism sector, they decontextualize ethnicity in all the 
political meanings and local conditions that are integral to the lives of the ethnic groups. By highlighting 
the cultural aspects of “Chineseness,” an uncritical relationship between cultural representation and the 
history of Chinese migration and modern China has been entrenched in the contemporary global market. 
This leads to the second theme of the dissertation – reinventing neighborhood – that primarily 
concerns questions of cultural identity and landscape constructions in Chinatown after the 1970s. The 
questions are fundamentally political, regarding the connection between place-bound identity, cultural 
tradition, and a broader context of the socioeconomic processes. As argued by Ananya Roy, “the 
valuation implicit in consumption gives value to tradition,” and “nostalgia as heritage… generates 
aesthetic icons of value” which “renders invisible the brutal mechanics of capitalist valuation.”82 For Roy, 
tradition has become a commodity whose value is decided by the logics of capitalism. More insidiously, it 
also serves as a mode of dissemblance that aestheticizes power and the political process of spatial 
reproduction.83 Zukin, in a similar vein, integrates analyses of cultural production and consumption into 
urban studies. Shifting the analytical focus from the production to the interpretation of cultural symbols, 
imagery, and themes, she argues that culture stimulates economic growth and forms the basis of a 
“symbolic economy.”84 The symbolic economy consists of two parallel production systems: the first is the 
production of space in which cultural meanings, differences, and aesthetic icons are incorporated as a 
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means of spatial framing and redevelopment; and second is the production of symbols, which reduces 
cultural aspects to their basic representations in order to facilitate both commercial exchange and the 
negotiation of social identity.85 The study of culture’s connection to the urban form provides valuable 
insight into the politics of space and the dynamics of architecture and landscape transformation in 
Chinatown.   
Grounded on these existing theories and studies of modern urban history, the research contributes 
specifically to the understanding of the changing roles and imaginations of the ethnic communities in the 
process of urban redevelopment. By anchoring the spatial struggles in the urban realm, it provides 
concrete examples and focused analysis of how ethnicity as a cultural and political concept settles for the 
identity of an urban space and the reproduction of social relationships. The study suggests ethnic history 
and urban history are intertwined categories, framing a broader social interpretation of the complexity and 
dynamicity of urban cultural landscape. 
 
Methodology 
The research, conducted in the cities of San Francisco, Chicago, and New York, has benefited 
from a combination of methodologies and a wide range of data including newspapers, government 
documents, websites, photographs, neighborhood newsletters, and scholarly works. Field investigation 
has focused on three spatial scales – the city, the community, and individual architectures and structures. 
The three metropolitan cities studied in this dissertation are located in the West Coast, the Midwest, and 
the East Coast respectively. The regional differentiations provide distinct contexts for this study to 
examine the interrelations of the city’s agenda of urban development and the spatial evolvement of ethnic 
communities in the United States. These cities are varied in their economic, social, and political 
conditions, but they are similar with respect to their strategic use of the space of Chinatowns. The three 
Chinatowns all have long history of Chinese settlements and have played important roles in the creation 
of the city and the reproduction of social relations. The comparison of these Chinatowns contributes both 
theoretically and empirically to our understanding of regionally specific variations to the widespread 
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processes of urban redevelopment and spatial apparatus that based on racial/ethnic differentiation. It also 
reveals varying modes of landscape spaces in staging and performing racial/ethnic identity and social 
activism.86 In the fieldwork conducted in the three Chinatowns, everyday walking around the 
neighborhood, grocery shopping, visiting Chinese restaurants and tea houses, participating in Sunday 
Church, and using public transportation to get to other parts of the city have provided me first-hand 
experiences of living in the space of Chinatown, observing community people’s everyday lives and their 
relations with the space. The observation of aspects of group interaction, communication, and group 
identity is also important in the field investigation. In documenting the individual buildings, I selected 
those structures with historical significance or representing a specific architectural typology. Archives, 
newspapers, and field observation provided a partial record of the floor plan, significant architectural 
details and building history of the structure.   
Personal interviews have been conducted with civic leaders, community activists, social workers, 
business owners, and residents in the Chinatowns. Most of the interviews adopted either English or 
Mandarin as the languages of communication, and I am fluent in both. They were usually scheduled in 
advance and planned with an interview outline of identified topics. In most cases, the interviewees gave 
me permission to record the conversations, and I did so. The fact that I do not speak Cantonese was a 
limitation to this research as many senior residents in the Chinatowns only speak Cantonese or a dialect 
know as Taishanese. The intra-ethnic differences and sensibility of the origin of country and region also 
prohibited me to conduct in-depth conversations with some of the interviewees.  
I conducted research in San Francisco in 2007. As the oldest Chinatown in the nation, San 
Francisco’s Chinatown is an important commercial and tourist attraction of the city. The city’s libraries 
and museums have a rich collection pertinent to the history of Chinese Americans and Chinese 
immigration. San Francisco Public Library, for instance, has a large collection of governmental 
documents regarding city- or community-initiated plans or proposals for the revitalization and 
redevelopment of the Chinatown. The Ethnic Studies Library at the University of California, Berkeley, 
provides archives of newspapers and manuscripts about the Chinese community in San Francisco. The 
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Foundation for San Francisco Architectural Heritage has comprehensive materials documenting the 
controversies and debates regarding the historic structures in the Chinatown area. Finally, the Society of 
California Pioneers provides important primary sources including maps, photos, and postcards to this 
study. My research on San Francisco’s Chinatown also draws on the important archive of the San 
Francisco Chronicle from 1970s to 1990s.  
The second area of research was Chicago’s Chinatown. I have been following the spatial 
movements in the area since 2003, when conducting research for my master’s thesis on the landscape 
history and historic preservation of that Chinatown. I used the interviews, field observations, and 
information I collected from earlier field trips, but I also conducted new research regarding the city’s 
process of urban redevelopment, politics of public housing constructions, and land-uses changes in the 
Chinatown area, drawing on photo and newspaper archives in the Chicago Historical Society and the 
Historical Chicago Tribune from 1950s to 1980s. However, compared to San Francisco and New York, 
Chicago has a relatively small collection of primary sources on the history of its Chinatown, especially in 
terms of spatial transformations and movements, which has posed a challenge for my fieldwork.  
Finally I did research in New York’s Chinatown. Distinct from the other two Chinatowns, New 
York’s Chinatown has a large concentration of Fujianese immigrants in addition to the early Cantonese 
settlers. My personal experiences as a native Fujianese with fluency in Fujianese dialect helped me 
tremendously to understand and examine the intra-ethnic differences within the community and to 
conduct interviews that revealed in-depth information about the values and the powers of memory 
inscribed in the landscape. The analysis of the politics, economy, and culture of spatial movements in 
New York’s Chinatown has also drawn on the archival resources in the Chatham Square Branch of the 
New York Public Library, which collects community newspapers and newsletters both in English and 
Chinese from the 1950s to the present.      
The goal of this research is to study the ethnic communities within an agency-oriented 
ethnographic theoretical perspective that connects macro-level urban transformations to the micro-
networks of social relations and spatial changes of the community.87 The methodologies of field 
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observation, interviews, and archival research demand close attention to the distinctly local mechanisms 
by which the built environment gains meanings.88 They particularly focus on the contingent and often 
contradictory social practices and identity formation processes in constructing a sense of community and 
space.        
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
The core of the dissertation is the relation between the character of place and space with the forces 
of urban redevelopment, capitalism, changing market, and local economic and political particularities. 
The chapters trace the landscape transformations in the Chinatowns of San Francisco, Chicago, New York 
to examine empirical connections between space, ethnicity, and urban economy and politics. The concern 
is not only with the space of “Others,” but also with the construction and politics of difference. The two 
parts of the dissertation are organized under the same premise but with a different emphasis. Part I 
(consisting of Chapters 1, 2, and 3) examines the spatial struggles in the Chinatowns, investigating the 
role of racial and ethnic discourse in shaping the urban landscapes. More specifically, these three chapters 
analyze land-use struggles from the 1950s to 1990s, drawing on the critical scholarship of cultural 
landscape and human geography, which emphasizes the mutual structuring of space and social relations. I 
maintain that exclusion by not only race but also class is integral to both the process of urban renewal and 
the production of insurgent space against hegemonic imposition of spatial orders from above. Land-use 
planning and the discourse of “rational” and “normal” space is central to the ongoing process of capital 
accumulation and the social reproduction of White hegemony. Part II (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) reexamines 
how images, narratives, and cultural representations were manipulated to restructure ethnicity. The idea of 
ethnic culture in multicultural policy and rhetoric practiced in American cities was premised on a 
bounded category of essential and essentialized differences. By examining the process of “self-
Orientalization” and the creation of enclave identity, the chapters in this collection attempt to demonstrate 
the relevance between cultural representations and discourses with the material struggles for economic 
advancement and social powers. Moreover, the existence of differences and differential relations within 
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the Chinese American collectivity, where gender, class, and nation of origin could vary considerably, 
challenges the dominant view that characterized ethnic culture as fixed and homogeneous. Thus the real 
issue explored in this section is the politics and social content of the spatial changes in Chinatown, 
including the manipulation of images and cultural experiences. The contested space of Chinatown 
epitomizes the complex processes in which the constitution of difference and the process of 
differentiation are inscribed in the production of urban space.  
It should be noted that this dissertation refers to Chinatown as the traditional or historic 
Chinatowns in the major cities that have long history of Chinese settlements. It is beyond the scope of the 
dissertation to deal with the many issues raised in other types of emerging Chinatowns such as suburban 
Chinatowns or the satellite Chinatowns where new settlements accommodate the growing and more 
diversified Chinese populations. In addition, the study deliberately resists the strategy of defining the 
Chinatowns through geographical boundaries. Instead, it emphasizes the “core” area, for place 
identification relies on the landmarks located at the historic core of Chinatown.89  
The comparison of multiple sites of Chinatown is justified by the need to understand the diversity 
and variety of the structures and agencies in the constitution of social space of the Chinese community. 
Doreen Massey points to the significance of geographical variation and spatial specificity in the 
construction of social relations.90 I agree with this and have consciously sought to move beyond the 
essentialist characterization in terms of the spatial structure and social relations of the Chinatown, to set 
the ethnic place within the distinct local context in which the ethnic group has been very differentially 
placed in relation to particular economic, social, and political dynamics of the regions and the cities. 
Moreover, the particularity of each Chinatown is reinforced by the fact that Chinese Americans and 
Chinese immigrants of each of the Chinatowns have distinct resources, languages, kinship networks, and 
social traditions with which to respond to the structural changes in the urban economy and society. One of 
the contributions of this research is its empirical examination of the different ways that transnational and 
local changes were and are impacting the everyday landscape of these Chinatowns. 
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Chapter 1: Housing and Spatial Struggles in San Francisco’s Chinatown 
San Francisco was one of the earliest cities to emerge from the immigration waves brought by the 
California Gold Rush of 1849. By 1875, San Francisco had become the largest city on the Pacific Coast 
and benefited from thriving economic activities such as mining, agriculture, fishery, and lumbering in the 
surrounding areas. The city developed fast and financial, wholesale, and retail districts soon emerged in 
the city’s central area . Following the 1906 earthquake and fire, San Francisco experienced its second 
upsurge of growth. After the conflagration destroyed the whole downtown area, the city was rebuilt as a 
new cosmopolitan urban center with modern high-rises. Completion of the Golden Gate and San 
Francisco Bay Bridges in 1937 facilitated the large influx of automobiles and led to the construction of 
parking facilities downtown. After World War II, San Francisco’s third current of development occurred, 
creating a new skyline of International-style high-rises. The growing importance of San Francisco and the 
Bay Area in the trans-Pacific trade and military relations provided a strong stimulus for the city’s postwar 
economic growth.1
With city planners and developers’ strategic efforts to transform a West Coast port into a regional, 
national and international corporate and service center, San Francisco was expanding at a fast pace that 
profoundly influenced the city’s urban-renewal efforts and impelled its transformation. San Francisco has 
historically played a crucial role in Asian trade. As a 1970 Wells Fargo Bank report stated, 
“Geographically, San Francisco is a natural gateway for this country’s ocean-going and air-borne 
commerce with the Pacific area nations… The most important stimulus to San Francisco’s economic base 
has been the increasing U.S. involvement in this century in Asian geopolitics with the concurrent buildup 
in armament production… and large gains in foreign trade.”
 
2 To sustain its supremacy as America’s 
gateway to Asia, especially with rising competition from Los Angeles, San Francisco urgently needed to 
revive its downtown business district which had been neglected due to suburban development. It was also 
important for the city to provide modern office spaces and other related infrastructure to attract the anchor 
of multinational corporations and transnational financial services. 
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One year before the enactment of the 1949 Housing Act, the San Francisco Redevelopment 
Agency (SFRA) was established to assume a strong leadership in the city’s postwar urban renewal 
program. The Agency was compounded with public and private powers, had extensive connections to the 
corporate state, and had relative independence from the local government. But this model of public-
private coalition for urban renewal could not ignore the pressures from corporate representatives. In 1955, 
city business elites united to form the Blyth-Zellerbach Committee, which assumed responsibility for 
providing necessary financial, administrative and other resources for the downtown redevelopment. Using 
Manhattan as their model of development, the committee created the San Francisco Planning and Urban 
Renewal Association (SPUR) to promote a downtown plan calling for more city facilities to 
accommodate the growing needs of tourism and commerce. By the late 1950s a powerful coalition 
launching San Francisco urban redevelopment had come into shape.3 The pro-growth groups were eager 
to find sites for downtown expansion. The Golden Gateway renewal project provided a wedge for the 
downtown eastward expansion, in which office buildings, hotels, and prestigious residential complex 
replaced the city’s large wholesale produce market. The South of Market area, to the south of downtown, 
was regarded as the major area for downtown expansion due to its low land value, low-density land use, 
and largely low-income population. But the expansion (later known as Yerba Buena Center) turned out to 
be a highly controversial project and encountered great resistance from the neighborhoods.4
From1965 to 1983, about 36 million square feet of new office space had been constructed in 
downtown San Francisco. Skyscrapers such as the Bank of America Tower and the Transamerica 
Pyramid significantly transformed the skylines of the city. The downtown expansion and the urban 
landscape transformation revealed some of the most fundamental socio-economic changes of the postwar 
era. To accommodate the nation’s economic shift from a manufacturing to a service industry, San 
Francisco was repositioned in the evolving economy through spatial reorganization and land-use changes. 
As efficient and profitable forms of land use, high-density high-rises became essential for the city to 
prosper in the processes of urban economic restructuring and maintain its central potions in the 
transnational trade. 
  
5   
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While the downtown grew fast, urban redevelopment often occurred at the cost of the extensive 
destruction of old neighborhoods that had been occupied by colored6, low-income, and working-class 
residents generated enormous social problems. During World War II, African Americans came in droves 
to San Francisco, most of them coming to work in the war industry and as military personnel. Then, 
during the 1950s, an influx of Asians arrived under a series of refugee acts and reformed immigration 
laws. With the increasing presence of African, Asian, and Latino populations, San Francisco gradually 
changed into a “city of color.”7
Within such a context, San Francisco’s Chinatown was by no means a “safe island” that could 
escape the impact of downtown expansion. In fact, the ethnic community known as Manilatown that was 
wedged between Chinatown and the Financial District was virtually demolished with the encroachment of 
the Financial District in the 1970s. By examining the interplay of macroeconomic forces, community 
political struggles, and housing needs associated with the spatial struggles in San Francisco’s Chinatown, 
the chapter documents the intricacies of urban renewal as a complex rhetoric at the center of Chinatown’s 
postwar landscape changes. Despite its highly conservative community leadership, Chinatown was able to 
take advantage of the city’s ethnicity-based social movements. To understand the forces created by urban 
redevelopment and racial ideology of the society, it is important to understand the city’s historical 
attempts to remove Chinatown from the city downtown and redevelop it into a commercial and residential 
 To recapture the centrally located neighborhoods occupied by the 
minorities after the Whites moved out, urban renewal was employed as mechanism to reclaim central 
urban spaces and reshape the city’s racial contours. The city found general public support for downtown 
growth. However, as happened elsewhere, the disadvantaged social groups, particularly racial minorities, 
did not benefit but instead became victims of the vigorous urban redevelopment. Thus when the city 
decided to evict residents of the Western Addition and the South Market to tear down the whole blocks of 
the neighborhoods, there were outbursts of resistance. With the eruption of the civil rights movement in 
the city beginning in 1964, the formerly excluded groups gradually procured the rights to participate in 
the political-administrative system and to negotiate the city’s redevelopment projects. Neighborhood 
activism became continuous and unified.  
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area serving wealthy classes. An important moment in this process was the battle against the demolition 
of the International Hotel in Manilatown and its meaning for the Chinatown community. Through 
examining some of the community struggles and conflicts that occurred in the 1970s, the chapter 
examines the role of agents in the city and community level, including individuals and social groups.  
 
The Chinatown Community and the Chinese 
When the City of San Francisco was established in 1848, the Chinese had settled in an area around 
Portsmouth Plaza, the hub of the city at that time. Most of the Chinese were brought to America as 
contract laborers to supply California gold mining companies with a reliable supply of cheap labors. 
Although they came voluntarily, many had to pay for passage across the Pacific by selling their limited 
property or by borrowing at exorbitant interest rates. These early Chinese immigrants were considered 
sojourners who had no intention of staying, but hoped to seek their fortune in America so that they could 
bring it back to China to retire to a wealthy life. With the increasing presence of the Chinese, Chinatown 
gradually came into shape at the beginning of the 1850s and was soon recognized as a distinct 
neighborhood in the city.  
The Chinatown was not a major residential settlement at that time, as eighty percent of the 
Chinese in California lived in the mining areas. Instead, it served as a provision station for the workers in 
the gold mines and later in agricultural and railroad sites.8 The form of the Chinese Quarter was not the 
result of deliberate planning but rather a series of voluntary and involuntary adaptations for the 
convenience of Chinese seasonal laborers working in other areas and to accommodate the large demand 
of domestic workers in the nearby harbors and hotels. In the years after the U.S. Civil War, anti-Chinese 
movement was aroused by labor disputes in California, which forced thousands of Chinese who lived 
outside San Francisco’s “Chinese quarter” to relocate to Chinatown for protection. The influx of Chinese 
laborers from mining, agriculture, and railroad sites caused severe overcrowding and sanitation problems. 
Instead of a transitional station, the Chinese Quarter became a more permanent living area with the poor 
conditions of a slum.9 
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Because Chinese could not own land due to the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, the Chinese had to 
take long-term leases and pay high rents to settle in the Chinatown area. As a historically urban ethnic 
ghetto, Chinatown was known for its over-crowdedness, dilapidated housing, and lack of amenities. The 
San Francisco Municipal Report 1884 – 1885 indicated that the streets and residences of Chinatown were 
“filthy in the extreme,” and attributed the unpleasant physical conditions to the “peculiar habits” of the 
Chinese themselves.10 It suggested that the residents of Chinatown should be placed under “constant 
watching and close supervision” to make them “adopt somewhat better habits and become less 
obnoxious… as well as a lesser source of danger to the public health.”11 Responding to the anti-Chinese 
sentiment, the City government made several attempts to remove Chinatown from its original location. In 
1853, the local newspaper identified Dupont Street of Chinatown (later renamed Grant Avenue) as the 
“most desirable in the city for retail stores and family residences,” and suggested the Chinese area should 
“be farther… from the heart of the city.”12
In 1882, the City Board of Supervisors recommended that the Chinese be moved to governmental 
reservations (perhaps with the nation’s policy toward native Americans as a model), or settled in a tent 
city near the city cemetery under police surveillance. 
  
13 The Chinatown quarantine in 1900 and the 
accusation of Chinatown as “a hazard to public health” further confirmed the government’s determination 
to take “the shame of the city” off the city map.14 The removal crisis was ended with the appeal of the 
Chinese to the federal government and the federal district court, which decided that the obligation was 
unconstitutional.15 However, as argued by David Sibley, “disease metaphors were characteristic of 
nineteenth-century scientific discourse which attempted to harness scientific knowledge in support of 
racist myths.”16 Such minority groups were associated with social disorder, inferiority and pollution, and 
were held in contrast with the White majority that was associated with order, virtue, and purity. In this 
way, power was naturalized or concealed as a system of meanings and values rooted in White hegemonic 
culture.17 The fear of infection, and the idea of a contagious disease spreading from a deviant or racialized 
minority to threatening the well-being of the normal majority, legitimated the erection of the social or 
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physical barricades to exclude the marginalized others.18 This rhetoric of disease, unfortunately, also 
called upon in the processes of dispossession and dislocation in the interests of dominant groups.19
Originally a center of Chinese business, by 1877 Chinatown had become a rigidly segregated 
community with its core set within the fifteen blocks, from Pacific Avenue at the north, California Street 
at the south, Stockton at the west, to Kearny Street at the east (figure 4).
   
20
 
 The hub of the Chinese Quarter 
 
Figure 4: The dark area shows the core area of San Francisco’s Chinatown, which had more than 90 
percent Chinese population according to the 1970 census account. (Graphic by author, based on the GIS 
data provided by the San Francisco City government at 
http://gispub02.sfgov.org/website/sfshare/index2.asp)  
 
was located on Sacramento Street, or Tong Yen Gai (Street of the Chinese People), with stores spread 
along Sacramento Street between Dupont and Kearny Streets, which constituted the early social, 
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commercial and recreational center of the Chinatown.21 Among the 930 buildings in Chinatown, 30 
percent were retail stores, 20 percent lodges, 18 percent light manufacturing industries, 11 percent 
prostitution houses, 10 percent gambling houses, 7 percent services, 2 percent opium resorts, and 1 
percent joss houses.22 As a bachelor society dominated by male laborers, Chinatown was decidedly 
associated with disease and immorality for its opium use, gang warfare, and prostitution. But this was 
partly the result of the city’s own zoning practices because the city allowed brothels to thrive only in 
Chinatown and the neighboring Barbary Coast. Thus the negative stereotypes of the Chinese were 
entrenched through wide broadcasting of accounts of Chinatown vice, which was located in that area by 
the city’s own design.23
The social, economic, and political transformations of the postwar era significantly impacted the 
development of the Chinatown. In 1943, the United States repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act, and in 
1965 the institution of the Immigration and Nationality Act abolished Asian quotas. From 1940 to 1970, 
Chinatown’s population increased about 25 percent per decade and propelled the expansion of 
Chinatown.
 After the 1906 earthquake and fire, a new Chinatown was rebuilt with conscious 
efforts to reestablish its reputation and appeal to the western public.     
24 Based on the 1970 census, the Department of City Planning defined a core and noncore area 
of Chinatown. Core Chinatown includes a 17-block area bounded by Kearny, Pacific, Powell, and 
California Streets, with a concentration of restaurants, stores, and residential units. The noncore area of 
Chinatown consisted of ten census tracks, mostly residential areas. The low-income ethnic enclave then, 
and today, is surrounded by the upper-income, largely White neighborhoods and the expanding Financial 
District (figure 5). The Financial District to the south side of Chinatown has high-rises that are visually 
distinct from the medium-height buildings in Chinatown. Sandwiched between the expensive 
neighborhoods of North Beach and Russian Hill to the north and Nob Hill to the south, the plainness of 
the apartment buildings of Chinatown vividly contrast with the high-quality, more splendid  architecture 
in the surrounding neighborhoods.   
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Figure 5: Chinatown is located at the central area of the city and is encircled by upper-income 
neighborhoods such as Russian Hill, Nob Hill, North Beach and the Financial District on the southeast 
side (Graphic by author, based on the GIS data provided by the San Francisco City government at 
http://gispub02.sfgov.org/website/sfshare/index2.asp).  
 
 
Grant Avenue, popularly considered the most characteristic street of Chinatown, is lined with 
Chinese decorative details such as ornate lanterns, ornamental architectural rooflines, and bright colors 
(figure 6). Not only is it the major corridor to and through Chinatown, but its thriving commercial 
activities oriented to tourists made it a culturally distinct district. Gift shops and restaurants are among the 
most popular businesses on the street. Even though the land values of this street are among the highest of 
the city, unlike its nearby financial district with high-rise office buildings, the buildings on Grant Avenue 
are mostly three- to four-storied structures with a few exceptions of high rises Local residents find their 
everyday needs met on Stockton Street, which runs parallel to Grant. The food markets, shops, restaurants, 
jewelry stores line the vibrant streets alongside post offices, banks, and professional offices. With many 
of the store frontages opening directly to the sidewalk, the street becomes a lively social space that both 
visually and physically connects to the shops.    
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Figure 6: View of Grant Avenue in San Francisco’s Chinatown, ca. 2007 (Photo by author)  
                                 
Perceived as “a City within a City,” the Chinatown contains the essential elements of a lively city, 
including commerce, light manufacturing, schools, religious institutions, parks and public and private 
residential buildings. Nowadays, in addition to the central area contained within Grant Avenue, Bush, 
Kearny, Broadway and Powell Street, the “City” of Chinatown has its “suburbs” extended to Van Ness, 
North Beach, Parts of Russian Hill and Telegraph Hill. Other sectors of San Francisco such as Sunset, 
Richmond, Mission, Diamond Heights, Bernal Heights, are satellite areas of the Chinatown.25 Despite the 
growth of suburban or satellite Chinatown, the historic Chinatown still serves as “capital city” for the 
larger Chinese American community for the entire Bay Area and beyond, as it is a shopping hub for 
Chinese goods and a socio-cultural center for services and Chinese institutions.26
  
 
The 1906 Earthquake 
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When the 1906 earthquake and fire occurred, many San Franciscans believed the destruction was 
an opportunity to erase the vice and filth of the Chinese community (figure 7). As the Overland Monthly 
proclaimed, “Fire has reclaimed to civilization and cleanliness the Chinese ghetto, and no Chinatown will 
be permitted in the borders of the city. It seems as though a divine wisdom directed the range of the 
seismic horror and the range of the fire god. Wisely, the worst was cleared away with the best.”27 The city 
authorities planned to grasp the opportunity to take over the land of Chinatown and rebuild it a White 
neighborhood and a city commercial center (figure 8). The City Relief Committee, composed of fifty 
prominent city residents, suggested that Hunter’s Point on the southeast corner of the city would be an 
ideal location for the future Chinatown (figure 9). Even though the city worked hard to realize the 
 
Figure 7: Grant Avenue (also known as Dupont Street) of Chinatown, north of California Street, ca.1906 
(Source: San Francisco Public Library) 
 
relocation plan, the proposal was vigorously resisted by the Chinese residents, who insisted upon moving 
back to their old quarters. The resistance was successful in many respects. First, Chinatown at that time 
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had already proved itself an important economic asset to the City. In addition to property taxes and poll 
taxes, the import duties paid by the Chinese was also impressive, amounting to one third of the total 
import duties earned by the city by 1906.28 Meanwhile Chinatown business  prospered by attracting 
tourists from all over the world and by virtue of its pivotal position in Chinese communities across North 
America. The economic benefits of Chinatown were apparent to many. When San Francisco threatened to 
remove Chinatown, other coastal cities such as Los Angeles, Seattle, and Oakland expressed their 
willingness to receive the Chinese refugees. The opportunistic attitude of these cities was one factor that 
undermined the determination of the City of San Francisco to expel the Chinese from their original 
neighborhood.   
 
Figure 8: A proposed plan for remodeling Chinatown along Grant Avenue, ca.1900 (Source: The Society 
of California Pioneers). 
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Figure 9: Locations of Chinatown and Hunter’s Point ((Graphic by author, based on the map provided by 
the City and County of San Francisco in 2009).  
 
In resisting the city’s imposed relocation plan, the Chinese allied with the White property owners 
of Chinatown to lobby for the reconstruction of Chinatown on its original site. The support from the 
White owners of Chinatown properties was fundamentally driven by economic interest, because the 
landlords were afraid their lands might be expropriated if a new development plan was proposed on the 
area. With the damage already incurred to their properties in the earthquake and fire, they were reluctant 
to confront another financial risk. In addition, the Chinese were ideal tenants. They never complained 
about the dilapidated conditions of the buildings that had been poorly maintained, and they paid as much 
as twice the rent as compared to the average rent of the region.29 The White property owners took 
advantage of the discriminatory racial policies and spatial regulations to exploit the Chinese tenants for 
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significant economic gains. Thus it was in their own interest that they took the side of the Chinese to fight 
against the relocation proposal. But the alliance between the Chinese and the White property owners also 
suggested that the Chinese had become more political astute; they organized themselves on the principals 
of self-determination but also by actively engaging with all possible allies  regardless of motivation. 
Although the interracial coalition was instable and situational, built up on a contingent need of 
representation, it transcended long-standing racial barriers.  
In addition to the economic importance of Chinatown for the city, the transnational networks 
retained by the community also played a central role in protecting the community from removal.  The 
enactment of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act had provoked the anger of all Chinese towards the unequal 
treatment of Chinese immigrants in America. At the same time a nation-wide boycott of American goods 
in China greatly damaged the trade economy of the United States. Thus when the 1906 earthquake 
occurred in San Francisco, the U.S. government hoped that by demonstrating its care for the affected 
Chinese residents, diplomatic relations with China would be repaired. Thus, President Theodore 
Roosevelt sent a message to San Francisco’s civic leaders, insisting upon equal treatment of the Chinese 
in the relief after the earthquake and fire. With this kind of attention, the Chinese community rose in 
political and economic importance. In addition, the Chinese ambassador also proclaimed his concerns 
over the proposed relocation plan. With an eye toward the future economic and political interests of San 
Francisco, the city authorities finally decided to give up the relocation plan of Chinatown.  
The efforts of the city to remove Chinatown reflected the desire of the city institutions to secure 
dominance through socio-spatial control of minority groups. Confronting the crisis of removal, however, 
the political community of the Chinese Diaspora was nurtured and gained institutional status, and this in 
turn enabled it to renegotiate relations with the local city government. In addition to the specific political-
economic conditions of the Chinese in the San Francisco, the success of the Chinese in the relocation 
campaign had also to do with the “deterritorialized nationhood” that was constructed by the cultural 
logics, filial piety, and enduring loyalty of the overseas Chinese to their home country.30 Through 
nationalist discourse and cultural solidarity, the mistreatment of the Chinese migrants in the United States 
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was translated into a political dispute in the context of transnationality. Empowered by their far-reaching 
network and cross-border citizenship, the Chinese migrants anchored their local political activities in the 
transnational political interconnectivity that was meanwhile dynamic and contingent.   
 
Housing and Recreational Crisis 
Since the end of the nineteenth century, San Francisco’s Chinatown has been known for its 
substandard housing and crowded living environment. According to a report conducted by U.S. Congress 
Housing Committee in 1948, “The great majority of them (the Chinese) live crowded together in rickety 
and dilapidated tenement houses… Apartments which would be deemed small for the accommodation of 
a single American are occupied by 6, 8, or 10 Chinese.”31 The report suggested that several reasons 
contributed to the housing problems in Chinatown: predominant bachelor populations with sojourner 
mentality, the growth of family population, racial segregation and restrictive covenants, geographic 
constrains for Chinatown expansion, dilapidated buildings not complying with city code, and lack of 
sanitary facilities in the tenement buildings.32 After World War II, the housing situation in Chinatown 
only worsened, but new repressive restrictions were imposed to protect the surrounding, wealthier areas 
from receiving the undesirable overflow. A permanent injunction issued by Superior Judge James Conlan 
barred the Chinese from occupying apartment houses on Nob Hill where owners signed a compact in 
1932 restricting the area to Caucasians. Nob Hill has historically been an expensive, exclusive, and 
largely White neighborhood that is located at the southeast side of the Chinatown. In April 1946, 
seventeen White property owners on Nob Hill Clay Street between Mason and Taylor Streets filed a 
lawsuit barring a Chinese woman, Mabel Tseng, from occupancy. Tseng had bought an apartment house 
in an area covered by the restrictive agreement. The other property owners complained that Tseng not 
only lived at the apartment house she owned, but also rented apartments to Chinese tenants. Judge Conlan 
granted an injunction which upheld the racially restrictive covenants, declaring “this agreement is not a 
violation of the 14th Amendment” of the Constitution.33 His decision prevented the possible expansion of 
the overcrowded Chinatown.  
 43 
The arrival of GI brides brought a sudden increase of Chinatown population while the repeal of 
the discriminatory immigration law in 1965 also facilitated a major influx of Chinese immigrants. With 
the tremendous increase of the immigrant population and constricted boundaries of Chinatown, the 
deficiency of housing became an urgent problem faced by the city government and community 
institutions. Many Chinatown residents lived in bad conditions. For instance, according to the 1965 
Community Renewal Programming Report, 77 percent of the dwellings in San Francisco’s Chinatown-
North Beach area were designated as substandard or seriously substandard.34 This was partly because 
Chinatown was the most densely populated area of San Francisco; there were from 120 to 179.9 persons 
per gross acre compared to 24.6 persons city-wide.35
In Chinatown, the community bathroom is a virtual way of life… 60 percent of the housing 
lack separate bathrooms… Another facility that is commonly shared in many Chinatown 
apartments is the kitchen; that is, if a resident is fortunate to have such a facility… Depending 
on the building and its location, 50 to 100 people may have to be served from one common 
kitchen… In some apartments where heat is lacking, the (cook) stoves serve also to heat the 
deficient buildings in cold weather… Apartments in Chinatown are deficient in the lack of 
natural and in many cases of proper artificial lighting…
 In a study presented to the Chinatown-North Beach 
Economic Opportunity Commission, Chinatown housing was described as following:  
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The 1970 census classified some 13.4 percent of Chinatown’s housing as overcrowded, and about a 
quarter of the Chinatown population lived in this kind of overcrowding. The density of 1.01 or more 
persons per room was three and a half times higher than the city’s proportion of overcrowded units to 
total housing stock.37
In 1939, the United States Housing Authority (USHA) had provided $1,365,000 for the Chinatown to 
build low-income housing, but because the high cost of land in Chinatown exceeded the federal standard, 
the project was deferred. At the urging of the San Francisco Junior Chamber of Commerce, the local 
housing authority, and the Chinatown community organizations, funds from the city were appropriated to 
purchase two-and-a-half acres of land in three separate lots in Chinatown in 1941. The housing project 
known as Ping Yuen (Tranquil Garden) Housing, which is located on Pacific Avenue and has 234 living 
units, remained an important source of affordable housing for the community, despite controversies 
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regarding segregated occupancy of the Chinese American residents (figure 10).38 North Ping 
 
Figure 10: Ping Yuan Housing Project on Pacific Avenue, ca. 2007 (Photo by author)  
 
Yuen, added later, is a building of 11 stories and 194 units, most of which are dedicated to senior housing. 
Although the construction of Ping Yuen provided low-income housing, the demand continued to be 
overwhelming.  There was a long waiting list of individuals and families waiting for a rare vacancy at the 
Ping Yuen. Among the about 700 Chinese applications for the city public housing in 1968, nearly all were 
for units in Ping Yuen. In 1969, the number of Chinese applicants increased to 900 while the number of 
available public housing units remained unchanged.39
The residents of Chinatown would not or could not look elsewhere for housing, because the ethnic 
enclave provided them with a sense of physical safety and social security. The fear of social isolation 
because of language and cultural difference was one of the major reasons that the Chinese wanted to stay 
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in Chinatown. Also, in Chinatown they lived within walking distance of workplace, residence, shopping, 
educational facilities, banking services, hospital, and other community services, a feature that appealed to 
immigrants who could not afford a car and relied on public transportation systems for commuting. 
Because of high demand, rents for private housing in Chinatown increased dramatically. From 
1960 to 1970, the median rent nearly doubled, and from 1970 to 1972, costs increased a further 50 
percent.40 The 1970 Census showed that units with rental price higher than $100 increased about three 
times, while units rented at less than $100 decreased by 62.4 percent.  The Chinatown area had a higher 
percentage of rental units compared to the rest of the city. In 1970, 83.1 percent of housing was renter-
occupied compared with 63.8 percent elsewhere in the city. However, compared to 1960, the number of 
renter-occupied units decreased by 3.8 percent, while the owner-occupied units increased by 13.4 
percent.41 The Chinese eligible to purchase flats or small apartments in the Chinatown or the North Beach 
not only were burdened with high mortgage rates but had to pay prices above market value, an insidious 
form of discrimination that discouraged home ownership.42
The growing population of San Francisco’s Chinatown was generally considered a key factor 
responsible for the worsened living conditions in Chinatown. However, despite the fast growth of 
Chinatown in the decade following WWII, in the next decade (1960 to 1970) the population grew only 
1.8 percent (from 55,091 to 56,013).
 Thus the private housing market was not able 
to meet the needs for low- and even moderate-income families; only Chinese families with high incomes 
could participate.  
43  The most significant demographic changes were those of  age, 
gender, and household composition. Accordingly, between 1960 and 1970 the age group between 15 and 
24 increased 84 percent, and young adults then comprised 17.6 percent of the Chinatown’s total 
population. The number of senior Chinese residents also increased 16.5 percent, comprising 14.4 percent 
of the population. Meanwhile, the ratio between male and female residents tended to be more balanced, 
and the family population increased 5.8 percent.44 Thus attributing the housing crisis in the 1960s and 70s 
only to the increasing number of Chinese immigrants was not entirely accurate. A more important factor 
causing housing shortage in the Chinatown was the polarization of the population between the young and 
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old, who earned less income than adults in their middle years, combined with the shrinking amount of 
available housing stock.   
During the 1960s, around 1,442 housing units were lost in San Francisco’s Chinatown, a decline 
of 5 percent. The lost of housing units was more severe at the core area of Chinatown, where a 14.2 
percent decrease of available housing units was recorded. 45  As the 1970 Chinatown Census concluded, 
the loss of housing units was worst in tracts having a high concentration of low-income residents, while 
the higher-income residential areas gained.46 The 1,590 new housing units in the adjoining neighborhoods 
of Chinatown such as Russian Hill and Northern Waterfront areas were all aimed at upper-income and 
high-middle income populations, which did not alleviate Chinatown’s primary housing crisis.47
In addition to a severe housing shortage, the lack of recreational spaces was also a great concern to 
the community. According to a study conducted by the students of University of California, Berkeley in 
1969, the funds appropriated for recreational purposes in Chinatown by the city’s Park and Recreational 
Department ranked among the lowest per capita during the years from 1961 to 1969. Chinatown’s limited 
public recreation spaces included the Chinese playground (0.58 acres) built in 1927, the Chinese 
Recreational Center (0.55 acres) from the 1950s, and the historic Portsmouth Square (1.21 acres). 
 
Commercial developments also replaced some of the housing. For instance, the southeastern corner of 
San Francisco’s Chinatown, a former residential space, was replaced by office buildings, parking lots, and 
other revenue-generating developments in the 1970s.    
48 These 
recreation spaces were far from sufficient for the 9,124 people living at the core area of Chinatown in 
1970. Regardless, a group of Chinese developers formed a company known as the City of San Francisco 
Waverly Parking Plaza Corporation in 1966, aiming to develop a parking lot to replace the Chinese 
playground. The corporation proposed to build a nine-story underground parking garage with a small park 
on the top, declaring that the plan would alleviate the prevailing parking problems and would improve the 
recreational facilities of the playground, which had been worn out due to the lack of maintenance. 
However, concerned community members opposed the plan by asking for whom the garage was intended, 
given that few of the residents in Chinatown’s the core owned automobiles.49 With the congested 
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conditions of Chinatown, they argued that a new parking lot would bring more traffic into the community, 
which would worsen the traffic congestion and raise safety problems for the residents, especially for the 
young children. In addition, replacing a playground with a park that would be furnished with grass 
surface, walkways, and benches failed to meet the community’s urgent needs for active outdoor 
playgrounds for the growing number of Chinese youths.50
The entire Chinatown/North Beach area had only 10 square feet of outdoor recreation space per 
person, which was much lower than the average city standards of 90 square feet per person. The lack of 
ground-level residential space and yard space, narrow and congested streets and alleys, as well as the 
steep topography of the Chinatown made public recreation space a critical need.
   
51
To address the housing and recreation space crisis in San Francisco’s Chinatown, the San 
Francisco Department of City Planning conducted the “Chinatown 701 Study” in 1970. The Study’s aim 
was to develop workable programs to resolve the pressing needs for more housing and recreation space in 
the community. One of its objectives was to increase the standard housing stock for low- and moderate-
income households in the Chinatown/North Beach area through facilitating new construction and 
rehabilitation of old buildings. Though the study was well intended, its success was limited by the 
government’s dominant agenda promoting urban growth.   
 The scarce of the 
outdoor recreation space thus posed severe dilemmas for the community’s social health.  
 
Urban Renewal and the International Hotel Controversy   
Although the postwar urban renewal in no way could compare with the impact of the 1906 
Chinatown relocation plan on the ideological and physical transformation of Chinese community, it 
followed a similar process of exclusion. During the rapid urban renewal of the 1960s and 70s, about 30 
million square feet of office buildings were erected in San Francisco, most of them in the downtown area. 
A series of headquarters such as the Wells Fargo Bank Building (1966), America World Headquarters 
(1969), and Transamerica Pyramid (1972) symbolized the formation of a new downtown. By the mid-
1970s, San Francisco had become the second largest U.S. center of international commerce and finance, 
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and its ratio of office space to population ranked as one of the highest in the country. The demography 
changed correspondingly from blue-collar to the professional, managerial, and other so-called white-
collar workers. The “Manhattanization” of San Francisco was accelerated by the city’s desire to maintain 
its central position in the cross-Pacific trade and also to participate fully in the nation’s corporate 
capitalism.52 While the urban renewal movement upgraded the city’s infrastructures, it unfortunately also 
led to the demolition of low-income housing causing the massive displacement of the poor. For instance, 
the federally aided urban redevelopment program totally transformed some neighborhoods such as 
Western Addition and South of Market, from which low-income Black and Asian residents were removed 
to make a way for “higher and better uses”53 serving capitalist development. Chester Hartman has 
observed that “by and large it has been the city’s low-income and third-world population and its blue-
collar workers who have been uprooted and evicted for the benefit of those with larger bank accounts, 
more political clout, and lighter skins.”54
One of these neighborhoods was Manilatown, located at Kearny Street. Manilatown was 
dismantled when the cheap hotels in the enclave were demolished as part of urban renewal. Under the 
rubric of “slum clearance” and “blight removal,” the city redevelopment groups aggressively captured as 
much downtown land as they could. Among the important moments of San Francisco urban movements, 
the protest of the demolition of the International Hotel (I-Hotel) in Manilatown was engraved in the 
history. The hotel was claimed as the last remaining building of Manilatown. Located at the intersection 
of Kearney and Jackson Streets, near the northeast edge of San Francisco’s Chinatown, the three-story, 
150-room residential hotel was built in 1854 and rebuilt in 1907 after it fell in the earthquake (figure 11). 
 Thus, urban renewal in San Francisco was conducted with the 
hidden cost paid by the underclass for the benefit of others. How to make the land more productive was 
the major concern for the city planners. The old hotels and tenement buildings that housed retired miners, 
railroad workers, or seamen became obstacles to “progress,” condemned to be demolished to make a way 
for modern structures. Increased property tax, land values, and higher rents led to a coherent pattern of 
exclusion under the name of urban renewal. Through these socio-spatial strategies, the city became less 
livable for the poor and racial minorities.  
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In the 1920s, the hotel became a home base for Filipino manongs (older brothers) and Chinese men who 
worked as seasonal workers. But in 1946, the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association 
proposed a plan for neighborhood urban renewal that aimed to eliminate urban blight by demolishing 
such structures. This meant that by the late 1960s Manilatown had been gradually replaced with profitable 
high-rise office buildings, although the hotel itself lingered. The need for parking lot and other 
commercial endeavors also drove people out and caused the demolition of low-rent hotels.  
 
Figure 11: View of the International Hotel on the left, undated. Note the introduction of another form of 
exoticism in the Islamic-style café next door, with horseshoe arches, bulbous domes, and slim “minarets.” 
(Source: Manila Heritage Foundation) 
 
In 1968, Milton Meyer and Company bought the I-Hotel under the management of real estate 
magnate Walter Shorenstein in order to build a multilevel parking garage at the site to alleviate the 
parking problem of the expanding Financial District. In the name of “getting rid of a slum” the company 
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sent eviction notices to the hotel tenants. According to the Examiner, one of the key factors in the 
decision to demolish the hotel was its low profitability.55 Most tenants of the hotel were single retired 
farmworkers and seamen who could barely speak English and lived on social security retirement benefits 
of between $90 and $200 per month, which was much lower than the average social security retirement 
benefits of the nation. Rents stayed at $50 per month before the hotel was torn down, and the manager 
asserted that the hotel had barely made any profits. For its $80,000 annual income from the 115 rooms 
and 10 commercial units, half went to Milton Meyer, $25,000 paid for property tax, $15,000 for 
insurance, and the rest spent for other expenses such as utilities and maintenance.56
The tenants organized the United Filipino Association (UFA) to fight against the eviction, 
declaring the I-Hotel as “the last outpost” of the once bustling Manilatown. This was actually a battle of 
the Filipino American minority to protect their identity and civil rights, and their struggle also indicated 
the political empowerment and insurgent citizenship of Asian Americans as participants in the larger the 
civil rights movement. In 1969, the UFA successfully obliged the hotel owner to sign a three-year lease 
with the existing tenants, a triumph of a wide-range coalition of individuals, private organizations, and 
civic institutions that had fought to protect the I-Hotel. However, soon after the lease was signed, a 
suspicious fire occurred, killing three tenants and destroying the north wing of the building.  After the 
fire, Shorenstein cancelled the new lease agreement, but under the pressure from the city and the general 
public, he eventually agreed to a new lease, in which the tenants would be responsible for rehabilitation of 
the building and bringing it up to code. The renovation of the I-Hotel depended on volunteer groups that 
included church groups, University of California -Berkeley students from the Third World Strike and 
other students, the American Jewish Congress, and individuals who were sympathetic to the plight of the 
hotel tenants.
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In 1972 when the three-year lease was due, the International Hotel Tenants Association (IHTA), 
which had replaced UFA, requested three promises from Shorenstein: that “the International Hotel be 
maintained, and will continue to be designated as low-income housing; a “reasonable and human” lease 
be drawn up with the tenants group; there be no further demolition of Shorenstein-owned, low-income 
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Filipino housing until other such housing is available in the area.”58 Shorenstein agreed to postpone 
demolition of the I-Hotel but then in 1974 sold the hotel to the Four Seas Investment Corporation owned 
by investors based in Bangkok and Hong Kong. After taking over the building, the new owner received a 
Superior Court order requiring the I-Hotel be refurbished to comply with city housing, plumbing, building 
and electrical codes or be razed. Instead the Four Seas decided to vacate the building within a month. 
According to the City’s chief building inspector, the hotel only needed electrical work. The Four Seas, 
however, insisted on evicting the tenants.59 In response to the eviction, the controversy revolving around 
the hotel six years ago once again raged around the city. With public support, the hotel tenants refused to 
leave and placed a sign declaring “We Won’t Move” at the hotel’s entrance way. Since the Four Sea 
Company also acquired another property on the same block as the I-Hotel, the public suspected the 
investment company was using the City Code to justify the eviction of the tenants, in order to make a way 
for a redevelopment project on the site. In October, 1974, the IHTA organized the tenants to protest in 
Chinatown and demanded the new owner to lift the eviction notice, repair the hotel, sign a long-term 
lease, and give the tenants an option to buy the building. Their requests achieved support from the City’s 
Human Rights Commission, which called for a long-term agreement that would keep the hotel for low-
rent housing and community services. However, the request didn’t receive support from the city or the 
investment company.60
In 1975, the Four Seas formally filed an application for a demolition permit for the I-Hotel and 
proposed to build a Far East Trade Center at the site. Despite all the opposition and protest, the city 
officials approved the application. The IHTA fought back by taking their cases to the Board of Permit 
Appeals. In March 1976, The City Permit Appeals Board held a public hearing meeting, in which 
representatives from Chinatown organizations and other supporting groups vigorously denounced the 
worsening housing conditions of the area resulting from the expansion of the Financial District. The 
representatives of the Four Seas, however, emphasized the “horrible” conditions of the building and the 
urgent need for property improvement. A flurry of lawsuits ensued, with several eviction dates set and 
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lifted. The Board of Supervisors eventually agreed to allocate $1.3 million to buy the I-Hotel, but a judge 
later ruled that the city had no right to buy the hotel and sell it back to the tenants. 61
Overwhelmed with the pressure of eviction, many elderly Filipino and Chinese tenants started to 
move out of the I-Hotel. By 1976, only 80 of the 130 tenants remained. By the time a new eviction date 
was set for December 15, 1976, the I-Hotel had become a rallying point for tenants and their supporters to 
form a human barricade around the building to prevent eviction. Fearing violence, the judge reprieved the 
order of eviction. On June 17, 1977, the I-Hotel was enlisted as the National Register of Historic Places 
because the hotel had been a cultural center for Filipino American and Filipino immigrants in the 1920s 
and made its name by housing the famous “hungry I” nightclub where many entertainment stars launched 
their career. The national landmark status would provide tax disincentives for the owners, require an 
environmental impact report to be submitted before demolition, and allow matching Federal grants and 
special tax incentives for the building restoration. Despite the nomination, the I-Hotel tenants were 
removed from the building on August 3, 1977. More than 1,000 angry supporters sought to prevent the 
eviction by forming a human barricade, but SWAT teams forcefully broke down the barrier. Within 36 
hours, the last tenant had been removed. 
  
The I-Hotel was eventually demolished by the end of 1977. However, the controversy remained 
more than a political statement for the elderly Filipino and Chinese tenants. Underlying the issue was the 
desperate shortage of low-income housing in the downtown area and the city’s insensitive response to that 
need.62 The “Manhattanization” and the urban renewal of San Francisco took the land and housing from 
the poor and the minority groups, to fulfill the needs of corporation expansion. But there was pushback 
because the struggle to save the I-Hotel galvanized Asian American activists to engage in “what would 
become a symbolic fight against capitalism and the plight of urban removal.”63 It was also a fight against 
racial discrimination. With the rising civil right movement, Asian Americans—like other disempowered 
minority groups-- had become a political group who coalesced to fight for their civil rights and citizenship. 
As Holston and Appadurai suggest, cities play a crucial role in renegotiating the notion of citizenship and 
insurgent identities. The authors define the distinction between formal and substantive citizenship and 
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argue that the material particularities of citizen have been incorporated into political representation and 
the citizen’s accessibility to substantive rights of citizenship. The disadvantaged social groups with 
distinguishing identities demand difference-specific citizenship that respects their “authentic needs and 
interests” and their rights to equal opportunity. By demanding the substantive citizenship to pursue their 
ideology of equality, the marginalized groups challenge the principle role of formal citizenship that has 
been used to coordinating and managing modern social identities.64 Holston and Appadurai also argue 
that violence is a form of social action and that transition to democracy brings its own forms of violence 
that  includes “a sustained expansion of political and socioeconomic rights for the urban poor.”65 Thus the 
violent confrontation at the I-Hotel was an insurgent social action for the Asian American minority to 
challenge the hegemonic form of urban renewal. They fought for their substantive citizenship which 
would respect their differences and specific social, cultural, and economic needs. These kinds of social 
movement of the urban poor and minority also create new sources of citizenship that engender new 
notions of membership, entitlement, community, and a new transnational politics.66
Not only the Chinese living in San Francisco’s Chinatown, but also Chinese immigrants in other 
cities showed their sympathy and support toward the I-Hotel tenants. They perceived the fight as “the 
struggle of all Chinese who are forced to live in ghettoes like Chinatown” and the “resistance to 
discrimination and oppression” of the exploitable cheap labor.
     
67 Many residents in San Francisco’s 
Chinatown participated in the I-Hotel fight. Accompanied with the long existing discontentment to “over-
priced, over-crowded, over-rotten slums the landlords created” in San Francisco’s Chinatown, the 
residents provided tremendous support to the I-Hotel battle.68
With the gradual demolition of Manilatown, Chinatown which was located near to Manilatown, 
was also threatened by the downtown expansion. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, some 1,700 
housing units in Chinatown were converted to office use, while a flux of overseas Asian capital boosted 
 In New York’s Chinatown, donations and 
petitions gave the I-Hotel groups financial and political support. The I-Hotel struggle inspired the 
residents of San Francisco’s Chinatown to fight gentrification, housing discrimination, and urban 
removal. In a larger sense, it also was a catalyst for Asian American activism nationwide.  
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the commercial and residential rents to a new height and drove small scale merchants and residents out of 
the neighborhood.69 This had a profound impact on the many Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans 
who lived in Chinatown. There were 24,813 Chinese living in the Chinatown area in 1950, and in 1960 
the number increased to 36,445.70 Most of the Chinese residents had modest incomes and relied on 
Chinatown businesses to make a living. In the core Chinatown, nearly 97 percent of the residents were 
renters; even in the noncore area renters were consisted more than half of the population.71
However, unlike Manilatown which gradually ran down as the early majongs aged, Chinatown 
thrived, transforming from a bachelor society to a family-oriented community after WWII. Its particular 
socio-economic conditions and land use patterns helped protect it from state-imposed urban 
redevelopment projects and sustained its very survival. The land values in the heart of Chinatown were 
extremely high and were comparable to the adjoining financial district. In 1972, land costs of the 
Chinatown core area ranged from $40 to $60 per square foot, and even in the extended area of Chinatown, 
the costs were still high, ranging from $15 to $30.
 Since they 
didn’t own the land they lived on, they could not even realize a quick profit from the real estate values 
due to gentrification. The uncontrolled development threatened to turn the community into a commercial 
tourist area, at the cost of displacing low-income Chinese immigrants and elderly.   
72  Although the inhabitants paid for this in the form of 
high rent, the elevated values also protected them by making it very expensive to acquire land for 
redevelopment. In addition, the original land-use patterns of Chinatown consisted of small and 
fragmented parcels, which made it extremely difficult to assemble a decent size of land for 
redevelopment. The small parcels in Chinatown were usually owned by a group of people according to a 
complicated ownership system – known in Chinese as Hui – whereby properties are acquired collectively 
by family or clan associations, and then profits are shared among the members. Thus, to purchase a parcel 
of land, a developers typically had to get consensus from the association members. Another factor 
preventing Chinatown from outside encroachment was its dense concentration of residential population, 
which posed a dilemma for redevelopment because of the burden of tenant relocation. The California 
Community Redevelopment Act of 1945 stated that clearances and redevelopment of deteriorated districts 
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would be approved only when adequate permanent housing was provided for displaced families with rents 
comparable to their previous housing. Thus the high congregation of residential units and the 
overcrowded conditions of the tenement housing precluded some of the new developments in the 
Chinatown.  
Although the particular social structure and land-use pattern of the Chinatown were key factors in 
preventing the intrusion of large scale redevelopment projects, they also presented obstacles for the 
community to get low-income housing. Most importantly, the high cost that discouraged developers from 
buying land in Chinatown also made Chinatown ineligible for federal funds for low-income housing 
projects, which favored projects on low-cost lands. There were two major types of land use in Chinatown 
– commercial and residential. The mixed-use of the built environment was important in sustaining the 
community because revenue-generating commerce helped to offset the high land costs of the area. 73 
However, the principal beneficiaries of Chinatown’s thriving business were a small group of Chinese 
elites who possessed sufficient capital and social resources to afford the expensive rents. In contrast, the 
immigrants who constituted the majority of Chinatown residents struggled on the poverty line. The 
unique problems of Chinatown placed the residents in a vulnerable position by making the neighborhood 
an unlikely selection of federal housing assistant programs despite its overriding needs. Federal 
bureaucratic procedures and regulations for assistance program were not designed to accommodate the 
specific conditions of the Chinatown.74
Programs to improve the community’s recreation areas also failed to meet the official criteria for 
funding.
  
75 According to the community report, due to the limitation of Chinatown’s land-use patterns, 
proposed recreation spaces usually had to take an innovative approach incorporating “mini-parks, joint 
use of school facilities, use of eminent domain, spot renewal, and relocation coordination.”76 The 
realization of these programs required the involved agencies to cooperate and respond effectively and 
creatively to unique situations. Unfortunately, until the 1970s the institutional organizations in Chinatown 
had not obtained sufficient human and capital resources to coordinate these kinds of programs.77 In 
consequence, federal funding was rarely allocated to build recreational facilities for the community.          
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As an ethnic neighborhood in the city’s center, San Francisco’s Chinatown was hit by urban 
renewal proposals that determined to make downtown San Francisco a commercial, financial, and 
administrative center of west coast America. But this met with resistance because Chinatown was also a 
thriving residential neighborhood with a strong sense of identity. Resisting the encroachment of the 
financial district and battling for affordable housing and a healthy living environment required the 
residents to constantly claim and maintain their rights to the social and physical space of the Chinatown. 
The controversies over the sale and demolition of Chinatown’s oldest temple, Kong Chow Temple, to 
make a way for high-rise office buildings in the 1970s provides a useful case for examining the multiple 
conditions of community-scale events and large-scale pro-growth that accounted for the Chinatown’s 
landscape transformation. 
 
Saving Kong-Chow Temple 
Kong Chow Temple is widely believed to be the first Chinese joss house built in the North 
America. Located at 520 Pine Street, close to the intersection of Pine Street and Kearny Street, the temple 
was historically an integral part of the Kong Chow Benevolent Association, a district association 
established by the people from the Sihui and Heshan areas of Guangdong province. The temple, which 
served as the association’s headquarters, was erected around 1857 (figure 12). It was an elegant, two-
story, neo-classical structure facing the Pacific Ocean when Pine and Kearny Streets were still close to the 
edge of the San Francisco Bay (before the reclamation project). During the 1906 earthquake and fire, the 
temple was dynamited by fire fighters to clear out blocks in order to contain the spreading fire. In 1909, 
the Kong Chow temple was rebuilt at the same plot of land, financed by members of the Kong Chow 
Association. The new structure was a three-story building with the temple on the top floor. It inherited the 
popular layout of Chinatown institutional buildings that had combined features of a Chinese tiled roof and 
decorations and typical American downtown structural frameworks.78
In 1962, an insurance company offered $350,000 to purchase the temple’s land, but the board of 
Kong Chow Association declined the offer, hoping for a higher price. After several years’ bargaining, in 
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1969 the association decided to sell the property to Title Insurance and Trust Company for $630,000. The 
new owner of the temple was Ralph K. Davies, chairman of the board of the shipping company American 
 
Figure 12: Kong Chow Temple at 520 Pine Street, before the 1906 earthquake (Source: The Unshakable – 
Rebirth of S.F. Chinatown in 1906 published by Sing Tao Daily on April 15, 2006, p.46) 
 
President Lines, who had been assembling all properties between the Pine and Kearney Streets entrances 
to the St. Mary Catholic Church’s Garage for a number of years with the plan to build skyscrapers. The 
City approved a permit to wreck the temple at March, 1969. However, right after the announcement was 
made, several community members expressed dismay, claiming the temple as a symbolic historic 
landmark of the San Francisco Chinatown. A battle to save the temple was soon initiated by Charlotte 
Chang, whose father, Yee Ah-tye, had originally donated the land for the temple in 1854. Charlotte 
Chang, who was 93 years old, proclaimed herself to be the only living witness to the words and intentions 
of her father. She insisted that her father stipulated the land could never be used for any other purpose 
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than Kong Chow Temple, but couldn’t provide papers or records to prove her claims because the 1906 
earthquake and fire had destroyed all the documents.  
Chang declared the temple’s place was a sacred ground because “a temple has been on that land 
ever since there were people living in San Francisco,”79 and the erection of an office building would 
violate its sacredness. In addition to acknowledging the historic significance of the temple to the Chinese 
community, Chang also insisted upon the temple’s importance in sustaining her personal and family 
memory, saying that “the temple [was] not important to her as a physical object but as a living symbol of 
the goals and principles for which her father fought.”80 With respect to the interests of the whole 
community, Chang pointed out the possibility of losing Chinatown to the big corporation. She argued that 
if the temple were sold, the whole portion of the 500-block on Pine would be lost and the continued 
encroachment of the financial district would have moved one block closer.81 She worried that if Chinese 
owners were lured by high prices to sell properties, there would be nothing left of Chinatown but the 
commercial street along Grant Avenue.82
Even though Chang’s argument appeared persuasive, she failed to get consent from the Kong 
Chow Association. To the Association, the temple had already become a financial burden. A 
representative of the Association argued that the building required approximately $50,000 to restore it to 
conform to the present building code. Instead of “wasting” money to repair the dilapidated temple, the 
association purchased a new building on Stockton Street and proposed to move the temple there. In 
recognition of the legacy of the first Chinese temple, Kong Chow Association asked the developers to 
erect a plaque at the site commemorating the temple's history.  
    
In April, in a suit filed by Chang’s attorney to halt demolition, the court upheld the Kong Chow 
Association. After the trial, in front of Kong Chow Temple, Chang and her supporters protested the sale 
and eventual demolition of the temple. Meanwhile in response to a plea to save the Kong Chow Temple 
by designating it as an historic landmark  the City Landmarks Board passed a resolution urging 
preservation. Nonetheless, without organized legal protection, the temple was finally dismantled to make 
way for a high-rise office building in the 1970s.  
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The controversy over Kong Chow Temple occurred in a particular historical moment of San 
Francisco, when the Manhattanization of the city was displacing the urban poor in massive numbers. The 
urban renewal movement intensified the conflicts between the residents and the corporations seeking 
expansion, and diminished the already scarce low-income housing in the city. The protest in defense of 
Kong Chow Temple provides a glimpse of the contested territory and power of Chinatown in the face of 
gentrification imposed by external forces. Chang and her supporters had good reasons to fear the potential 
encroachment on Chinatown of the urban redevelopment, especially when she could clearly see 
Manilatown disappearing due to the uncontrolled expansion of San Francisco’s financial district. Feelings 
of insecurity about territory, status and power brought the consciousness of the enclave into focus. Kong 
Chow Temple not only signified the historical significance and cultural affiliation of the Chinatown 
community, but more importantly, stood for the symbolic boundaries of the community. Thus the dispute 
regarding the demolition of the temple was actually grounded on the competing spatial discourses of 
ethnicity, economic development, and political imageries.    
The Kong Chow Temple controversy was a watershed event not only because of the significant 
loss to heritage but also because it revealed the internal conflicts regarding the evolving historical value, 
economic interests, gender roles, and social learning of the Chinese community. The unsuccessful effort 
of Chang and her followers was partly the result of an asymmetrical distribution of power relations within 
the Chinatown community. Historically perceived at odds with the national linguistic, cultural, and social 
norms, the Chinese immigrants had a relatively independent economic and political structure in the 
ghettoized Chinatown wherein traditional social organizations had arbitrary authority over the socio-
economic and political life of the community. The patriarchal culture of these male-dominated 
organizations put women in a subordinate position to men, traditionally excluded from the boards of the 
family and district associations. As Chang bitterly complained to a local newspaper, it was the fact that 
she was a woman that deprived her of the respect of the board members of Kong Chow association who 
didn’t take her advice seriously and simply ignored her letters and phone calls. Chang, as a second-
generation Chinese American woman, didn’t succeed in mobilizing community activism and ultimately 
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failed to challenge the patriarchal hierarchies of the male-dominated social constructions. However, her 
efforts to protect the temple reveal that gender roles and gender tensions within the community were 
slowly beginning to change. The collision of diverse interests and the imbalances of power still continue 
to shape Chinatown as a contested space manipulating and sustaining the competing identity discourses 
and the politics of place-making.    
 
Fighting for Affordable Housing 
San Francisco’s Chinatown is, after Manhattan, the second most densely populated area in the 
United States. Its substandard housing conditions and congestion are ranked the worst in San Francisco.83 
In 1966, the city’s Economic Opportunity Council (EOC) designated four targeted areas for the anti-
poverty program, which included the Western Addition, Hunters Point, the Mission, and Chinatown. The 
former three communities were actively engaging in community building with a strong ideology of 
political empowerment. Chinatown, however, showed little enthusiasm. Susan Fainstein, Norman 
Fainstein, and P. J. Armistead have suggested that this is because the community’s “organizational 
leadership has been highly conservative.”84 The community virtually opposed the designation of 
Chinatown as an impoverished area and did not mobilize the poor to participate in anti-poverty 
programs.85 Thus there were complaints about the Chinatown leadership that stressed social services 
without building the community’s organizations.86 Marilyn M. Chou states that the indifference of the 
poor residents to the anti-poverty program resulted from the “fear and suspicion of revolution and 
politics” that had long existed among the Chinese immigrants.87 The homeland political trauma could 
have affected the attitudes of the Chinatown residents and explained the conservative attitudes of the 
community’s traditional leadership toward the program. In addition to the political tradition of the 
Chinese, I propose that the racial politics and social environment of the U.S. cities also significantly 
impacted the community development. Kay Anderson has argued that White Europeans have repeatedly 
built and justified a form of cultural hegemony over “racial others.”88 Whiteness as an epistemology 
reveals the privileged status of the White against which racialized identities are considered as different 
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and inferior, but this epistemology can be hard to grasp, since it has been naturalized as a system of 
meanings and values rooted in the hegemonic culture of the White.89 In categorizing Chinatown as 
“theirs,” the mentality of “us versus them” or “otherness” has also penetrated the Chinese’s mind, 
although grounded on different ideology.90
Clearly, there were internal historical factors leading to Chinatown’s indifference to the anti-
poverty program. But the failure of the program was also due to the insensitive design of the program 
itself, which tended to ignore the specific needs and anxiety of the community.
 In addition to the self-identification of Chinatown as a place 
“different” from other national space, the relatively independent socio-political structure that has 
dominated Chinatown’s everyday life for over a century was crucial for understanding the 
“uncooperative” attitudes of the Chinese towards the city’s poverty program. Although the traditional 
Chinatown associations tied by kinship or social brotherhood were very community-oriented, it took the 
form of mutual help (which began with the early bachelor sojourners) and placed emphasis on community 
service rather than community political organization.  
91 Firstly, the publicity and 
emphasis on problems such as poverty, crime, unemployment, and unsanitary environments called for 
more attention for the miserable conditions of the poor, which negatively impacted the community’s 
tourism and commercial development. In 1970, Chou observed, “Tourists no longer visit Chinatown 
recently publicized as a ghetto torn by crime, delinquency, poverty, and exploitation. Businesses in the 
community go downhill; Chinatown’s once stable economy becomes less stable.”92 The program also 
failed to mediate the high rate of unemployment in Chinatown because the persistent form of “ghetto 
living” constrained the residents’ opportunity to find jobs outside Chinatown. Chou stressed the 
importance of the city making “constructive efforts” in order to provide an open and equal job market for 
the unemployed Chinese, which would rescue them from the increasingly competitive employment 
situations in Chinatown, as well provide the city a large source of manpower.93 Chou’s point was valid; 
however, the firmly entrenched racial hierarchy and the socio-cultural dilemma still presented major 
obstacles for the Chinese immigrants seeking work opportunities outside Chinatown.   
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Despite their rejection of the city’s anti-poverty program, the Chinatown activists and residents 
strived for a better community life. Especially for the desperately needed low-income housing, the 
community activists and residents were allied in negotiating with governmental institutions and private 
property owners, seeking opportunities to mediate the severe housing shortage in Chinatown. Community 
members made constant efforts to acquire available lands within the Chinatown area for low-income 
housing development and to convert existing buildings to affordable housing.  
One of the early efforts made by Chinatown activists in the fight for low-income housing occurred 
in 1972 when a site at the southwest corner of Stockton and Sacramento Street was opened to 
redevelopment. Situated between the core area of Chinatown and Nob Hill, the block was occupied by 
dilapidated residential structures and unimproved parcels that were used for parking. Among the eleven 
residential buildings, seven were seriously substandard, one building of four housing units had been 
closed by the city and remained unoccupied. Considering the modest relocation of tenants that would be 
involved in developing the site, Chinatown Coalition for Better Housing (CCBH) proposed to tear down 
the existing buildings and construct subsidized low-to-moderate income housing in their place. But when 
the budget of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was slashed in the fall of 
that year, the Chinese community members were informed that federal matching funds for the Stockton-
Sacramento redevelopment project, also known as Mei Lun Yuen, were no longer available. Concerned 
with the cutting of federal funds, some 200 community members—mostly senior citizens—gathered in 
Portsmouth Square and walked five blocks to the HUD Embarcadero Center offices to demonstrate their 
concerns. The demonstration got a lot of publicity in the local media but failed to obtain funds from 
HUD.94
After the demonstration, representatives of the CCBH met with HUD officials in Washington, D. C. to 
urge the allocation of the federal funds. Although impressed by the cohesive, well-organized, and wide-
ranging community support, the HUD officials indicated that theirs funds were committed to the relief of 
hurricane damage in Pennsylvania. However, on July 23, 1973, a U.S. district judge ordered HUD to 
release funds for federal housing subsidy programs.
 
95 To attract the support of HUD, Mei Lun Yuen 
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project’s non-profit developer, the Presbyterian Church in Chinatown, invited financial involvement from 
a private developer, the San Francisco-based firm of Arcon. The church agreed to take charge of the 
housing portions of the project, and the firm would be responsible for the commercial portions, including 
8,000 square feet of shops and a 195-space underground garage. But the Nob Hill Association, Nob Hill 
Neighbors, and the 840 Powell Street Home Owners Association, objected to the Mei Lun Yuen project 
and sued HUD on the grounds of the increased traffic, congestion, noise and air pollution that might be 
brought by the commercial garage and the possibility of blocking the view. These and other disputes 
delayed the construction of Mei Lun Yuen Housing but they did not prevent it. Finally in 1979, a 
groundbreaking ceremony for the Mei Lun Yuen housing development was conducted, and in 1982 the 
first Chinese senior housing was completed (figure 13). 
  
Figure 13: Mei Lun Yuen Senior Housing at the southwest corner of Stockton and Sacramento Street, 
including parking space, offices, and apartment units, ca. 2007 (Photo by author) 
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In addition to constructing new public housing for the low income population in Chinatown, the 
Chinatown activists also strived to convert the existing buildings to residential use. In 1972, a YWCA 
residence club at 940 Powell Street became available for redevelopment. The seven-floor building was a 
popular residence club with a capacity of 165 rooms was designed by architect Julia Morgan in 1932 to 
provide shelter for young women new to the city (figure 14). However, the occupancy rates of the 
 
Figure 14: Previous Women’s YWCA at 940 Powell Street. Now it is known as the YWCA Apartments 
which contains ninety-seven federally subsidized low-income living units, ca. 2004 (Source: NoeHill In 
San Francisco, website: http://www.noehill.com/sf/landmarks/sf122.asp, accessed: 9/25/2010) 
 
building had sharply declined since the 1970s, due to the rigid rules set by YWCA originally to regulate 
the behavior of the young female tenants.96 From 1963 to 1970, the average occupancy of the residence 
club was over 98 percent, but by 1971 occupancy had dropped to 66.5 percent.97 In recognition of the 
declining occupancy rates and the consequent financial problems, the YWCA board appointed a Task 
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Force on Housing to suggest an alternative use of the club facilities. Considering the building’s proximity 
to the Chinatown, the Task Force sought advice from the Ad Hoc Committee on Housing of the Clay 
Street YWCA in order to incorporate the opinions of the Chinese community on alternative uses. The Ad 
Hoc Committee’s preliminary and final reports suggested that the building could be used as Chinatown 
senior housing, permanent family housing, or temporary housing for immigrant families to comply the 
community’s urgent needs for low- and moderate-income housing. The report envisioned that the 
Chinatown community would benefit from the federal subsidy program that the YWCA would be using to 
rehabilitate the Residence Club.98
In 1973, with the national fiscal crisis, President Nixon declared a moratorium on all new public 
housing and HUD froze funds for low- and moderate-income housing projects. The policy change and the 
continuing decline of occupancy rates at the Residential Club prompted the eventual closure of the club 
by June 1973. After the closure, the Residence Club committee asked the YWCA Board to approve a plan 
to make the Club co-educational and place it under new management. However, before a final resolution 
had been formed, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that the YWCA board had already turned the 
residence club over to new management. It asserted that YWCAs in other major cities “have been coed 
for some time – primarily because women aren’t as interested as they once were in sexually segregated 
living arrangements.” 
 However, the Ad Hoc Committee’s recommendations received 
opposition from the Residence Club committee, which urged the YWCA Board to appoint a new task 
force that would include representatives from the Board, Resident Club, and Clay Street Center to review 
the Committee’s report. The new Task Force on Housing generally agreed with the Ad Hoc Committee’s 
proposal, but no follow-up work was undertaken after that.  
99 The new management would adopt more attractive approaches such as “a free 
month’s rent” for new residents, serving “two meals a day, six days a week,” “bring a pool table, holding 
dances,” and eliminating “the archaic rules.”100 The news immediately drew attention from the Chinese 
and the Chinatown organizations concerned about housing problems. The CCBH urged the San Francisco 
YWCA not to sign the proposed contract and to realize its approved recommendations of converting the 
YWCA Residence Club into desperately needed low- and moderate-income housing.101 The CCBH’s 
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request was widely supported by various community and city organizations including Self-Help for the 
Elderly, National Committee against Discrimination in Housing, San Francisco Department of City 
Planning, and many other concerned social groups. A few Chinese American individuals also expressed 
their concerns. These letters varied in content, but all emphasized poor housing conditions in Chinatown, 
and the urgent need of the community for low- and moderate-income housing. They asserted that it would 
be unreasonable for the Residence Club to be used for other purpose because the building was located in 
the midst of the Chinatown/North Beach area that was always referred to as “the worst housing conditions 
in the San Francisco Bay Area.” 102
In December of 1973, the downtown YWCA reaffirmed their commitment to the housing 
conversion and asked an eight-member committee to draft plans for the financial feasibility of the project. 
Through the combined efforts of the YWCA, the CCBH and others, in 1977 HUD finally agreed to 
allocate $2.95 million for the conversion of YWCA residence club. However, due to the inflation in the 
construction industry costs, the seismic work required bringing the building up to city and federal 
standards and costs of the additional units, the estimated cost of the project rose to $6.3 million. Despite 
threatening to withdraw funding, HUD finally approved $6.4 million for the 97-unit senior housing 
project, to which the city provided an additional $647,000 from its Community Development fund. 
Construction started in November of 1979. The project not only provided senior housing units, but also 
community spaces in which educational and social services, child care were offered to encourage 
interaction of different community groups.  
  
The success of the Mei Lun Yuen senior housing and the conversion of the YWCA Residence 
Club were grounded on consolidated supports and widely agreed upon community values. However, 
when such projects involved dislocation or commercial interests, internal schisms and conflicts within the 
community were exposed to reveal a more complicated and multi-faceted picture of the transforming 
social, political, and cultural landscape of the Chinatown. For example, in 1984, Self-Help for the Elderly 
was awarded a $27 million housing grant from the federal government. They proposed to build low-
income housing for the elderly through a public-private partnership. Since 1973, federal subsidies for 
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public housing had experienced a major decline. Thus public-private partnership was considered to be an 
effective way of balancing the developments of low-income housing and commercial activities. The joint 
project – called Orangeland – was a $19.5 million, 220,000-square-foot development project named after 
the local landmark market located at the corner of Stockton and Jackson Streets. For 35 years, the 
Orangeland produce market and the surrounding shops had supplied the Chinatown residents with 
groceries, herbal medicine, and other living necessities. But the Orangeland development proposed to 
displace the market with new commercial and residential buildings, as well as displacing about 60 
immigrant families. The new construction would contain an 11-story, 70-unit senior housing financed by 
a HUD grant in a tower that would be built largely on an adjacent school district parking lot leased by the 
developer for 75 years. In return, the developer would be allowed to build a seven-story building 
accommodating restaurant, retail stores, underground parking, and 35-units market-rate condominiums.  
Despite the community’s historic struggles for affordable housing, the Orangeland project aroused 
concerns. The community groups resisting the project included the CCBH, the Chinatown Neighborhood 
Improvement Resource Center, Asian Neighborhood Design, the Asian Law Caucus, the Chinatown 
Transportation Research and Improvement Project, the Orangeland Merchants Association and the 
Orangeland Tenants Association. Some of these opposing organizations had played a crucial role in 
fighting for the low-income housing in Chinatown. They believed that the relocation plan was inadequate 
to resettle the displaced population. Some residents of the existing buildings, mostly new immigrants, 
feared they would be left homeless if no adequate housing in Chinatown would be provided for them, 
especially as the vacancy rate in Chinatown was extremely low. Generally, there was fear that the rent of 
the new commercial units would skyrocket to match other high rents in the area. Similarly, small business 
owners were afraid that they would be forced out of Chinatown. In May 1985, some 400 people attended 
the Orangeland project hearing. The Chinatown groups were divided into two sides. On one side, 
opponents voiced their concerns about the proper relocation of the 176 people displaced by the project. 
They noted that none of the development’s new living units were going to be allocated to the current 
residents. On the other side, the Orangeland supporters emphasized the severe housing shortage for the 
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elderly, pointing to the more than 6,000 senior people who had applied for 145 units at Mei Lun Yuen, 
one of the few low-income housing projects in Chinatown.103 They argued it was a precious opportunity 
for the community to obtain low-income elderly housing through public-private partnership. In fact, 
everyone was in support of the senior housing, but they were split on the commercial development on the 
site, which would require demolition of the two mixed-use buildings and further aggregate the area’s 
congestion problems by bringing in more traffic. The controversial Orangeland project was approved by 
the San Francisco Planning Commission a week after the hearing. But given the zoning regulations in 
Chinatown, a special permission for the Orangeland project was required to relax the height permit of the 
building, and this was rejected by the Board of Supervisors. Despite the developer’s promise to donate a 
portion of the land for the senior housing in exchange for city approval for the entire project, the board 
vowed to support the senior housing only if it were not tied to the commercial development.104
In the Orangeland project controversy the needs of the two most vulnerable groups in Chinatown 
– the elderly and the immigrant families – collided.
 The battle 
was eventually won by the tenants who successfully blocked the eviction of the immigrant families and 
the construction of the Orangeland project.  
105 The internal schism among the community groups 
was founded on the severe shortage of low- and moderate-income housing and the anxiety toward 
gentrification. Chinese American activism in lobbying for affordable housing gained wide political 
support. The successful mobilization for the construction of Mei Lun Yuen and the conversion of the 
YWCA residence club into a subsidized senior housing were the result of efforts made by Chinese 
American activists who lobbied for social provisions and social justice. Based on racial claims and the 
desire to preserve Chinatown as a vital living community, Chinese Americans and Chinese immigrants 
launched crusades for public assistance to improve housing for the senior residents and families. These 
politics, constructed on an ethnic basis, gave voice to a racial minority; however, they failed to resolve the 
dilemma of diversity among the ethnic community for which social groups representing different interests 
continue to struggle against each other for a limited share of social provisions. The changing needs of 
community development and issues of representation called for a true connection between people in the 
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neighborhood, community organizations, and civic institutions to access a politics of incorporation, 
equality, and citizenship in the immigrant community.106
 
   
Conclusions 
The struggles of Chinatown activists and residents in the urban renewal movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s illuminated the ambivalent process by which the landscape of Chinatown was transformed. 
Chinatown suffered from dilapidated conditions and the possibility of gentrification. About 76 percent of 
Chinatown’s masonry buildings had been built before World War II, and these were among the most 
vulnerable buildings to earthquake damage. The changing demography under the series of new 
immigration laws aggravated the housing crisis of the community and its need for more outdoor places of 
public gathering. In addition to community development pressure, overseas investors and the expansion 
of San Francisco’s financial district drove up the community’s real estate values. Even the traditional 
family and district associations who had formerly charged low rents to the commercial and residential 
units in their properties couldn’t resist the temptation of high profits by selling their buildings to 
developers. These pressures worsened conditions in Chinatown, but they also were the catalyst for a new 
sense of mission to preserve Chinatown from urban encroachment and neighborhood displacement. This 
in turn became a powerful way to retain the ties of Chinese Americans and Chinese immigrants to the 
place of Chinatown where their ancestors had been forced to live due to racial segregation. From the 
activism to save I-Hotel and Kong Chow Temple, to ethnic politics making claims to improve housing 
and community facility, the existing categories of ethnicity, cultural identity, and racial ideology have 
been contested, renegotiated, and reconstituted. The rise of post-industrial economy after WWII generated 
a “privatist political culture” that privileged capital accumulation and market forces.107  However, the 
urban pro-growth machine was challenged by the production of minority spaces, which negotiated and 
contested the contradictory structures of modernity and liberalism. By examining the context-specific 
struggles over space in San Francisco’s Chinatown, the chapter has emphasized the ways that the urban 
redevelopment process was intermingled with the social and cultural tensions inherent in a plural and 
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liberal urban society. The issue of race permeated the grass-roots struggle over the housing and landscape 
changes in the Chinatown, which revealed the exclusionary kernel of urban renewal and redevelopment 
policies.  
Within the context of a marginalized ethnic enclave wherein individual voices—especially those 
of women—were generally ignored, the Chinese American activists mobilized their political resources to 
make a racial claim for community needs. When exclusion by race and by class played a central role in 
the discourse of urban planning, the Chinatown that had historically protected the Chinese immigrants 
from oppression and job discrimination in the larger spaces of the modern metropolis retained its 
importance by insisting on the continued economic viability and socio-cultural cohesion of the Chinese 
American community.108 Michel Laguerre suggests that “the analysis of minoritized space – the myriad 
forms of positionality that generate social distance and that maintain and reproduce social hierarchy, 
oppression, and discrimination in society – affords a productive way to explain the disparities of social 
conditions among diverse groups of people and their reproduction through time in American society.”109 
In other words, space functions as a mechanism to maintain and reproduce power relations and racial 
hierarchy of the dominant society, separation and difference between the racialized minority and 
mainstream, and an inferior and subaltern position to the dominated. Chinatown was historically imagined 
as an ethnic ghetto and a place of “otherness.” The stereotypical representations of Chinese immigrants as 
alien, barbaric, and deviant from the national categories were strengthened by a series of anti-Chinese 
exclusion acts before WWII and the systematic social construction of otherness throughout the century. 
As a result, Chinatown, as a ghettoized community, was subject to the racist practices that consistently 
excluded the Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans from the national space and polity. In this 
sense, racial oppression and discrimination have been manifested and reinforced in the construction of 
“minoritized space” in which subaltern subjects have been produced. Space becomes an important 
mechanism for the dominant to exert hegemonic power over the dominated and allocate the racialized 
minority in a subaltern position.110  
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Yet while Chinatown was a minoritized space containing subordinated subjects, I see it also as an 
insurgent socio-political space containing the distinct cultural values and economic purposes of the 
marginal groups. The particular political and socio-economic system of San Francisco’s Chinatown 
reinforced social construction of spatial boundaries, for which space functions as a device that could 
challenge the dominant values of the elite control. Emphasizing the community’s spatial integrity and 
ethnic identity, the Chinatown activists protected the community from displacement and the 
encroachment of the growing downtown. In this way, “minoritized space” was not simply a mechanism of 
the hegemonic power of the dominant group, but empowered the subaltern minority by developing it as 
an infrastructural basis of resistance and ultimately support.  
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Chapter 2: “Urban Renewal Comes to Chinatown with Ease?” – The Case of Chicago’s Chinatown 
By 1870, the city of Chicago had experienced a fast rate of growth and became one of the 
manufacturing and transportation centers of the nation. Although the Chicago Fire of 1871 razed almost 
the entire downtown and near north, the city’s transportation and industrial infrastructure remained 
untouched so that the city could rapidly recover. In 1893, the World’s Columbian Exposition signaled that 
Chicago both socially and physically had become a world-class city, a stature that it has maintained ever 
since.1 However, after WWII, the demography and racial composition of the city of Chicago underwent a 
major transformation. The city’s postwar industrial growth attracted many of the African Americans 
migrating northward from the South. During the decade between 1940 and 1950, the African American 
population increased from 277,731 to 492,265, while during the next decade, the population almost 
doubled to 812,637.2 The increasing presence of the Black population in the city motivated the so called 
“suburban exodus” of middle-class Whites which had ramifications for the inner city. The suburban 
expansion drew away not only many of the city’s tax-payers, but also its commercial and industrial 
establishments. Due to the “white flight,” the percentage of Whites in the city’s total population 
continuously dropped from 68 percent in 1950, to 51 percent in 1960, and 39 percent by 1970.3 In 
contrast, during the same period, the African American community was left behind in the increasingly 
impoverished city ringed by White suburbs from which they were explicitly excluded. The White 
“suburban exodus” left behind many vacancies in the inner city where available housing units were 
desperately needed by the growing Black population, and accordingly, during the 1950s, three-and-a half 
blocks changed from White to Black occupancy per week. Most of the changes happened in the city’s 
declining neighborhoods from which Whites fled to more pleasant locations in the city or its exclusive 
suburbs.4 By 1970, African Americans constituted about 33 percent of the city population in total. With a 
simultaneous growth of Latino and Asian populations, Chicago had turned to a “minority-majority” city 
by 1980.5  
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The changing demography and especially the fast growing Black population inevitably accelerated 
the tensions of the city’s already entangled racial relations. The post-war adoption of Keynesianism 
increased governmental interventions in the everyday life of traditional neighborhoods. Meanwhile liberal 
environmentalism advocating a “full codification of the new egalitarianism” found a growing audience in 
the United States. It aggregated the ideological forces concerning race relations in the country and led to 
the call for the complete integration of Blacks into society. 6 However, in Chicago the process of Black 
integration encountered tremendous resistance. The democratic political machine dominating the city took 
great effort to preserve the city’s existing racial patterns in housing by reaffirming racial borders and 
segregating Blacks in a new ghetto of monstrous public housing projects. Public housing, in a sense, was 
employed as a subordinating tool for urban renewal by not only removing objectionable residents from 
the better areas  but also “reducing the likelihood of racial transition in neighborhoods beyond black 
Chicago.”7
Although racial hierarchy and discriminatory patterns were firmly entrenched in the social and 
geographical structures of the city, the ideological shift at the national scale, changing demography and 
racial composition, and increasing governmental intervention rendered its long-standing racial borders 
unstable and contested. This eventually led to the renegotiation and redefinition of the city’s geographical 
racial patterns. To explain how this occurred, this chapter starts with the examination of how race riots 
and public housing projects helped to reshape the city’s physical and social racial structures. By placing 
Chicago’s Chinatown in the rapidly changing urban forms that were partly motivated by intensified 
tensions between Black and White, the chapter engages with the question of how the space and place of 
Chinatown was reproduced to accommodate the evolving urban environment that reinforced and justified 
spatial and social segregation along the lines of race, ethnicity, and class. Unlike the Chinese in San 
Francisco, as described in Chapter One, who actively fought for low-income housing through negotiation 
 In the process, the city government played an active role in making lines of racial segregation 
both physically and socially. Buttressed by private business interests, the urban revival of Chicago’s inner 
city was conducted at the cost of dislocating minority groups. It reasserted the segregated forms of 
housing by using public housing as a new form of ghetto. 
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with the city and national institutions, the ethnic leaders in Chicago’s Chinatown tended to employ the 
narratives of “model minority” and “self-help.” The notion of “model minority,” which first appeared in 
1966, relies on the empirical evidence for success and a culturally based interpretation for achievement to 
define the Asian Americans as a successful minority capable of overcoming obstacles and moving up the 
socioeconomic ladder on their own.8
 
 Through examining the social implications and political meanings of 
such efforts and intra-ethnic relations involved in community building, the chapter reveals the political 
and economic basis and ideological ground for the Chinatown community’s housing and territorial 
struggles. It also explores the role of ethnicity and its discursive representation, with special attention to 
the manipulation of ethnic identity as a kind of social and cultural currency in spatial production and 
reproduction.  
Border War and the New Geography of Chicago 
To study Chicago’s war on racial borders, it is necessary to understand the impact of two major 
race riots that occurred in the city. The first was the devastating 1919 riot, known for its brutal 
confrontations between Black and White citizens. The territorial clash accompanied by ideological, 
political, and economic conflicts was usually referred to as a typical “communal” riot.9 After the 1919 
riot, a South Side “ghetto” was firmly settled with predominantly African American occupancy, which 
extended from 22nd Street to 55th Street, between Wentworth Avenue and Cottage Grove Avenue (figure 
15). During the next several decades, it gradually expanded southward to incorporate the previously 
White neighborhoods. The riot revealed the existence of severe racial tensions in the city of Chicago, 
which had been previously grounded on a long-standing racial apartheid. The bitter experience led the 
city to fear another racial riot and to worry about racial relations, but ironically, as Janet Abu-Lughod has 
pointed out, rather than mediating the racial apartheid, the city adopted a more restricted planning policy 
to increasingly segregate the racial groups.10 During the two decades between 1940 and 1960, the city of 
Chicago witnessed a massive influx of the African Americans and a subsequent expansion of the city’s 
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Black ghetto which greatly transformed the original patterns of racial order. Accordingly, the number of 
  
Figure 15: The map shows the concentration of Black population at the South Side of Chicago in 1940 
(Source: City-data Forum, website: http://www.city-data.com/forum/general-u-s/1090967-segregation-us-
cities-visualised.html, accessed April 9, 2011) 
 
census tracts identified as “mixed” increased from 135 to 204 in the period from 1940 to 1950.11 The 
increasing number of “mixed” census tracts, as suggested by historian Arnold Hirsch, however could not 
precisely represent “a reversal of the city’s march toward complete segregation.” Rather, it showed a 
process of redefining the racial borders.12 Hirsch asserts that Black isolation was heightened with the 
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growth of the Black Belt. (The Black Belt refers to the chain of neighborhoods on the south side of 
Chicago which had a large concentration of African American population by the mid-20th century. It 
stretched 30 blocks along State Street on the south side and expanded only to the east and south in the 
second-half of the 20th century.) The percentage of Blacks who lived in exclusively Black census tracts 
increased 3.3 percent during the decade between 1940 and 1950. More Whites felt threatened by the 
presence of Blacks in their turf, and thus the number of “mixed” areas tended to be temporary, so that a 
new racial contour gradually began to take shape.13
To revive the inner city and draw investment to the downtown core, especially the Loop area, 
Chicago business elites actively promoted urban redevelopment of the city. The big corporations such as 
Marshall Field and Chicago Title and Trust Company played a seminal role in devising plans for the 
revitalization of the central districts. These corporate pioneers, with the support of the Metropolitan 
Housing and Planning Council (MHPC), a private reform group comprised by the city’s realty firms and 
prominent lawyers, architects, bankers, and industrialists, proposed plans for the public agencies to 
acquire land for private development.
  
14 They advocated that public infrastructures and public housing 
should be constructed by state funds to clean up the “slums” and resettle the population dislocated by 
urban redevelopment, for which the city’s Land Clearance Commission was established “to purchase, 
condemn, clear and resell slum properties to private developers.”15 From the 1950s to 1970s, major 
infrastructural development such as the O’Hare Airport and the expressway network had been 
constructed, while several public housing projects were also built to accommodate dislocated populations. 
The city’s public authority, business elites, and city planners were allied to maintain the city as an 
economic power through the post-industrial transformation and expansion of the downtown area. Their 
efforts led to the demolition and reconstruction of the large areas surrounding two major institutions at the 
near south side of the Loop, Michael Reese Hospital and the Illinois Institute of Technology. These 
redevelopment projects, despite their success in attracting middle- and upper-middle class populations to 
the city, were intended to eliminate decayed dwelling tracts and anchor the sites of two prominent 
institutions.16 In 1958, the Department of City Planning released the “Development Plan for the Central 
 81 
Area of Chicago,” which was prepared in consultation with private groups constituted by members from 
the leading corporations from the city downtown. The plan placed great emphasis on the physical 
restructuring of the downtown core, focusing on the development of office space and new activities that 
would contribute to economic growth.17 The document also called for the construction of a new civic 
center and an expressway system that would link the central district to the rest of the city. It promoted a 
substantial shift to a second-circuit economy characterized by finance, services, retailing, and 
management, aiming to reinvent the city as a postindustrial metropolis.18 In 1973, another important 
planning document, “Chicago 21: A Plan for the Central Area Communities,” was released as a joint 
effort of the city government and the Chicago Central Area Committee. The plan carried on the focus of 
the previous proposal and stressed physical expansion of Chicago’s downtown core. It explicitly 
discussed the neighborhoods to the south of the Loop such as Chinatown and Pilsen as sites for residential 
upgrading.19 Although, for various reasons,these two planning documents were not comprehensively 
implemented, they did achieve some significant success including the revitalization and residential 
conversion of the Printer’s Row area and the construction of Dearborn Park to the south of the Congress 
Parkway.20 But the domination of private business interests in the coalition between the public and private 
sectors suggested that the primary value of urban redevelopment lay in profit maximization and economic 
gains. In these redevelopment projects, public good, as argued by Hirsch, was never the primary 
motivation, but merely a by-product.21
One of key concerns in Chicago was the physical dilapidation of the city’s South Side. The history 
of racial segregation, White opposition, and “the peaceful cooperation of local real estate boards” played 
a paramount role in retaining Black residential boundaries and resulted in horrific overcrowding and 
residential blight.
      
22 Government support for segregation also had direct impact on the evolution of the 
racial borders of the city. As explained by Robert C. Weaver, the city government tended to create more 
ghettos during the postwar redevelopment, in which Chicago’s urban renewal programs and public 
housing projects accentuated artificially created racial boundaries and produced a “second ghetto” at the 
West Side where residents were even poorer and had less political voice than those of the South Side. 
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Unlike the old South Side ghetto, this second ghetto was formed with deep governmental involvement – 
the city-sponsored slum removal and the construction of high-rise public housing projects not only 
reshaped and transformed the Black Belt at the South Side, but also created a new “vertical ghetto” at the 
West Side to supplement the old one.23
The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) was established by the State of Illinois in 1937, in 
response to the federal legislation creating the public housing program. In the postwar era, among the 
7,644 low-income housing units operated by the CHA, about 4,000 segregated Blacks lived in the Ida B. 
Wells, Robert H. Brooks, and Altgeld Gardens projects.
 In a sense, public housing not only served as a strategy for the 
private business agents to jumpstart the urban redevelopment of Chicago, but also as a tool to redefine 
segregation lines by race and class.  
24 Since 1949 when the federal Urban 
Redevelopment Act was instituted, the affordable housing available to the minority groups in Chicago 
had become scarcer due to the preferable investment in the profitable areas near the Loop which had been 
gradually gentrified. In addition, the slum clearance aimed at demolishing the “non-White” 
neighborhoods worsened the housing crisis for the city’s minorities. The Chicago’s City Council 
overruled the intentions of the CHA, in particular those of Executive Director Elizabeth Wood, who 
wished to encourage racial mixing and believed some of the new housing should be erected in White 
areas of the city.25 Although Wood together with Robert Taylor, the first African American chairman of 
the CHA board, fought very hard to oppose the segregated patterns of public housing, they were forced 
out by the City Council in 1954 and replaced by someone “with strong connections to city hall and 
Chicago’s notorious Democratic machine.”26 Their removal indicated a turning away from the effort to 
create integrated and low-density housing developments by the CHA, after which substantial policy 
changes occurred. Under Wood’s two immediate successors, William B. Kean (1954-1957) and Alvin 
Rose (1957-1968), the CHA built several public housing projects that were large, high-rise, and “prison-
like” apartment buildings exclusively in poor, Black neighborhoods or areas undergoing racial 
transition.27 These public housing projects were dominantly occupied by Black tenants, while the few 
projects located at the White neighborhoods such as Chicago’s Lathrop and Trumbull Park Homes only 
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served White tenants.28 In 1964 the CHA displaced 259 families for public housing constructions, of 
which 234 were “non-white” households.29 And by 1976, nearly 40,000 segregated low-income housing 
units contained in 1,273 separate buildings housed nearly 5 percent of the city’s total population.30
These efforts to containing the Black and poor population within a walled city inevitably 
intensified the racial hostility in the city. In 1966, Dorothy Gautreaux, a CHA resident and civil right 
movement activist, filed a discrimination suit in site selection and tenant assignment for public housing. 
The Gautreaux case was settled with the court ordering the CHA to provide small-scale and scattered 
public housing primarily in the White districts. 
  
31 Meanwhile the new policy of Public Housing Authority 
was no longer to reproduce the existing racial composition of an area. However, in actual practice, despite 
the Gautreaux decision and the changing national policy, the members of City Council representing White 
wards vetoed relocation housing projects that would be built on the vacant lands in White districts. In 
addition, the reduction in federal aid for public housing due to the federal fiscal crisis also presented 
obstacles for the CHA to continue building public housing. Thus by the 1970s, the CHA became an 
“administrative backwater,” losing its political connection, financial support, and human resources.32
Compared to its counterparts in other metropolitan cities such as New York and San Francisco, 
the CHA had much weaker political power and support. 
  
33 But according to Abu-Lughod, the public 
housing controversies and “border wars” in Chicago were fundamentally built on “the deep racial 
animosities that drove Chicago’s transformation in the booming postwar decade.”34
The 1968 race riot in Chicago, also known as the King riot, was an expression of the black 
community’s outrage. Characterized by vandalism and destruction of properties, the riot took place at the 
West Side’s second ghetto. Although the second ghetto had poorer and less organized black residents 
compared to the South Side ghetto, the existence of the South Side ghetto provided important ideological 
and social foundations for the rise of the second ghetto.
 The rubric of urban 
renewal and slum clearance safeguarded and justified the relations of exclusion and marginalization that 
undergirded the city’s planning efforts, which generated social polarization and class violence.  
35 The South Side ghetto presented as an entity of 
clearly defined racial borders, traditional acceptance, and unsettled tensions. In order to control its 
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expansion and the racial succession that occurred after the suburban exodus of middle-class Whites, the 
city government buttressed the second ghetto.36 The formation of the second ghetto was also a result of 
the practice of the 1919 riot commission’s recommendations for solving the racial hatreds and housing 
difficulties in the city. Instead of “forceful segregation,” the commission suggested “better Negro 
housing” as a way to relieve racial tension while preserving the existing structure of racial segregation 
largely intact. 37 After several decades, however, the “better Negro housing” consisted of nothing more 
than high-rise public housing projects erected along State Street, extending from the Cermak Road (22nd 
Street) to 55th Street, forming a new wall in the segregated pattern of the second ghetto. As argued by 
Hirsch, the maintenance of the South Side ghetto and the creation of the second ghetto were both the 
result of the continuous forces and pressures sustaining the unequal racial relations. The “‘invisible’ 
violence of the postwar era” applied various measures of influence to maintain and expand Chicago’s 
ghetto in both a social and physical sense.38
The overwhelming racial tensions between Black and White in postwar Chicago were translated 
into urban forms that were fragmented and unevenly developed. The urban space was produced by spatial 
strategies grounded on racial beliefs and the dual forces of repression and exclusion. As the decision-
making mechanism for Chicago’s urban redevelopment was decidedly monitored by corporate and private 
interests, the postwar rebuilding of the city emphasized the economic revitalization of downtown area and 
investment in building transportation infrastructure and luxury housing. At the same time, it facilitated the 
displacement of the central area and promoted public housing projects that could absorb the dislocated 
population and sustain segregated residential forms. Within the context of urban segregation and uneven 
development, the Asian Americans in general, and Chinese Americans in particular, carefully articulated 
their own racial discourse to situate themselves in the Black-White binary of the racial landscape. 
Chinatown was a minority space inscribed with the imprints of racialized bodies. Thus it reinforced the 
socio-legal category of the “outsider” and became a material and spatial metaphor of racial and cultural 
“otherness” for the dominant society. Chinatown evolved within this context of the city’s postwar urban 
redevelopment. 
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Chinatown on the Border Line 
Chicago’s Chinatown is located in Armour Square, west of the Near South Side and east of 
Bridgeport (figure 16). Armour Square has historically been an area converged with diverse ethnic groups  
 
Figure 16: The location of Amour Square and Chinatown (Graphic by author, based on GIS data provided 
by the City of Chicago website: http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/doit/supp_info/gis_data.html) 
 
where the Black Belt, Chinatown, and the working-class White communities were contiguous. The first 
settlers of Amour Square were working-class Irish, German, and Swedish laborers. In 1865, the Union 
Stock Yard was opened at the southern part of the neighborhood. With the establishment of new railroad 
trunk lines and the growth of the meat-packing industry at the edge of the neighborhood, nearly all the 
building lots in Armour Square were filled by the end of the nineteenth century. The various ethnic 
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communities in Armour Square lasted from one to three generations but started to break up as the younger 
generations advanced socially and economically. They moved outward in a somewhat linear pattern to the 
outer, newer parts of the city and often eventually into the suburbs, and they were replaced by poorer 
ethnic groups seeking low-rent. Thus, when the early immigrants moved out during the 1900s, Italians 
and Yugoslavs began to settle in Amour Square. In the 1912, the Chinese moved from the Near South 
Side where the first Chinatown was built (at Clark Street) to Armour Square.  
Dong Jue Moy, who arrived in Chicago during the mid-1870s, was considered the first Chinese 
pioneer in the city, followed shortly afterwards by his brothers Moy Dong Hoy and Moy Dong Yee. 
Finding Chicagoans more welcoming to the Chinese than the people of the Pacific Coast, they wrote to 
their friends and relatives, urging them to move to Chicago. By 1928, about eight hundred Moys lived in 
the city, comprising a quarter of the city’s Chinese population. Although the Chinese of Chicago suffered 
the same restrictive immigration laws and had the same disproportionate gender ratio as those on the West 
Coast, from 1870 to 1920 their population grew steadily.39 After the first Moy settled in Chicago, he 
opened a dry goods store known as Hip Lung Ying Kee at Clark and Madison streets. In 1880 the store 
was moved to 323 South Clark, where the first Chinatown in Chicago came into shape. By the late 1880s, 
the early Chinatown had twelve grocery stores and three chop suey houses.40 Unlike San Francisco’s 
Chinatown, which had successfully remained in place despite the relocation plan of 1906 earthquake and 
the waves of urban renewal, Chicago’s Chinatown was removed from its original Clark-Madison Street 
location because of the raising rents and urban revitalization. In addition, the Tong War between On 
Leong Tong and Hip Sing Tong also forced a large number of the Chinese population to move southward 
in 1912 to Cermak Road and West Wentworth Avenue, an area located in Amour Square. 41
The Chinese were restricted to the one-square-block area at 22nd Street (Cermak Road) and 
Princeton Avenue with a series of ten-year leases, totaling $50,000 in annual rents. As Italian residents 
began to move out, the Chinese gradually occupied the area around Cermak Road and Wentworth 
Avenue, which soon became the hub of Chicago’s Chinatown (figure 17, 18).
 
42 When the Chinese settled 
in the area, they didn’t make much effort to alter the buildings or make them look more like the buildings 
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in China but instead adapted themselves to the existing buildings. Because the early Chinatown was 
dominated by male laborers, the standard American downtown structures were reused as tenement 
buildings for the single men. The buildings on the commercial street of Wentworth Avenue evolved for 
mixed uses such as residential hotels, shops, restaurants, warehouses, and light manufacturing businesses. 
The street frontages often opened directly to the street in the manner of an Asian shop house, though later 
they commonly adopted large expanse of glass with a recessed entry placed symmetrically in the façade.43
Laundry was one of the major businesses for the Chinese settlers in Chicago, and about 28 percent 
of the Chinese were engaged in laundry business in 1928.
 
Typically the buildings covered their lots to the allowable maximum, thereby adjoining the edge of the 
sidewalks and rising to a height of three to four stories.    
44 Another popular occupation for the Chinese 
was the grocery store business. Usually Chinese grocery stores provided not only groceries, but also 
stocked herbal medicines, clothing, house wares, and laundry supplies, most of the stock imported 
directly from China. In Chicago the Chinese grocery stores were concentrated in the Chinatown area. One 
of the first was the Hip Lung Ying Kee & Company on South Clark Street, which later moved to 233 W. 
Cermak Road. During the 1930s there were forty-two grocery stores within that three square block area of 
Chinatown. The same area also accommodated a large number of Chinese laundries and restaurants.45 
The number of Chinese restaurants grew as more Chinese immigrants arrived and more Americans gained 
a taste for Chinese food. With the expansion of the restaurant business, new companies were formed to 
provide the supplies needed by the restaurants. Some Chinatown companies specialized in certain 
products such as noodles, wonton, and egg rolls.46   
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Figure 17: The core area of Chicago’s Chinatown is bounded by Cermak on the north, Stevenson 
Expressway on the south and east, and S. Stewart on the west (Graphic by author, based on Google map). 
Compared to the old Chinatown on Clark Street, the relocated Chinatown on Wentworth and 
Cermark was in a much more isolated location. But perhaps because of the undesirability of the location, 
the Chinatown had the opportunity to flourish and development as most of the non-Chinese businesses 
continued to move out of the area in the 1920s and 30s and the area became dominated by Chinese 
businesses. The Chinatown was also fortunate to survive the widening of 22nd Street (Cermak Road) in 
1922 when new buildings were erected and the construction slowly pressed southward along Wentworth 
Avenue.47 
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Figure 18: View of 22nd Street (Cermak Road), ca. 1916 (Source: Chicago Historical Society) 
 
The African American settlement in Armour Square was started in World War I because of the 
expansion of the Black Belt on the east along State Street. By the 1920s, the African American 
constituted 23 percent of the population in Armour Square. In the 1919 Chicago riot, many assaults and 
confrontations took place in the Stock Yards area, immediately west of the Black Belt. Wentworth 
Avenue, the major street cutting across Armour Square, was referred as the “Dead-Line” because of its 
role as a border separating the Black area to its east from the almost exclusive White turf to its west.48 
During the riot, Wentworth Avenue witnessed the most brutal confrontations, injuries, and fatalities. It 
also worked as the key policing line for the city police to separating the black and white fighters. 
According to the investigation conducted by the Lowden Commission after the 1919 riot, both Bridgeport 
and the Back of the Yards district were so hostile that the African Americans “not only (found) it 
impossible to live here, but expose(d) themselves to danger even by passing through.”49 Thus despite the 
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geographical proximity of the respective ethnic communities, the racial composition of each enclave 
remained relatively homogeneous because neither Black nor Chinese could move into the hostile White 
areas.  
Even after WWII, the segregated residential patterns remained largely untouched. In 1960, 
Bridgeport had 90 percent White residents, while Blacks constituted 9 percent of the population and the 
Chinese only 1 percent. It was constant violence towards the Black and other racial minorities, rather than 
restrictive covenants as that prevented the racial transition of these White working-class neighborhoods in 
Armour Square. In the 1970s, the Black and the Chinese population still showed little increase in 
Bridgeport; however Mexican immigrants then constituted about 11 percent of the total residents, 
indicating the beginning of Bridgeport’s transformation into a racially “mixed” neighborhood.50
Probably because of its diverse racial compositions and working-class majority, Armour Square 
became one of the favorite spots for the city to implement the public housing projects. According to the 
Chicago Defender, the largest African American newspaper in the nation, the sites for public housing 
projects “were carefully selected in areas that would present little racial friction,” and “on which business, 
political, and racial interests can agree.”
  
51 Due to the fierce resistance from the White neighborhoods in 
the area, nearly all the projects were built within or close to the minority neighborhoods such as Black 
Belt and Chinatown, or abandoned industrial sites. During the 1940s, the public housing program built 
around 40 percent of new housing units in Armour Square while the other 60 percent were mostly 
projects converting old apartments into smaller units. By 1950, the population of Armour Square 
experienced a steady increase with African Americans comprising 46.9 percent of its total population.52
During the 1950s and 60s, the construction of the Dan Ryan Expressway and the Stevenson 
Expressway greatly impacted the demographic and physical landscape of Armour Square. The demolition 
for the expressway construction caused the number of residential units in the neighborhood to decline 
about 25 percent, while in 1960 the population dropped about 32.4 percent compared to a decade earlier.
 
The growth was largely due to the extensive public housing projects.  
53 
Nevertheless, the loss of older housing units was offset by waves of new public housing construction in 
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the area. In 1952, the CHA completed 147 units in two seven-story buildings known as Archer Court at 
23rd  Street and Princeton Avenue, on the west side of Chinatown, wherein occupants were dominantly 
Black with a small number of Chinese tenants.  During the 1960s, two more major public housing 
projects were constructed: the 198-unit Armour Square apartment building located at South Wentworth 
Avenue, and the Raymond Hilliard Homes at 22nd and State Street.  
With the introduction of the CHA public housing projects in Armour Square, the racial 
composition of the neighborhood underwent substantial changes. Firstly, Whites continued to move out 
the area in the 1960s, so that the neighborhood population had dropped about 12 percent by 1970. 
Following the exodus of the Whites came an influx of new Chinese immigrants due to the more lenient 
immigration policy instituted in 1965, as well as the African Americans moving into the public housing 
projects. Although Chicago’s Chinatown had a relatively small Chinese population, after World War II its 
population experienced fast growth, like other major Chinatowns in the U.S., because of the liberation of 
American immigration restrictions and the Civil War in China. The Chinese population in Chicago grew 
from 3,094 in 1950 to 6,214 in 1960.54 In 1970, Chicago had the nation’s fourth largest Chinese 
population and of this group of 12,653 Chinese, one fourth chose to dwell in Chinatown.55
By 1970, Armour Square was hardly a neighborhood itself, but rather divided into a number of 
enclaves, with Chinatown located at the few blocks on Cermak and South Wentworth, the Blacks 
concentrated south of 35th Street, while the Italians, Croatians, Spanish, and a few Irish and Germans 
lived in the middle of the area bounded by Comiskey Park on the south and the Ryan and Stevenson 
expressway on the north. At that time, Armour Square was a low-income community with very low 
education levels.
  
56 The physical landscape of the community deteriorated rapidly because of poverty and 
the extensive construction of public projects. Thus Armour Square became one of the neighborhoods in 
decline with “row upon row of dilapidated buildings, overcrowded and pest ridden.”57 A study conducted 
by Real Estate Research Corporation suggested that “neighborhood decline is an inherent part of the basic 
urban development process—the “trickle-down” process—that dominates American urban areas.”58 The 
research classified the neighborhood decline into five processes: decreasing socioeconomic status, ethnic 
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change, physical deterioration and decay, increased pessimism about the area’s future, and economic 
disinvestment. The forces causing neighborhood decline are “super-complex,” and they combine “social, 
racial, economic, physical, historical, political, and psychological elements.” 59
The governmental involvement through urban renewal, public housing, and slum clearance 
actively intervened in the neighborhood’s transition and historic fabric. The politics of site selection for 
public projects, which were usually imposed on the least empowered social groups, further marginalized 
the social disadvantaged, especially the racial minorities. The Black and the Chinese in Armour Square 
were confined in their own enclaves, which physically, economically, and socially suffered the impacts of 
neighborhood decline. As an ethnic minority that was “minor” not only in term of its population but also 
its political economic and social powers, the Chinatown residents were also affected by the extreme 
housing segregation and discriminatory public housing policies practiced in Chicago. As critics have 
pointed out, the CHA was building “almost a solid corridor of low rent housing along State Street and 
nearby streets from Cermak Road (22nd Street) to 51st Street.” The high concentration of public housing 
led to the “pyramiding of existing ghetto” and the concentration of urban vice.
 In the case of Armour 
Square, the neighborhood decline was to a large extent caused by the city’s deliberate imposition of the 
immense public housing projects in the area, which forcefully transformed the demographic and racial 
composition of the area. The massive postwar slum clearance also aggravated the decline of the old 
neighborhoods.  
60 The extreme economic 
and social segregation and inadequate quality of public services, including police, schools, and sanitation, 
resulted in high rates of unemployment, concentration of poverty, and an upsurge of the underground 
(often illicit) economy.61
Growing from a minor ghetto, the West Side had become a major ghetto in the city by the 1970s. 
In 1979, a Chinese-Canadian tourist who was visiting Chicago’s Chinatown was killed at the tunnel under 
the Dan Ryan expressway which served as a physical boundary between Chinatown and the city’s public 
housing complexes. The crimes had serious repercussions in Chinatown, where tourism was the pillar 
industry. Merchants in Chinatown complained that they bore “the brunt of the bad publicity because the 
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news media often unfairly link(ed) Chinatown to crimes that occur near the housing projects.”62 In a 
newspaper article titled “Chinatown still peaceful kingdom,” many Chinese residents voiced their 
criticism of the biased media portrayal when they realized that the community was “financially harmed by 
unfair publicity.” They emphasized that the Chinese were law-abiding citizens, citing the low incidence of 
crime among the Chinese, compared to other ethnic groups in Chicago. A Chinese interviewee explained 
to the journalist that the Chinese were taught to honor their parents and obey the law from a young age; 
she said “Our aim is always to become better citizens and to play a more important role in American 
affairs, to contribute our culture to the American culture.”63
The way that physical distance between the two communities was discussed also revealed the 
eagerness of Chinatown residents to differentiate themselves from the neighboring “second ghetto.” A 
newspaper article asserted that the railroad viaduct and the Dan Ryan expressway were barriers that 
divided the region into “two very different worlds” (figure 19). On one side was Chinatown, “a well-
  
 
Figure 19: The channel under the railroad viaduct at the west side of the Chinatown connecting the 
community to the West Side ghetto. It was deemed dangerous to cross through the channel which has a 
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high incidence of crime. The Chinatown community requested the city to close down the channel in the 
early 2000s, but the request was denied, ca.2010 (photo by author). 
 
ordered community and one of the city’s top tourist attractions,” while on the other side was “a couple of 
public housing complexes, along State Street on both sides of Cermak Road, where the crime  
rate is high and the danger to out-of-towners who stray is real.”64 David Sibley has indicated how 
Whiteness has been associated with order, rationality, and qualities, in contrast with Black disorder, 
irrationality, and looseness in a colonial context.65 He argues that the use of White and Black to represent 
these qualities is intended to make White social behavior virtuous and to legitimate White rule. In the 
system of values, Whiteness has become a symbol of virtue, goodness, and order.66 By drawing an 
analogy to White virtues, the Chinese Americans and Chinese immigrants engaged in the process of 
portraying themselves as a “model minority” and sought ways to improve their positions in the racial 
social ladder. The fear of crime and the idea of encumbrance by deviant Blackness to threaten the normal 
society justified and legitimated the erection of real barricades demarcating spatial boundaries. The 
boundaries were both spatial and social. Panic feelings and intensive suspicion heightened boundary 
consciousness among the Chinatown residents. The social cleavages between the residents of the so-
called “two different worlds” were virtually a social product of the mainstream society. To relegate 
dominated groups to the social margins by claiming for them inferior and immoral attributes was 
historically a way of legitimating exploiting and excluding. In the urban renewal process, urban planning 
and public housing have allied in a common effort of segregation and control. The asymmetrically 
distributed power relations of surveillance were disguised by interethnic conflicts in which ethnic 
minorities struggled against each other for a better publicity and community life. In the context of urban 
transformation, the Chinese immigrants used the rhetoric of “model minority” to try to win the advantage 
for their own urban agendas. Especially when tourism became a dominant aspect of Chinatown 
development, such discourse was also used in Chicago as well as other Chinese communities to project a 
positive image as a safe and family-friendly place. As shown in Chapter One, for instance, the refusal of 
the Chinese in San Francisco to participate in the city’s anti-poverty campaign was a result of their 
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rejection of publicity emphasizing the unpleasant aspects of Chinatown as a low-income community. 
However, their efforts couldn’t change the fact that their neighborhood was further marginalized and 
segregated through the planning mechanism implemented by the institutional apparatuses. The external 
constraints and spatial obstacles limited the range of choices that Chinatown would have in developing 
the community’s social and political revenues.  
 
Freeway Construction and Urban Segregation 
Post-war redevelopment in the city of Chicago, as mentioned before, was due to private capital. 
The decision-making mechanism of the private/public coalition tended to be directed by corporate 
business interests. Because these focused on reviving the city’s downtown area, the urban renewal 
program failed to provide a concerted redevelopment policy for the regions outside the central area. As 
Squire, Bennett, McCourt and Nyden have observed, “No other part of Chicago away from the Loop and 
the near north lakefront has been subject to a comparable expenditure of public or private resources.”67 
However, despite the uneven distribution of redevelopment resources, the areas outside the downtown 
district were not immune to the forces of urban renewal and did not remain intact. In fact, the impact of 
urban renewal substantially transformed the landscape of these non-central areas and profoundly 
influenced their future development. The authors observe that  “South Side and West Side renewal set in 
motion huge migrations of displaced residents, for the most part black, into neighborhoods more removed 
from the central city.”68 The Chicago Defender published an article titled “Urban Renewal for whom?” 
which resolutely argued that the city’s redevelopment plan failed to supplement the shortage of “low and 
middle income housing both private and public,” and moreover, that the plan maintained extant lines of 
segregation that denied African Americans “free access to the housing market.”69 Compounded with the 
extensive program of public housing construction, the city successfully reorganized its spatial patterns 
through reconstructing the downtown area, improving affluent neighborhoods, and building transportation 
networks, but at the cost of displacing the poor and the racial minorities.70  
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During this era when urban renewal programs dramatically transformed the city landscape, 
Chinatown as an ethnic enclave was influenced by these urban trends. The unequal distribution of urban 
renewal funds made the poor and working-class neighborhoods suffer long-standing neglect and pay the 
costs for the economic growth of the private sector and the expansion of the dominant institutions. 
Chinatown, adjacent to the Black Belt and other “mixed” working-class neighborhoods, was itself 
classified as a “slum” or “blighted area.” It was one of the neighborhoods that was neglected as resources 
were diverted to downtown commercial development, construction of transportation network and luxury 
waterfront condominiums. The Housing Act of 1949 and 1954 legitimated the local government practice 
of acquiring and cleaning lands in blighted areas for resale to private of government developers. 
Ironically, despite the fact that Chicago was a major beneficiaries of federal funds for urban renewal, the 
poor and minority populations were not the beneficiaries of the urban renewal projects. To the contrary, 
they were forced out of their own neighborhood, but seldom provided alternative affordable housing.71
After the war, the Chicago Plan Commission recommended that the City Council build a 
comprehensive superhighway system in the city.
  
72  Seven expressways would “relieve traffic jams on 
local streets which depreciate surrounding property values and at the same time set up boundaries for 
neighborhoods, which is a part of the master plan for rebuilding Chicago.”73 Among the seven proposed 
highways, two of them, the Dan Ryan Expressway74  and the Stevenson Expressway, would bypass 
Chinatown and connect at a location around 26th Street and Lowe Avenue. As a major branch of 
Chicago’s free superhighway system, the Dan Ryan Expressway was the biggest single highway project 
in the Midwest. Its route was designed to start from Congress Street at Union Avenue, cross to the west 
side of Chicago River and connect with the Stevenson Expressway at Archer Avenue (figure 20, 21). It 
then would roughly parallel Wentworth Street to 63rd Street and swing to follow State Street through the 
south. During the summer of 1957, the state, county, and city highway departments started to acquire land 
for the expressway construction. The three levels of highway departments separated their responsibilities 
for three sections of the highway – the city was charged with the section from Congress to 39th Street; the 
state was responsible for the section from 39th to 63rd, and the county charged section from 63rd to 103rd 
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Street. The federal government provided 90 percent of the construction cost; the rest was covered by the 
local government.  
 
Figure 20: Locations of Dan Ryan Expressway and Stevenson Expressway (Graphic by author, based on 
map on website: http://www.rosals.com/images/chicagoarea.gif) 
 
Despite the relatively easy settlement of the expressway funding, land acquisition for the highway 
didn’t go smoothly because of the vigorous resistance from the neighborhoods in the south. Local civic 
groups in the Roseland area opposed the proposed traffic interchanges at Cottage Grove Avenue and 
South Park Avenue, claiming that the interchanges were “unnecessary and detrimental to the highway and 
the residential neighborhoods.”75 The two avenues were also considered too narrow to accommodate 
heavy traffic between 95th and 103rd Street.76 Their opposition was successful and the area traffic 
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interchanges were eventually eliminated from the planned east leg of the Expressway. In addition, some 
south side residents worried that the expressway construction would interfere with their homes and 
business. Representatives of the Richton Park village board, for instance, urged the county and state 
highway engineers to move the route in Richton Park at least one-mile west, asserting that the village had 
already filed a plan for expansion with the county before the expressway was planned. This was an 
important argument because state law entitled villages to expand within one and one-half miles outside 
village limits. Since Richard Park is bordered on the west by factory land and bisection of the area might 
invite slummification, location engineers for the county highway department agreed to reconsider the 
route of west leg of the Expressway crossing the Richton Park village. After a year of difficult 
negotiation, the last parcel of land was procured in the summer of 1958.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Dan Ryan Expressway and Stevenson Expressway has posed as physical barriers restricting the 
expansion of Chinatown (Graphic by author, based on google map) 
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In December 1961, at the opening of the first section of the Dan Ryan Expressway,  Mayer Daley 
optimistically declared, “Congress and Northwest expressways, with this Dan Ryan expressway to be 
finished next year and with the Southwest expressway now underway is bringing a renaissance to the 
central business district. New skyscrapers are announced almost daily. The dispersal of population and 
business to the suburbs is being reversed.”77 However, the expressway construction was delayed due to a 
controversy over whether the Chicago River should be crossed by a fixed bridge, a lift bridge, or a 
tunnel.78 When a fixed bridge was eventually built over the Chicago River, the Ryan Expressway was 
officially opened in December of 1962. To the east of the expressway, public housing projects including 
Stateway Garden and the Robert Tayler Homes were erected overlooking the expressway, which were 
named “Daley’s legacy as the creator of modern Chicago.”79
By cutting through the densely populated south side neighborhoods, the Ryan Expressway was 
like a “knife through the Negro community.”
  
80 With the “slum clearance, several poor neighborhoods in 
the south—among them the Armour Square—disappeared as communities. As Pacyga has argued, the 
placement of the Dan Ryan along Wentworth Avenue “somehow contain(ed) the city’s growing African 
American population behind its traditional borders.”81Along with the rows of public housing projects 
congregated at its east side, the Dan Ryan replaced the Wentworth Avenue to become a new, more 
powerful racial divide of the city. While the Black population experienced a major decline of 50 percent 
in Armour Square, it meanwhile became heavily congregated in the southern part of the area. The Fuller 
Park, at the south of Armour Square, for instance, had a dramatic increase of the Black population, which 
made up 96 percent of the residents as the Dan Ryan was being constructed. In Englewood, further down 
south of the Fuller Park, the Black population grew about 59 percent.82 In a sense, the Dan Ryan not only 
redrew the racial lines of the city by driving the African Americans to the south, but also contained them 
in the second ghetto on the expressway’s east side. As one of the oldest ethnic neighborhoods in Armour 
Square, Chinatown was also significantly impacted by the demographic and socio-economic changes 
brought to the area by the expressway construction. It didn’t suffer the demolition that the Black area had 
suffered, because Chiantown stood at a distance from the swathe of construction.83 The Ryan Expressway 
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was mostly criticized for razing the old neighborhoods at the south and intentionally segregated the 
growing Black population. But for the Armour Square, the expressway together with public housing 
projects dramatically transformed the historical fabric of the neighborhoods and hindered their social and 
spatial mobility. Within the declining area where traditional neighborhoods were deteriorated, the tropes 
of spatial practices maintained and reinforced Chinatown as a subordinated “minority space.”84
A major highway construction that more directly affected the Chinatown community was the 
Stevenson Expressway.
  
85 The expressway’s 17.5 mile route starts from the Dan Ryan Expressway near 
26th Street, extends southwest in the bed of the long discarded Illinois-Michigan Canal, and connects to 
the U.S. Route 66, the Chicago-Springfield-East St. Louis highway. The expressway was proposed to 
provide a high-speed connection between the central district and the Chicago Midway airport, and it was 
advantageous for the highway department to use the relatively vacant right of way offered by the canal. 
However, the state department held up approval of the project while challenges to the state’s ownership  
were decided. 86
In 1962, land clearance for the Stevenson Expressway started. Compared to the Ryan Expressway, 
Stevenson Expressway has a shorter route, and most of which passes through industrial, railroad, or 
vacant sites. Thus there were few controversies with respect to land clearance and residents’ resettlement 
during its construction. Nevertheless, two groups of south side residents, the Longwood Civic Association 
and the Organization for the Southwest Community, began to watch the Aberdeen Street site after 
learning that the house at 9903 Aberden St. would be moved to 9643 Genoa Avenue, a site not zoned for 
the flat buildings. The organizations organized some 50 neighborhood residents to protest the removal of 
the building by parading on the sidewalk. By then the building had already been moved part way into the 
street, whereupon the building engineer was charged with moving a dwelling without proper permit. In 
contrast to the resistance from the southern neighborhoods, Chinatown remained relatively silent, even 
 After several years in court, the land title controversies were settled, and in 1961 the 
Stevenson Expressway construction was eventually approved. Similar to Dan Ryan Expressway, county, 
city, and state highway departments collaborated on the construction and the federal government provided 
90 percent of the construction fee under the inter-state highway program.  
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though the expressway’s path would tear the community into two parts by running across the southern 
part of Chinatown. In addition, the expressway would effectively prevent any future southward expansion 
of Chinatown.  
If the Stevenson Expressway had set a physical barricade on the south side of Chinatown, the 
construction of the Franklin Street Connector placed another wall on the eastern edge of the community. 
Because the Dan Ryan Expressway was considered the busiest and “most dangerous” in the city, to 
relieve the traffic load, the city proposed a new extension known as the Franklin Street connector to 
provide a direct connection with the Loop. Concerned that the highway extension might take away their 
housings on South Wentworth Avenue, the Chinatown residents voiced their concerns. The city soon 
clarified that the path of the connector would leave the buildings in Chinatown intact. 87  However, a new 
route for the Franklin extension was proposed a year later. The new route would start at the Cermak exit 
of the Dan Ryan at 24th place and would continue along the eastern bank of the south branch of the 
Chicago River to connections with the upper and lower levels of Wacker Drive at Harrison Street.88 
Before the construction plan was finalized, the city decided to acquire 22 parcels of land in the heart of 
Chinatown, with the expectation of acquiring all the necessary rights by the year of 1969.89
The land acquisition for the Franklin extension severely disrupted the historic and social fabric of 
the Chinatown and decreased the available land for affordable housing. Like the Chinatowns in San 
Francisco and New York, Chicago’s Chinatown also experienced rapid population growth and severe 
housing shortage after the war. Nevertheless, the city officials and state highway spokesmen ascribed the 
rash demolition of the Chinatown buildings to the “hazardous conditions” of the area, wherein “the 
buildings, nearly all of which are vacant, have missing windows and segments of walls, and debris is 
 A wrecking 
company was awarded a contract to demolish stores, apartment buildings, and warehouse structures 
located on the east side of Wentworth Avenue from 18th Street to Cermak Road. Hardin Square Park, the 
only nearby recreation space to the Chinatown community, as well as several historic structures, including 
Sun Sing Theater that had catered to the Chinese laborers since the Chinatown was formed, were torn 
down to make way for the expressway extension.   
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scattered around.”90 Throughout the end of nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, Chinatowns 
were historically perceived by the western public and the city officials as blighted, unsanitary, and 
districts harboring vice. Because of this perception, they were also regularly the objects of slum clearance 
or urban renewal programs to make a way for the city’s modernization.91
The Department of Urban Renewal was responsible for relocating the residents in the razed area, 
but most of the dislocated residents did not want to leave Chinatown, to which they were emotionally and 
socially connected. Of the twenty-five families and fifty-nine single persons affected, the agreement 
between the city and the Chinatown organizations caused the removal of four families to the nearby 
Raymond Hilliard homes and the rest stayed within Chinatown. The relocation process went surprisingly 
smoothly. Representatives of the Department of Urban Renewal declared that they had “excellent 
cooperation from the community in finding new homes for the residents.”
 The imagery of a typical slum, 
as mentally attributed to the area, justified the city’s imprudent decision to raze the properties and 
dislocate the local residents even before a final decision on the expressway route had been reached. 
Ironically, the razed site remained vacant for several decades because the expressway extension project 
eventually took a different route. In 1980, the vacant lots were converted into a parking lot to mediate the 
parking problems in Chinatown.  
92 In Chicago Tribune, an article 
titled “Urban Renewal Comes to Chinatown with Ease” applauded Chinatown as “a proud community 
that preserves its traditions” and praised the community for the way that they handled the urban renewal 
process. It asserted that the relocation process in Chinatown didn’t receive as much resistance as in the 
south side of Chicago where the process was “resented” and urban renewal was “viewed as ‘people 
removal’.” It further emphasized the “dignity” of the Chinese residents by highlighting Chinatown as the 
most impacted by potential loss of land because of its constrained geographical condition and the 
estimated number of people who would be relocated. 93 In contrast to the historic stereotypes of Chinese 
immigrants as uncivilized and immoral, the article perpetuated a new stereotype of “model minority,” by 
which the Chinese immigrants were perceived as docile, modest, and cooperative. The myth of “model 
minority,” which held that the Chinese merged into main stream society quietly and unobtrusively, was 
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used in the newspaper article to compare them favorably with people from “south side areas” where 
African Americans were historically congregated. While this may have served the Chinese well, as a 
strategy for differentiating between ethnic groups, its racial biases were clear.  
Although the relocation occurred peacefully, Chinatown was left with a severe housing problem. 
To relocate those displaced within the Chinatown area, the city sold a 3-acre vacant property adjacent to 
the Ryan-Stevenson expressway exchange to the CHA for construction of moderate-income housing. The 
project developer decided to install modular townhouses on the site and sell them to the families. 
However, although financial package was supposed to enable the families to buy the housing units, the 
housing was still out of reach for most low-income families. Without a committed effort to create new 
affordable housing for the community, the city placed the community in a desperate situation. 
With the construction of the two major expressways in the 1960s and the completion of the 
Franklin Street Connector in the 1970s, Chinatown had been firmly surrounded by physical barriers 
segregating the neighborhood from the rest of the city. Unlike the old Chinatown whose boundary was 
policed by constant social surveillance and racial violence, the postwar Chinatown was formed through 
the imposition of physical enclosure walls. The 1934 census showed that tract 3401 ( located at the north 
side of core Chinatown bounded by Clark Street at the east, 18th Street at the north, Cermak Road at the 
south, and the South Branch of the Chicago River at the west) had 553 residents, among which 79 percent 
were Chinese. In 1980, the census tract showed that Chinese occupancy in the same area dropped to 71 
percent of the population. This reduction in occupancy, especially in the face of the dramatic growth of 
Chinese population in the core area of Chinatown,94
The city-sponsored public projects not only forcefully defined the geographical territory of the 
Chinese community, but also marginalized their status, identity, and social relations. It effectively 
 was almost certainly caused by the demolition of 
affordable housing in the construction of Franklin connection. With the completion of the expressways 
surrounding Chinatown, a large number of Chinese started to congregate at the core area of Chinatown. 
Here the Chinese had constituted less than 10 percent in 1934, but by 1980 the figure had risen to more 
than 74 percent.  
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performed their status as subordinated subjects. The built environment is not a neutral stage for the 
unfolding of social relations, and the construction of walled enclaves can’t be understood simply in terms 
of geographical or physical location or distance: it entails qualitative relationships circumscribed in 
space.95
The expressway constructions were celebrated by the city elites as the symbol of Chicago’s entry 
into the new modern world as imagined by modernist architect Le Corbusier and his followers in the 
1920s. Accordingly, the city was improved with a new airport, numerous skyscrapers, and the 
superhighway system, which gave great impetus to the economic development of the city. However, the 
triumph was achieved at a cost to the inner-city neighborhoods because the “renaissance” was grounded 
on the depreciation of the civil rights of the urban poor and minority groups, whose “blighted” 
neighborhoods were torn asunder or demolished to make a way for the public projects and redevelopment 
programs. A report evaluating land values in Chicago before and after expressway construction selected 
eleven areas along the major expressways for investigation and concluded that all areas “exhibited net 
value increases over time,” which generally proved “the hypothesis that increased land values are 
associated with increased accessibility, resulting from expressway construction and measured by distance 
to the roadway.” Significantly, the only exception was the area delineated along Eisenhower Expressway 
where “(a)nticipation of the ghetto expansion westward into the Eisenhower test areas appears to have 
lessened the desirability of owning land in those areas, contributing to lowered demand and, in turn, 
decreasing land value.” Thus, only in those areas where racial change did not occur, the land values were 
increased.
 
96 This study, to an extent, revealed that the expressway construction not only reinforced or 
reshaped the racial geography of the city through entrenching physical barriers between the 
neighborhoods, but also intervened in the social and demographic transformation of the old 
neighborhoods via changing land and housing prices. The racial minority and urban poor became the most 
vulnerable groups, not only excluded from the potential benefits of increased land values brought by 
expressway construction, but actually suffering property devaluation when their neighborhoods 
experienced racial change due to urban restructuring.  
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David Sibley has argued that “Locations are selected which remove the minority from areas 
valued by the dominant society, and in isolation, the design and regulation of space are supposed to 
induce conformity.”97 These schemes demonstrate the state’s role in securing the interests of dominant 
society through socio-spatial control of the marginalized groups. Michel Laguerre also asserts the 
importance of spatial analysis in identifying hegemonic and subaltern sites of relationships and 
understanding minority question and minority status in American society. He points out that the 
organization of space is a reflection and mechanism of the way in which “power is parceled, stratified, 
and deatomized.”98
 
 Thus the imposition of a new spatial order on the Chinatown can be understood as 
hegemonic sector’s attempt  to provide an infrastructural basis of domination and control. The agenda of 
urban growth and urban renewal legitimated these spatial practices of positioning and maintaining the 
subaltern sites.  
“Self-Help” in Chinatown 
As discussed above, population growth and the imposition of city urban renewal projects led to an acute 
shortage of affordable housing in Chicago’s Chinatown. Compared with San Francisco’s Chinatown 
which was surrounded by upper-income white neighborhoods and the Financial District, Chicago’s 
Chinatown was physically constricted by the new expressways, leaving it no space to grow. To relieve the 
housing shortage, the Neighborhood Redevelopment Assistance (NRA) actively participated in the 
campaigns to provide more housing for the community. The organization is a non-profit organization 
founded by G. H. Wang, a former diplomat from Nationalist China in 1959. The Chinatown Coalition for 
Better Housing (CCBH) that played a leading role in the housing development in San Francisco’s 
Chinatown, grew from the city-sponsored Chinatown Citizen Advisory Committee for the 701 Project for 
Chinatown Housing and Recreation. In contrast, the Chicago NRA was an organization heavily relying on 
community resources and private partnerships. Since the 1970s, the Civil Right movement had inspired 
nation-wide activism in Asian American communities. Thus motivated, the NRA started to take a more 
active role in the housing development in Chicago’s Chinatown. The organization built several housing 
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projects in the 1970s, which included three-story buildings with twelve condominium apartments (at the 
northeast corner of 24th Place and Wentworth Avenue), twelve two-story townhouses (at the south side of 
24th Place), and eight townhouses (at the northwest corner of 25th Place and Wentworth) (figure 22). All 
these housing projects were private funded and targeted to middle-class Chinese Americans. Instead of 
seeking government subsidizes, the NRA adopted an innovative strategy of fund raising, which was to 
pre-sell the housing to those who were willing to make down-payments of 25 to 40 percent. The prices of 
the condominium housing ranged from $27,000 to $29,500 per unit, and the townhouses were priced at 
$37,000. In addition to the down-payment, the buyers had to qualify for mortgages from the First Federal 
Savings & Loan Association of Chicago. In these ways, the developers secured the financial sources for 
the new housing construction and significantly decreased the investment risk.99 
 
Figure 22: Townhouses at the south side of 24th Place, ca. 2004 (photo by author). 
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Noticing the rapid development of Chinatown housing, a newspaper article titled “No Government 
Aid Sought” argued that it was the character of the Chinese themselves that drove the community’s 
autonomy in developing the housing projects. In the interview with the author, Wang asserted that “With 
our people, it’s a question of our philosophy of saving face… Much as they might need to, they do not 
want to take any federal or any other government aid… Our Chinese-Americans in Chinatown believe in 
self-help and in helping each other.” Based on Wang’s assertion, the author explained how the Chinese 
virtues of hardworking and “saving for the future” meant that they did not have to rely on the government 
to improve their community.100
Although the housing development in Chicago’s Chinatown seemed successful in terms of fund 
raising and making maximum use of community resources, the projects did not actually suit community 
needs. The new housing projects that were intended to attract middle or upper-middle income Chinese 
Americans back into Chinatown, in fact excluded most of the existing Chinatown residents who were 
working-class laborers, with a median household income level well below that of the city. Chinatown also 
had a high percentage of elderly, many of whom had lived there all their lives as part of the old “bachelor 
society.”
 Although intended as praise, this idea that Asian Americans could “make 
it on their own” deflected attention away from societal factors contributing to racial inequality, and was 
linked to the political and ideological construction of a non-racial discourse that focused primarily on 
culturally based differences. According to this perspective, the fate of the Chinese was not caused by 
external economic and political forces but by their own behavior.  
101 Chalsa Loo observes that where discrimination had previously forced the development of a 
homogeneous neighborhood along ethnic lines, a new homogeneity along class lines emerged after the 
war.102 With the postwar repeal of discriminatory anti-Chinese laws, the Chinese Americans with better 
incomes tended to move into adjoining outlying neighborhoods or suburban areas, while the poorest 
people remained in the Chinatown. Rental units continued to be the dominant form of housing in 
Chicago’s Chinatown, exceeding 50 percent.103 The units were overcrowded and lacked necessary 
amenities, but the rents were generally lower than the city median rents, and so large numbers of new 
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immigrants went there in search of affordable housing. Thus, although Chinatown had undergone many 
important changes in the 1960s and 70s, it remained a low-income community.  
In 1972, the NRA group proposed to build a low-income rental building in Chinatown for the 
growing numbers of the Chinese elderly, many of whom lived in substandard housing but paid more than 
one-quarter of their income for it. The NRA leased a one-acre site at 23rd Street and Princeton Avenue 
from the CHA in 1977 and planned to build a nine-story, 139- one-bedroom unit apartment building on 
the site. Duane E. Linden & Associations was commissioned to design the building with an “oriental 
motif and landscaping similar to that of an oriental garden.”104 Subsidized by the HUD mortgage 
insurance of $4-million through the 1968 Housing Act, the development was also designated for Section 
8 support, which provided payments to individual landlords to cover the gap between the tenant’s income 
and the prevailing fair market rent evaluated by HUD. When in 1979 the Chinatown Elderly Apartment 
building was completed, it was the first housing project in Chinatown constructed through public-private 
partnership (figure 23).  
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Figure 23: Chinatown Elderly Apartment building with pagoda roof over the central entrance and oriental 
motifs in the panels between the vertical supports, ca. 2004 (photo by author). 
 
Despite the success of the elderly housing, no such efforts were made in the following decade. 
Instead, the community leaders and developers focused on projects that would attract young Chinese 
American families and professionals return to the Chinatown. This idea of developing Chinatown as a 
middle-class community had been in the mind of the community leadership. For a long time In 1945, 
Gerald H. Moye, the honorary mayor of Chinatown, had asked the City Council to pass an ordinance that 
would declare the Chinatown district a “blighted area.” He hoped that the city would be able to acquire 
the land of Chinatown under the slum clearance law and then sell it to the Committee for Chinatown 
Redevelopment constituted by Chinese elites and merchants. The Chinatown Redevelopment Committee 
planned to build 80 single dwelling units and apartments to house 900 Chinese families. Moye projected 
that the rent would range from $12 to $15 a room. However, the City Council rejected this proposal, 
believing that the rent was too high to justify terming the project “slum clearance.” The proposal didn’t 
get through, but it revealed the efforts of the Chinese elites to make Chinatown a desirable place for the 
well-to-do families and then create an imagery of “model minority.”  
Driven by profit, the Chinese elites and developers introduced townhouses and luxury 
condominiums that only middle or upper-middle income Chinese families could afford. According to the 
1990 census, Chicago’s Chinatown had the smallest proportion of one room units (habitation affordable 
by individuals)  and nearly half of its housing units had more than four rooms. In contrast, San 
Francisco’s Chinatown had 67% of its housing accommodating units with less than four rooms.105 In 
addition, while over one-half of the rental units in San Francisco’s Chinatown were located in multi-unit 
housing complexes, only one-third of the rental units in Chicago were in multi-unit structures.106 Peter 
Kwong’s work The New Chinatown exposed the reality of vicious oppression and exploitation imposed 
on Chinese workers that were concealed under the myth of “model minority” and economic boom of 
Chinatown.107 Although housing stock in Chinatown did improve, the improvements were not felt by the 
working class members of the community who could no longer afford to live there. The “model minority” 
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myth that portrays Asian as the most assimilated and successful minority group, as Lisa Lowe has argued, 
tends to “underscore Asian American heterogeneities” in terms of class, gender, culture, and national 
origin.108
The promotion of the Chinese as an independent, hard working ethnic group able to take care of 
itself was used to justify the inadequate federal funding subsidies and lack of governmental involvement 
in solving the severe housing crisis. The oblique stereotypes of “model minority” obscured the actual 
living conditions and the fact that most Chinese immigrants were still struggling with poverty and 
substandard housing conditions. The Chinatown community redevelopment groups who sought self-
funded financial resources for new housing projects weren’t trying to solve the shortage of affordable 
housing, but rather to construct Chinatown as a middle-class community. The attribution of the Chinese 
virtues of “saving face” and “self-help”—although voiced by the Chinese themselves— were picked up 
by the media as a convenient racial ideology that distinguished the Chinese from the stereotype of 
welfare-dependent African Americans.
 With the increase of the land values, Chinatown experienced an intra-ethnic gentrification of the 
community. The poor Chinese immigrants became more segregated in the old core area of Chinatown, 
while the new developments were mostly occupied by well-do Chinese families.  
109 It also perpetuated the myth of “model minority” by ignoring 
the fact that the lack of institutional and political support left the Chinese with few choices but relying on 
themselves. The Chinese families were regarded as “excellent tenants” who “are neat and orderly” and 
“discipline their children… pay their rent… don’t wreck the property.”110 When the number of Chinese 
families in Archer Courts public housing dropped from 57 to 19 in 1958, the local newspaper asserted 
that “the Chinese Americans are industrious, which means they are likely to raise their income beyond the 
limits permitted by the CHA. Then they are kicked out, and the apartments are filled with people with 
lower standards of industry and morality.”111 The passage juxtaposed the  stereotype of the Chinese 
American as industrial and docile, against the stereotype of African American as “people with lower 
standards of industry and morality.” Thus, the “model minority” stereotype was not only constructed from 
the perspective of White superiority, but also played a didactic role among the ethnic minorities through 
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stratification of the ethnic groups according to the levels of assimilation and accommodation to the norms 
of good manner, civilization, and morality.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed in depth the socio-economic transformation and ideological changes 
that undergirded the evolution of urban forms in the city of Chicago through the 1960s and 1970s. In the 
pre-war urban pattern, Black and White communities were separated by physical distance. Political and 
economic repression that tried to avoid violent confrontations between the two groups led to the 
consolidation of the south ghetto. After the war, the municipal government’s increasing intervention in 
urban planning and the urbanization processes created a new form of segregation. Under the name of 
renewal and redevelopment, the old residential pattern was destroyed through socio-spatial strategies such 
as congregating public housing in undesirable areas and installing a divisive superhighway system. The 
transforming urban forms indicated the coalition of the different levels of government to “redescribe and 
renew accounts of the interdependencies and interrelations of the regional unit.”112
The study of Chicago’s Chinatown in the context of postwar urban restructuring advances a more 
thoroughgoing vision of landscape changes grounded on the socio-economic transformation of urban 
society through post-industrial processes. Focusing on issues of housing and territory constraints imposed 
by the city, Chinatown is conceived less as a cultural image or ethnic entity, and more as a complex social 
space containing dynamic interactions, relations, and set of beliefs formed by and informing a sense of 
identity. The particular urban history of Chicago that was featured as a long-standing racial apartheid and 
spatial battles between the White and the Black placed the Chinese Americans in an ambiguous racial 
dynamics. With the deeply entrenched White/Black racial binary and tensions, the Chinatown residents 
were not only geographically constrained within the divided racial enclaves, but also socially restrained 
by the city’s deliberate construction of its racial borders. Furthermore, by actively contributing to the 
 A rationalized and 
centralized government structure provided an effective network of service and resources for the entire 
metropolitan region.   
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construction of “model minority” imagery that placed them more in the mainstream, the Chinatown 
community groups actually rejected the representation of themselves as poor, instead, focused on 
attracting the middle- or upper-middle Chinese immigrants back into the community.  
In sum, this chapter has sought to capture the series of distinctive agendas for spatial 
transformation in Chicago’s Chinatown. What we see within the landscape of Chinatown is a measure of 
evolution, and above all a continuing emphasis upon racial hierarchy and social controls of marginal 
groups. The chapter has showed how, through postwar urban renewal, new and distinctive forms of ethnic 
landscape were produced by the spatial agendas grounded on unequal power relations. At the same time, 
however, on the ethnic community had its own internal issues of authority, representation and claims to 
identity. Its identification as a “model minority” and the rhetoric of “self-help” were forms of “proper” 
display and performance of collective imageries of Chinatown community. They clearly functioned as 
vehicles for claiming upward social resources, through which the working-class majority of the 
community was rendered invisible as a new social structure came into shape.    
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Chapter 3: Restructuring the Space of Production in New York’s Chinatown 
The Chinese in New York City had since the 1870s traditionally settled along Mott Street and its 
surrounded areas on the Lower East Manhattan. The area was adjacent to the Bowery and the Five Point 
Area that was notorious for criminal activities, gang wars and severe pollution problems. As more than 
half of the Chinese population worked in laundries scattered throughout the metropolitan area before 
WWII, New York’s Chinatown was the social and political center for the Chinese with a concentration of 
the family and district association headquarters and commercial facilities. Like the early Chinatowns in 
San Francisco and Chicago, New York’s Chinatown was dominated by male laborers because of the 
exclusion acts that prohibited family reunion. In the bachelor society, vice industries such as prostitution, 
gambling, and opium dens prospered. But after the repeal of the Chinese exclusion act in 1943, these 
declined as the ethnic community gradually turned into a family-oriented society.1 In 1950, the core area 
of New York’s Chinatown that was bounded by Canal Street, Worth Street, Bowery and Baxter Street 
contained approximately 4,000 Chinese, while the surrounding area had between 1,000 and 2,000 Chinese 
residents (figure 24).2
Because of their relatively small population size, the Chinese were categorized as “Others”—as 
distinct from Whites, Blacks and Puerto Ricans—in the census of Lower Manhattan. Not until when the 
narrow quotas applied to Chinese were broadened in 1965, a large influx of Chinese immigrants flowed 
into New York’s Chinatown, which not only resulted in social changes of the community, but also a 
significant physical expansion of territory. According to the census, there were 69,324 Chinese 
Americans and Chinese immigrants living in New York City in 1970, comprising 0.9 percent of the city’s 
total population.
 Mott Street between Canal Street and Chatham Square was known as the historic 
heart of Chinatown. The first Chinese general store had opened in 1872 around the intersection of Mott 
and Pell Streets, from which the Chinatown had grown into being. Since then, Mott Street has teemed 
with restaurants, herb stores, tea houses, and gift shops, mostly catering to the needs of tourists (figure 
25).   
3 Of these, about 24,000 were settled in the Chinatown area, and they also gradually 
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began to extend into the surrounding areas including Little Italy, East Broadway, Bowery and Chatham 
Square. It was the first time in history that new Chinese immigrants in New York City outnumbered those 
who went to California. Since then, New York’s Chinatown has been the largest Chinatown in the nation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: The core area of New York’s Chinatown (Graphic by author, based on GIS data provided by 
the New York City government at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doitt/html/eservices/eservices_gis_downloads.shtml) 
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Figure 25: Storefront of 38 Mott Street in historic Chinatown, ca. 1903 (Source:  
http://www.nychinatown.org/storefronts/mott/38mott.html, accessed on Dec. 1st, 2010) 
 
Jan Lin observes that New York’s Chinatown “displays signs of both the lower-circuit traditional 
sector and the advanced sector of transnational capitalism.”4 The juxtaposition of international and 
national banks with the locally-oriented ethnic restaurants and sweatshops makes Chinatown a site of 
“heterotopia,” in which incompatible spaces or temporalities are hierarchically distributed.5 The 
underlying dynamic interplay between the upper and lower circuits functions in a critical relation to the 
polarized spaces in the form of socio-political conflicts over land-use policy and community 
redevelopment. Though the schism between the two circuits is also manifested in other Chinatowns, New 
York’s Chinatown is one of the most dramatic owing to the New York’s central position in the world 
economy. Especially since the 1970s, the city officials have actively engaged in a campaign to encourage 
foreign investments in New York City. City planners have also used the mechanism of urban policy to 
facilitate such trends. In Chinatown, local real estate and finance interests have sought to redevelop the 
community through the stimulus of spatial restructuring. The influx of oversea capital has incited an 
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upward spiral of real estate values and gentrified Chinatown by the construction of luxury housing and 
office buildings.  
This chapter takes a retrospective look at some of the major spatial controversies that occurred in 
New York’s Chinatown within the context of urban redevelopment. The chapter starts with an 
introduction of the shifting socio-economic conditions of the Chinatown within the context of urban 
restructuring and the political changes of homelands. It then describes the territorial expansion of the 
Chinatown and the impact of the expansion on the community and the inter-ethnic anxiety that it 
provoked among the Chinatown residents and their neighbors. It then focuses on some of the key issues 
with respect to the city’s zoning regulations and planning efforts, and the controversies surrounding the 
process of spatial restructuring. As a port-of-entry ethnic enclave, New York’s Chinatown is a key place 
where urban authorities have forged a social order and racial hierarchy through planning apparatus. Thus 
the focus of the chapter is upon the ideology and social meanings underpinning landscape changes. It 
identifies the series of agendas producing and reproducing the space of Chinatown, and examines the 
multiple facets of the complex and contingent characters of spatial processes in the urban ethnic 
community. 
 
Transnational Capital Investment and the Shifting Sociopolitical Patterns in Chinatown 
By 1898, Greater New York City had come into shape with five boroughs – Manhattan, Brooklyn, 
Queens, Staten Island, and Bronx – consolidated into the city. In 1916, in response to growing population 
and increased densities in both tenement zones and commercial districts of the city, New York instituted 
the first zoning law of the nation, which played a significant role in creating the now distinctive skyline of 
Manhattan.6 In the mid-1950s, lower Manhattan was declining as midtown gradually replaced it as the 
commercial center, and in response a partnership of public authorities and private investors was initiated 
to rejuvenate lower Manhattan by 1970. Cooperation between the businesses and government agencies 
was considered the most ideal mode of urban redevelopment for its speed and economic efficiency, 
according to Harry Schwartz. Schwartz proposed that the problem of relocation could be handled by 
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limiting the re-rental of vacant apartments before the start of relocation and by bundling the operating cost 
of vacant apartments into renewal budget.7  The specific goals of urban renewal had the following order 
of priority: slum clearance, renewal of blighted areas, upgrading substandard houses, downtown 
remodeling, new public buildings, solving traffic problems, and house preservation.8 Despite the seeming 
efficiency of the public-private partnership, it was criticized in some quarters for “finding justifications 
for investments [rather] than …weighing the rationality of investments.”9
When Lower Manhattan was successfully revived to attract global capital investment in the 1970s, 
New York’s Chinatown likewise attracted a large influx of oversea capital from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Southeast Asian counties. Given the uncertainty of the political environment in these regions or countries, 
many wealthy merchants transferred their capital to the western countries, among which the United States 
was one of the most favorable destinations. Furthermore, because of cultural familiarity and social 
affiliation, Chinatown was perceived by the oversea Chinese investors as the first experimental site for 
investment. Although San Francisco and Chicago were also among the destinations of Chinese 
investments, New York’s Chinatown ranked the most popular probably due to the city’s reputation as the 
most established international commercial and financial center and because the Chinatown was the largest 
in the United States.  Since the early 1970s, a large amount of capital has flowed into the community, 
most of it in the form of real estate investment. As a result, the traditional streetscape of small-scale and 
low-rise buildings has been interrupted by newly constructed steel and glass skyscrapers. Furthermore, 
the concentration of oversea capital in real estate led to the inflation of property values. During the five 
years from 1970 to 1974, land values in Chinatown increased 34 percent, while the building values 
increased 24 percent (at $62 to $210 per square foot, comparable to properties in midtown).
 In a sense, the urban 
redevelopment program was mainly employed to attract capital resources to expedite development of the 
area, rather than for the public good of society.  
10 Local 
business also experienced major growth. The growing number of small enterprises led to a competition 
for commercial space and eventually a spiraling of rents. In addition to substantial amount of “key 
money” (money paid covertly, and usually illegally, by a prospective tenant to a landlord as inducement 
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to secure a rental), the monthly rents for commercial units dramatically increased. Thus many small 
businesses that were unable to compete with well-financed businesses were gradually forced out of 
Chinatown.11
In addition to changes in real estate, change also occurred when foreign capital was invested in 
banks, restaurants, garment factories, media, and other entreprises. By 1980, eight commercial banks and 
three saving banks with a total of thirteen bank branches had been opened in the Chinatown. One of the 
largest transnational banks, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, opened its Chinatown branch in 1977, 
and in a few years over a million dollars had been deposited in the bank.
 
12 Many other banks, including 
the Manhattan Savings Bank, Citibank and local banks such as the United Orient and the Golden Pacific, 
all reported successful business in the Chinatown.13 80% of the deposits of these banks came from the 
Chinese patrons, most of them refugees from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian countries.14
The influx of foreign capital, to an extent, accelerated the development of Chinatown business and 
provided employment opportunities for the community people. However, this had no discernible effect on 
the living standards of Chinatown residents because the cost of living rose at a faster rate than 
employment opportunities. From 1970 to 1974, Chinatown saw a 14% increase in family income, but the 
cost of living had increased 40%.
  
15 Thus Chinatown residents did not benefit from outside investment; 
rather their real income decreased. As John Wang has noted, many community residents were justifiably 
concerned that the continuous influx of foreign capital would place more pressure on the already crowded 
space and force out small business and working class residents by pushing rents to outrageous heights.16 
Profits from foreign investment rarely contributed to the improvement of the community infrastructure, 
and jobs created as a result of overseas investment were usually low-wage jobs with long hours and no 
job security. Such conditions could hardly provide upward mobility for the ordinary people in the 
community.17
In addition to transnational investment, the tides of  immigrants who entered America through the 
liberation of immigration act in 1965 also imposed significant pressures on the community’s services. 
Because the existing social services were not sufficient to accommodate the needs of new immigrants, 
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who faced significant stresses as a result of their translocation, problems such as juvenile delinquency, 
mental disease, health and welfare crisis, and family dysfunction started to threaten the everyday life of 
the neighborhood residents. The traditional mode of self-help inherited from the bachelor society 
appeared to be insufficient, incapable of solving the emerging social problems. At the time, the social 
scientist Stuart H. Cattell concluded, “The most pressing need in Chinatown is an effective community 
organization that would bridge the gaps between the numerous voluntary associations and thereby break 
the log-jam of conflicting interests and inaction which is holding up the solution of many problems.”18
However, along with increasing social problems, the community was further endangered by a 
divided leadership. The traditional family associations, tongs (secret societies),
  
19 and merchant groups 
were connected under the leadership of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA). The 
CCBA was historically perceived as the “City Hall” of Chinatown, representing most of the community 
organizations to make Chinatown a coherent social entity. Nevertheless, since the 1960s the emergence of 
new social agencies led by second-generation Chinese Americans became a powerful challenge to the old 
authorities. The friction between the CCBA and these younger organizations was stirred by the numerous 
community problems that threatened the safety and health of Chinatown residents but remained ignored 
or unsettled by the CCBA. Although it represented Chinatown’s fifty-nine family associations and trade 
groups, the CCBA was criticized for its ineffectiveness in dealing with problems such as housing 
shortages, teenage gangs, and unemployment. For instance, the CCBA officer responded to the problem 
of young street gangs in Chinatown by saying, “There are always a few bad ones. We are more interested 
in setting up a scholarship fund for the good ones.”20 The CCBA typically viewed the community 
problems as “internal” issues and rarely sought governmental aid. The indifferent or maybe ignorant 
attitudes and insufficient understanding towards some of the most severe community problems caused 
people to question the leadership ability of the traditional organizations. In addition, the members of those 
associations tended to be older with the values of that generation, whereas the younger people no longer 
relied on the kinship network to pursue their American dream. Grounded on the social rules of the Old 
Chinatown, the traditional organizations seemed incapable of responding to the very real needs of young 
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Chinese-Americans and new immigrants, who in consequence then turned away from the CCBA to their 
own social organizations. Thus CCBA’s role became uncertain. A survey conducted in 1976 found that 
the majority of the Chinatown residents did not know the services that the CCBA purported to provide for 
the community.21
As the old power structure waned, new community groups consisting of professionals and new-
generation Chinese Americans became involved in community activism. Sometimes there was 
competition and friction between the old and new social organizations, fueled by the limited 
governmental funds and resources that could be allocated to the Chinatown. For instance, the dispute 
between CCBA and Chinatown Planning Council (CPC), a city-sponsored community organization, over 
the building of P.S. 23 brought the internal rift of the community to the surface. The P.S. 23 building was 
a vacant, 87-year-old school building at Mulberry Street (figure 26). Both the CCBA and the CPC wished 
to procure the building for their own uses. The competition lasted for a few years and eventually ended 
with the triumph of the CCBA after its successful fundraising for former Mayor Abe Beame’s election 
campaign. Since then, the Chinatown community became more divided with conflicting interests and 
gaps between the different generational organizations.  
 Although the CCBA started to question the traditional strategy of self-reliance and 
cooperated with the city government to establish the Chinatown Advisory Council under the leadership of 
Manhattan Borough President, it was still considered too conservative to handle many of the community 
problems. 
In addition to the CPC, which was an active advocate for the community with extensive services 
such as a manpower program, daycare center, employment and legal aid, school counseling, and 
translation, some other organizations also grew out of the 1970s with the vigorous support of young 
Chinese Americans and significantly influenced by the Civil Rights, Black power, and anti-Vietnam War 
movements.22 Of these, one of the most influential organizations was the Asian Americans for Equal 
Employment (AAFEE) which was formed in 1973 to fight the discriminatory hiring practices of the 
construction industry. It organized a series of demonstrations and protests against the construction of the 
Confucius Plaza housing project in Chinatown, where discriminatory hiring practices toward Asian 
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American workers were alleged. Through such efforts, the campaign eventually won more construction 
jobs for Asian Americans throughout the city.  
 
Figure 26: The controversial P.S 23 building nowadays is the Museum of Chinese in America, ca.2006 
(Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/70323761@N00/331531471/, accessed Oct. 5, 2010) 
 
The different types of social organizations representing distinct social and political interests pulled 
the Chinatown community in many directions. Although similar situation also happened in other 
Chinatowns, the antipathy in New York’s Chinatown tended to be more open and intensive. While in San 
Francisco and Chicago traditional organizations such as CCBA still played a dominant role in the 
sociopolitical life of the Chinatowns, measured in ways such as property ownership and media control, 
the power struggles between the social organizations in New York’s Chinatown remained active. Some 
influential professionals and businessmen, striving for greater unity, tried to bridge the gap between the 
old private organizations and young public agencies, but their efforts didn’t succeed. The complicated 
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processes of the transforming social, economic, and political landscape of Chinatown challenged the 
established historical fabrics and social norms of the community. Of the multiple forces from both outside 
and inside, from above and grassroots, the existing categories of identity, power hierarchy, and ethnicity 
had to be renegotiated and reconstituted.  
 
Chinatown in Expansion  
In 1965, approximately 4,769 Chinese entered the U.S.; the following year the number increased 
to 17,608. A special exemption in 1967 brought another 25,000 Chinese immigrants. And from 1968 to 
1974, more than 138,000 Chinese immigrated into the nation. 23 Because of the large numbers of new 
immigrants, the Chinese ethnic group began to be officially recognized as a “minority group” in lower 
Manhattan district. The dramatic influx into Chinatown led to severe crowdedness in the small section 
centered at Mott and Pell Streets and Chatham Square where the core area of the Chinatown was located. 
Under the combined pressures of rapid population growth and foreign capital investment, the territory of 
Chinatown quickly expanded. In contrast to San Francisco’s Chinatown that was constrained by wealthy 
neighborhoods and Financial District, and Chicago’s Chinatown hampered by the highways and railroads, 
New York’s Chinatown was able to grow to the north and the east, an area previously dominated by the 
Italian and Jewish immigrants (figure 27). In 1969, a journalist of The New York Times studied the 
Mulberry Street, the old center of lower Manhattan’s Little Italy, where several Italian restaurants were 
congregated. He observed that nearly all the Italian restaurants were gone, replaced by Chinese shops and 
restaurants. “There was a day when Chinese residents of the area were clustered together in a few blocks, 
not daring to venture north of Canal Street, even for a stroll,” he wrote, quoting an elderly Italian 
resident’s remarks. “Maybe it was the traffic, but many (the Chinese) also were afraid they would be 
beaten up. Now, they are not only across Canal, but they’re buying houses and flats as far north as 14th 
Street.” By 1980, the Chinese were estimated to own 70% of the buildings in Little Italy. Even along 
Mulberry Street, the major corridor of Little Italy, nearly half of the properties were owned by the 
Chinese.24  
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Figure 27: Chinatown centered on Mott and Pell Street, and Chatham Square expanded both northward 
and westward to Little Italy. (Graphic by author, based on GIS data provided by the New York City 
government at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doitt/html/eservices/eservices_gis_downloads.shtml)  
The Chinatown’s expansion into the Little Italy was partly caused by the moving out of second-
generation and upwardly mobile Italians who preferred to shift to Bensonhurst and the suburbs. The 
Italian businesses in Little Italy had experienced steadily decline during the 1970s, which provided 
opportunities for the new Chinese immigrants who preferred the familiar living environment and 
proximity to Chinatown that Little Italy offered. But the rapid expansion of Chinatown sparked some 
tensions between the Chinese and the Italian. The latter worried that “there may not be any more Little 
Italy”25 –a fear that was well grounded. The Chinese merchants actively acquired old tenement buildings 
around Mulberry Street, renovated them, and raised the rents to about four times of original prices. Given 
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the shortage of housing in the Chinatown, many Chinese were willing to pay for the rental units, despite 
prices that exceeded typical market value.26 In these tenements, Chinese tenants constituted a majority. 
Chinese merchants also acquired commercial units in Little Italy. Conflicts tended to occur more often 
when the stores were still run by Italian shopkeepers. Some of the Italians charged their Chinese landlord 
with overcharging on rents.27
Confronted by the rapidly changing cultural landscape of Little Italy, the Little Italy Restoration 
Association, with the assistance of the City Planning Commission, initiated a plan in 1974 to revive the 
community. In 1976, the City Planning Commission successfully designated the Little Italy a Special 
District, in which special zoning district legislation was employed to “establish a framework in which the 
potentials of communities with distinct characteristics can be realized.”
   
28 Whereas the 1961 zoning 
ordinance of the Little Italy district had promoted high towers covering a limited portion of the site while 
leaving maximum open space at the ground level, the revised special legislation attempted to preserve the 
unique identity of the neighborhood “in a unified, coherent fashion” and also provide guidelines for the 
future development of the community.29 The legislation placed a great emphasis on the vitality of street 
life and preserving the small scales of the neighborhood in order to strengthen the economic base of the 
community. By prohibiting vehicular traffic at Mulberry Street, the plan encouraged greater pedestrian 
use of the street and the growth of retail businesses. 30 Though the community leaders of the Little Italy 
reached an agreement with the Chinese property owners to maintain the Italian characteristics of the 
streetscape, the new zoning legislations received opposition from the Chinese merchants because it 
required all the stores located in Little Italy’s commercial zone to display Italian characteristics, with no 
exception for those owned by the Chinese (figure 28). Although the concept of preserving cultural 
neighborhoods, applied here to the Italians, could equally have served the interests of the Chinese under 
different circumstances, the Chinese merchants saw the legislation as an instrument impeding the 
operation of Chinese business in Little Italy and restraining the expansion of the Chinatown into that 
area.31 In a public hearing regarding the institution of a Little Italy Special District held in 1976, over 80 
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percent of the attendants were Chinese Americans and Chinese immigrants. They asserted that although 
  
Figure 28: A view of a typical Italian restaurant on Mulberry Street of Little Italy, ca.2008 (Photo by 
author) 
 
the Chinese constituted over half of the residents in Little Italy, they were excluded from the decision-
making process. The Chinese also questioned the boundaries of the Little Italy as defined by the Special 
District regulations. Because some blocks were all occupied by the Chinese, they insisted that these 
should be considered as part of the Chinatown. In addition, the restrictions on the percentage of the 
Chinese-occupied residential units and Chinese owned stores, and on the display of Chinese characters on 
store signboards were considered damaging to the interests of Chinese business owners and Chinese 
residents.32
Despite the continuous expansion of Chinatown, the increasing numbers of new immigrants still 
appeared a big dilemma for the community’s social coherence and housing provisions. As upwardly 
mobile Chinese Americans moved away to areas such as Jackson Heights, Corona and Flushing in 
Queens, those left behind were mostly people with lower incomes and less social mobility. The 1970 
census revealed that the Chinese families in New York’s Chinatown had a significantly lower median 
  
 130 
income ($7,344 a year) than the Chinese in the rest of the country ($10,610 a year). Between 20 to 33 
percent of Chinatown residents lived in poverty. 33 In 1975, the unemployment rate in Chinatown was 12 
percent, compared to a nation-wide rate of 8.6 percent.34
Most housing was in poor condition. Approximately 80% was old tenement buildings built before 
1901, and one of every 12 apartment units lacked adequate heating and plumbing facilities. Many of the 
buildings violated the city’s minimum housing standard and building codes. For example, it was common 
for the residential units to lack air ventilation or windows in the bathrooms, and some didn’t have private 
bathrooms at all. Because of the dilapidated conditions and poor wiring systems, many of the tenement 
buildings were firetraps – accordingly, there were five to six major fires on average annually in 
Chinatown.
 In 1979 the median household income in 
Chinatown was $9,668, which was only 70% of the median household income in New York City. 
Oppressed by poverty, Chinatown residents also struggled with a severe housing crisis. Although nearly 
all apartments in Chinatown were covered by rent control or rent stabilization laws, the residents still had 
to pay an increase of 300% in rents from 1970 to 1980, in which the household income increased only 
40%.  
35 Despite the bad quality of the housing, there were few vacancies for residential units: the 
vacancy rate in tenement buildings was less than 2%, and there were no vacant units in subsidized 
housing projects.36
Only a few subsidized projects had ever been built in Chinatown. The low turnover rates and long 
waiting lists made the likelihood of getting into subsidized housing very slim – only 19 percent of the 
Chinatown residents lived in public-aided dwelling units in 1980. The community had a level of 
overcrowding that was three times higher than the rest of Manhattan borough, which made it one of the 
most densely populated residential areas in New York City.
  
37 Although the median rents in Chinatown 
were lower than other parts of Manhattan, over half of the Chinatown households paid about 50 percent of 
their income for the rents. The great demand for housing led to corrupt practices. Landlords were able to 
avoid statutory restrictions on rent by asking illegally for “key money,” which usually would be paid 
“under the table” before signing the lease. In one case, displaced tenants paid $400 per month for a two-
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bedroom apartment, but the “key money” was $4000.38
Despite the over-crowdedness and generally unpleasant living conditions of Chinatown, the 
commercial units were in great demand and the rents almost quadrupled from the mid-1970s to 1980. 
Stores and offices began to replace residential units located at the upper floors of tenement buildings. As 
over half of the tenement apartments were converted to commercial units, the housing crisis worsened. 
Approximately 500 apartments had been eliminated, and 1,400 residents had been displaced from 1970 to 
1980.
 With apartments in such short supply and with 
such huge up-front costs to moving in, it is little wonder that residents accepted substandard conditions.  
39 The CCBA reported that by 1982, there were around 350 to 400 restaurants and 500 garment 
factories in Chinatown, which employed more than half of the Chinatown residents.40 However, these 
businesses, like the residents, were challenged by the rising real estate values. For example, the rent for a 
fish market on East Broadway increased from $1500 to $4500 per month following the expiration of the 
lease. Paralleling the increasing rents was the rapid growth of the real estate market in Chinatown. The 
exchange of real estate properties were three-and-one-half times more frequent in Chinatown than in the 
rest of Manhattan. 41 The vigorous market was largely the result of the influx of overseas capital. Around 
30% of the total assets of Chinatown were presumed to come from foreign capital.42
Thus, the expansion of Chinatown involved not only the displacement of the Chinese, but also the 
dislocation of other ethnic groups such as Hispanics and Blacks, who imputed their mistreatment not to 
the handful of wealthy investors but to all Chinese, especially those living in the Chinatown. Probably as 
a result of this, several cases of anti-Chinese violence were reported in the Lower East Side. As asserted 
 Unlike Japanese 
investment in U.S. which was concentrated in office buildings and hotel properties in midtown and the 
financial district, Hong Kong investors preferred to invest in loft buildings and garment factories in 
Chinatown and the surrounding area of the Lower East Side. Through renovating or converting the 
buildings into condos or office buildings, the owners could triple the value of their original investments.  
In this way, the Hong Kong capitalists boosted property values on the Lower East Side – the closer they 
were to the heart of Chinatown, the higher the property values. Little Italy and the old Jewish 
neighborhood at the southeast side of Chinatown were also affected by inflated prices and gentrification.  
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by a member of the Committee against Anti-Asian Violence, “Other ethnic groups in the area are 
confusing two different groups: the immigrant workers and the Hong Kong investors… There is a sense 
among non-Asians in the community that all Asians own land and are taking over.”43 The antagonism 
provoked by the foreign investment and subsequent gentrification led to racial friction between the 
Chinese and other minorities. Unlike the Chinese in Chicago’s Chinatown who played as “victim” to the 
vices accumulated by the public housing project built at its neighborhoods, here the Chinese were 
identified as the aggressors breaking into the neighbors’ territory and take over their properties. The clash 
was perceived as one of ethnicity, when it was really provoked by class. This indicated the 
incompatibility of the upper circuit of transnational capital investment with the lower circuit economy 
dominating the everyday life of Chinatown and Lower East Manhattan. The conflicts of the two circuits 
were not only manifested in the controversies over land-use planning, economic development, and 
community redevelopment,44
 
 but also the inter-ethnic disputes over territory and spatial identity.  
Special Zoning and the Controversies 
With the institution of the Little Italy Special District, the New York City Planning Council also 
proposed a plan in 1977 to establish Chinatown as a Special Zone. Similar to Little Italy, the proposal for 
Chinatown emphasized commercial development by increasing the number of stores in the community. It 
planned to stimulate new building construction while simultaneously preserving the existing building 
scale in order to maintain the distinct cultural identity of Chinatown. With respect to the impact of the 
special zoning regulations on Chinatown development, the community members voiced their concerns. 
First, they believed the zoning plan would not relieve the severe housing shortage of Chinatown but 
would, with its emphasis on encouraging commercial land use, further inflate real estate values and thus 
present a bigger dilemma for affordable housing. The building height restriction proposed by the Special 
Zoning also would limit the opportunities of developing low-income housing in the community. 
Secondly, although commercial development in Chinatown would increase the tax revenue, the 
community members worried that the government would reduce funding for the community’s social 
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services. Nine public daycare centers in Chinatown were already closed because of state funding cuts, 
which posed a hardship in a community where most family members worked long hours at low-paying 
jobs. The Special Zoning for Chinatown was criticized for “planning shrinkage” by encouraging industrial 
and commercial development by gentrifying the neighborhoods. The physical boundaries of the 
Chinatown district defined by the Special Zoning were also criticized for restraining the future growth 
and territorial expansion of the Chinatown.45
Despite the controversies, in 1979 the City Planning Commission and Department of City 
Planning conducted the Manhattan Bridge Area Study (MBAS), which included the Chinatown Study 
Area (CSA).
  
46 Grounded on the Street Revitalization Plan of 1976, the MBAS attempted to grasp a 
deeper and broader understanding of the dynamic of the study area, especially the Chinatown community 
that was experiencing explosive growth. The study described the CSA as “a point of entry for new 
Chinese/Asian immigrants, as a housing resource for low income people, as a production center for the 
Garment District, as a major tourist attraction, as a center of Chinese culture and services.”47 It recognized 
the intense spatial competition within the community after 1965 and the increasing land-use for office 
buildings and luxury condominiums. By pointing out that the original zoning regulations had generally 
favored commercial development over residential use, the study emphasized “a wide range of housing 
opportunities within the area so as to encourage the retention of moderate and upper income residents.” 48 
Given the continuous growth of the Chinatown population, it suggested that in addition to the 
rehabilitation of old housing stock, new housing should be constructed to meet the desperate needs of the 
community. New residential buildings could be financed by both private and public programs, but the 
plan had to be “infill in nature rather than redevelopment oriented.”49
In 1981, the City Board of Estimates decided to institute a Special Manhattan Bridge District 
based on the suggestions of the MBAS. The special district consisted of twelve blocks bounded by East 
Broadway, Oliver, Monroe and Pike Street. The purpose of the rezoning was to encourage development 
that would enhance the neighborhood by providing more housing and community facilities. The 
regulations particularly encouraged new constructions on vacant lots by relaxing the floor area ratio of 
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these individual sites to accommodate bigger and higher buildings. The overall intention was to preserve 
the general character of the entire community, while facilitating development. The qualification for 
buildings constructed under the Special District regulations required developers to provide at least one 
amenity designated for the benefit of the community as a whole, which could entail rehabilitation of 
selective buildings (on or off the site), community space for non-profit organizations, or subsidized low 
and moderate-income apartments (either in new buildings or existing buildings in the area).  
Despite the admirable intentions  of the new zoning rules to develop Chinatown while preserving 
its overall flavor, the proposal was controversial because of the possible and unpredictable impact of new 
developments on the existing social and economic constituencies of the community. Chinatown was in a 
great demand for low and moderate-income housing and community infrastructures, but the kind of 
development that was promoted by the zoning regulations failed to address this need. For instance, the 
Special District provided more bonus space for constructing new buildings than for rehabilitating old 
ones. The introduction of luxury high-rises might also turn the Chinatown into an “oasis for the rich.”  
Disregarding the concerns about displacement and gentrification, officials of the Special 
Manhattan Bridge District Committee insisted the Special District was an effective means to forge the 
private developers “to return something to the community.”50 In 1982, the Chinatown residents and 
community groups sued the city for failing to provide enough information for the Chinatown residents 
and excluding the residents from the decision-making processes. The notice of public hearings for the 
Special District was published in two publications of City Record and Comprehensive City Planning 
Calendar, which were more likely to be read by lawyers and real estate developers than ordinary people. 
Recognizing this, the State Supreme Court ruled that, “The notice published in two obscure publications, 
unknown to most English-speaking New Yorkers, to say nothing of those who speak only Chinese, is not 
the adequate notice mandated by the City Charter.”51 Thus it declared the Special District constitution 
illegal, although the ruling was overturned on appeal. In its judgment on the appeal, the Court stated that 
it would make no difference of publishing the notice in a Chinese newspaper because,  
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As a matter of observation by members of this bench, the general rule (is) that legal 
notices published in foreign language newspapers are published in the English 
Language… Ours is basically an English speaking society and that is the national 
language. It is appropriate, therefore, that all notices required by law to be published in 
that language. It would place an unbearable burden upon government if, before 
publication, a census were required to determine which were the tongues spoken in the 
community for the purpose of determining the foreign language newspapers in which its 
required to be published.52
 
  
The statement effectively allowed the marginalization of the Chinatown residents on the grounds 
that English was the national language (which although often stated, has never in fact been mandated by 
law). Mike Davis has observed that this case produced a “linguistic and cultural fortress” that 
institutionalized discrimination and legalized the deprivation of civil rights.53
After the Court reinstated the Special Manhattan Bridge District, the debates regarding the zoning 
regulations continued. The proponents of the Special District argued that Chinatown should be “more 
open and aggressive,” and criticized those who opposed new developments as “nostalgic” and 
“romantics.”
 With language as the border 
of exclusion, the Chinese immigrants were deemed non-English speaking, inassimilable aliens. Ignoring 
the vigorous linguistic and cultural diversity of the society in actual practice (although presumably not in 
those neighborhoods where the presiding judge lived), the statement was constitutive to the mechanisms 
in sustaining and reinforcing the subordinated position of minority groups against which a white Anglo–
“American” identity was produced and secured. Moreover, there was also an odd contradiction in the 
city’s actions. On one hand, the city attempted to preserve the traditional character of Chinatown, in 
which language was an important part of the cultural heritage of the community, but on the other, it 
identified that same linguistic difference as a liability. The irony was no accident, but relied upon the 
incongruence between a “borderless” economic development and political imperatives. 
54 The community defenders, otherwise, declared that they “just want people to have a place 
to live and not have to fear the bulldozer or skyhigh rents.”55 In 1971, when the New York Telephone 
Company planned to build a new switching station and evict residents in the Two Bridge area, the 
tenants—primarily Italian Americans—established the We Won’t Move Committee. They together with 
the Two Bridge Neighborhood Council successfully obliged the telephone company to move the 
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switching facility to Pearl Street. Although only a few Chinese participated in the protest, the success 
profoundly influenced community activism in the area and was a great inspiration for Chinatown 
residents to stand together fighting for their interests.   
The first developer to be granted a permit to build in the Special District was the Overseas 
Chinese Development Corporation, which had urged the City Planning Commission to grant “straight up-
zoning” in Chinatown. The corporation bought a site at Madison Street in 1979 with the intention of 
building East-West Tower. The two towers would be eighteen and seven stories respectively and have 
143 one-bedroom units. They would also include a senior citizen center and a day care center as 
community amenities in exchange for a higher floor area ratio. Granted a building permit, the corporation 
demolished two vacant tenement buildings on the site in 1981. However, it was soon revealed that in 
1979 when the site had been purchased by the developer, the two tenement buildings were fully occupied. 
The developer was accused of engaging in several forms of harassment, including cutting essential 
provisions such as hot water and heat, in order to evict the residents before the date the Special Zoning 
ordinances came into effect, and its permit was revoked. In addition to East-West Tower, another major 
housing project, a 21-story, 142-unit luxury apartment building located on Henry Street, was also 
approved under the Special Zoning in 1982. The Henry Street site was owned by Henry Street Partners, 
who planned to accommodate a new community YMCA and a swimming pool on the ground floor of the 
project and also provide $500,000 as a housing-improvement fund for the community. The developer 
justified the project by arguing that there was a significant deficit of housing for upper-middle income 
Chinese in Chinatown and the Henry Street project would suit their needs. The high-rise condominium 
prices ranged from $120,000 to $150,000. According to the standard rent to income ratio of 25%, less 
than 1 percent of Chinatown residents could afford to buy a unit in the condominium.56 The developer 
chose to ignore the community’s urgent needs for low- and moderate-income housing because such 
projects promised little profit and no subsidies from the government would be forthcoming.57 In response, 
the community activists declared that it was the proximity of Chinatown to the Financial District that 
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attracted the investors who sought high profit returns and the community would not “give away the future 
of the neighborhood for a swimming pool.”58
The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF) filed a lawsuit seeking to 
stop the construction of the Henry Street luxury condominium. Several community organizations together 
filed amicus curiae brief in the Court of Appeals in New York State to support the legal challenge to the 
Henry Street project. The brief asserted, “gentrification has had devastating impacts on low-income 
people and minorities in several New York City neighborhoods,” and the process of gentrification was 
linked with the “increased real estate speculation, rising property values, escalating rents, tenant 
harassment, and ultimately the displacement of residential and commercial tenants in low-income 
neighborhoods.”
 
59 In 1986, the construction of the Henry Street Tower was blocked by the court because 
of the insufficient study of its environmental impact. As suggested in the Judge’s statement, environment 
should be broadly defined to include not only natural elements such as “land, air, water, and noise,” but 
also “population concentration, distribution or growth” and “community.” The statement further asserted 
that “under the city environmental-quality review, the potential displacement of local residents and 
businesses is an effect on population patterns and neighborhood character which must be considered in 
determining whether the requirement for an environmental impact statement is triggered.”60 The ruling 
was significant because it recognized the efficiency of social reproduction as a key element for evaluating 
urban transformations. Although the proposed Henry Street Tower site was a parking lot that would not 
involve direct displacement and eviction of the local residents, the court urged a thorough study of its 
impact on the surrounding area and possible consequence of “second displacement.”61 In 1989 the Henry 
Street Project was ultimately constructed by a group of Hong Kong investors, but the controversy 
revealed the contradictions between an urban form that prioritized access to capital accumulation and one 
elicited according to the efficiency of social reproduction.62
The city-sponsored Special District rezoning in Chinatown encouraged private-market 
gentrification that sought a full-scale remaking of the Lower Manhattan District. Without considerable 
public subsidy, the private-market finance and in particular, the overseas Chinese investment, was used to 
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transform Chinatown into a landscape complex that could be capitalized. As Neil Smith observes, “real-
estate development becomes a centerpiece of the city’s production economy, an end in itself, justified by 
appeals to jobs, taxes, and tourism.”63 In the process, gentrification evolved into “a crucial urban strategy 
for city governments in consort with private capital” under the rhetoric of urban renewal or urban 
redevelopment.64
 
 In contrast with Chicago’s Chinatown where new housing development was built to 
attract middle- or upper-income Chinese families as shown in Chapter Two and Chapter Five, residents in 
San Francisco and New York’s Chinatowns strived for affordable housing. Realizing the threat of 
displacement, they organized anti-gentrification movements to challenge the hegemonic forms of 
neighborhood redevelopment that mobilizes real-estate markets as a tool of urban economic expansion.  
Chinatown Garment Industry Zone 
From 1969 to 1976, manufacturing of all kinds had gradually declined in New York City. The city 
as a whole lost about 600,000 jobs, or 16 percent of the total. From 1969 to 1980, midtown garment 
sector jobs had dropped from 40,000 to 25,000, primarily due to competition in the developing countries 
and other parts of the nation.65 Despite these shifts occurring elsewhere, the garment industry in 
Chinatown experienced significant growth with the influx of cheap labor and foreign capital investment, 
and it became secondary only to the restaurant business in terms of importance to the community’s 
economy. The number of employees in the Chinatown’s garment industry had doubled from 8,000 to 
16,000 from 1970 to 1980. According to the report of International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 
Chinatown had only five garment factories in 1954. But in 1968, the factories increased to 125, and by 
1979 there were about 500 garment factories, hiring about 12,000 to 14,000 workers.66 The rapid growth 
of the industry during the 1960s and 70s was partly due to the extremely low rents for industrial space 
that resulted from the exodus of many other Manhattan manufacturing factories. Thus, the loss of jobs in 
one sector, paradoxically, provided new jobs in another. In addition, a large number of immigrant women 
came to U.S. to join their families under the 1965 Immigrant Acts, and they constituted the dominant 
labor force for garment factories. The easy operation, minimal requirements for little language skills, and 
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relatively small investments also made the Chinese, like the early Jewish immigrants, enter the garment 
industry quickly to develop Chinatown into the biggest manufacturing center of clothing in the city. The 
proliferation of Chinatown garment factories significantly changed the social patterns of the community. 
While the restaurants usually preferred male laborers, the garment factories tended to hire women. The 
gendered labor division allowed two forms of industry to coexist perfectly, and that remain the two pillar 
industries of Chinatown economy. It also increased employment opportunities for the Chinese families in 
which both male and female members would be able to work.   
But Chinatown was soon to experience another shift. Driven by the city-sponsored projects of 
urban revival and the real estate boom in the late 1970s, the demand for loft space for residential and 
office use was growing. Proximate to the SoHo and Walker Street area, Chinatown was perceived as one 
of the most promising areas for loft space conversion (figure 29). By 1980, around 6% of the loft space 
that had been used for manufacturing in Chinatown had been converted as residential units.67 With the 
growing number of property owners applying for permits to convert their buildings for commercial or 
residential purpose, the garment factories confronted enormous pressures of decreased industrial space 
and consequently increasing rents. In 1982, Chinese merchants lobbied the city to urge prohibition of the 
conversion of industrial space in Chinatown. Given these conditions, the City Planning Commission 
proposed to relocate the garment factories that were centered in midtown and Chinatown to a new site in 
Manhattan or elsewhere. They argued that the relocation would not only provide sufficient space for 
developing the garment industry, but also would relieve the shortage of commercial space and housing in 
these central areas. The proposal would supposedly facilitate “a major business venture” that “could free 
up land in areas of Manhattan where increased building (was) taking place.” 68 For the Chinese merchants, 
however, the removal of garment factories from Chinatown would damage the economic stability of the 
community and threaten the very survival of the garment industry itself. Being a labor-intensive industry, 
the success of Chinatown garment factories relied heavily on cheap labor in the form of new Chinese 
immigrants who spoke little English and had great attachment to their community. In relocating the 
garment factories would destabilize the community fabric:  workers would have to move outside of 
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Chinatown to a location near the working place, which might necessitate the reemployment of family 
members, the breakdown of social networks, and the deprivation of social services catering specifically to 
the Chinese immigrant families. Thus, relocating the garment factories seemed an unlikely plan for the 
Chinese merchants to survive in the industrial competition.  
 
Figure 29: The loft building at 372 Broome St. was converted from a garment factory building, ca. 2009 
(photo by Robert K. Chin, http://www.nychinatown.org/storefronts/mott/372broome.html, accessed on 
Oct.5, 2010) 
 
In addition to loft space conversion, the garment industry was also threatened by booming 
property values in Chinatown. The rents for factory spaces had rapidly increased during the 1970s and 
80s. A workshop that had rented for $830 in the 1970s, for instance, had increased to $2,500 in the 1980s, 
with an extra $20,000 as “key money.”69 Despite the increased rents, the property owners still sought to 
evict tenants in order to realize a faster profit by putting the land up for sale. One such case was a ten-
story mansion on East Broadway that was occupied by a garment factory. The Jewish landlord sold the 
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property to an overseas Chinese investor who offered $2,500,000 for the property that had been priced 
around $200,000 in 1970. 70 There were also reports of the landlords using poor managements and 
refusing to provide services as a strategy to get the garment factories to vacate. In such a circumstance, 
the Chinatown garment factories had few choices – they had to either close the business or move to a 
cheaper place. By 1986, the number of Chinatown garment factories had decreased from 600 to around 
500.71
In 1981, the New York City Board of Estimates adopted a new program to place restrictions on 
the conversion of manufacturing space so as to protect manufacturing jobs. It extensively rezoned the 
midtown and lower Manhattan and designated four districts – the Midtown garment center, northeast 
Chelsea, the meat-market area, and the graphic-arts center – as exclusively dedicated to manufacturing. 
Four other “mixed-used” districts, including the Midtown garment center east, southeast Chelsea, SoHo/ 
NoHo, and Tribeca, were allowed to provide only seven million square feet of loft space for residential 
conversion. Advocates of the program declared the zoning change would save more than 100,000 jobs 
and preserve one of the city’s vital industries. But for the real estate owners, it was simply a political deal 
between Mayor Ed Koch and the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) in exchange 
for the support for urban redevelopment project at the 42nd Street.
  
72 In 1987, on the advice of the City 
Planning Commission and ILGWU, the Board of Estimates also approved the rezoning request of a 
seven-block Walker Street area that was bounded by Broadway, Canal, White and Lafayette Streets, for 
the purpose of preserving the area’s garment factories.73 The zoning change indicated the area would 
transform from a mixed-used area to a strictly manufacturing zone. It would protect 4,000 jobs, among 
which were 3,000 jobs provided by Chinatown garment factories.74
Lisa Lowe considers the liberation of immigration policy in the post-war era as an expression of 
the need for economic restructuring in the United States. She argues that with the development of global 
capitalism, the capital imperative demanded immigrants to renew the domestic labor supplies.
  
75 
Chinatown was a space repeatedly reproduced to accommodate the nation’s desire for promoting 
production and restructuring the domestic relations of that production.76 It is logical in a capitalist system 
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to create space that would make manufacturing cheaper and more efficient. Thus, the city’s efforts to 
preserve the garment industry in Chinatown through rezoning regulations demonstrated the ways that 
space was internal to capitalist logics, in which the urban ethnic ghetto was articulated by the forces of 
production and a common economic framework of the local and the global.   
  
The Imposition of White Street Jail in Chinatown 
When the Special Manhattan Bridge District (SMBD) was initiated in 1981, a partnership led by a 
Chinese shipping magnate and an American developer, proposed to build a 52-story commercial and 
residential tower on a vacant lot bounded by Walker Street on the north, Baxter and Centre Streets on the 
east and west, and White Street on the south. Because of the opposition from community members and 
the long-lasting law suit against the SMBD projects, the plan was given up and the city bought the land in 
order to build a prison there. The need for the jail stemmed from the closure of the obsolete Men’s House 
of Detention at Rikers Island in 1978. In looking for an appropriate site for a new detention center, the 
city outlined several selection criteria: the site should be adjacent to the Courts to minimize transportation 
cost; it should be distant from residential areas; the need for demolition and site preparation should be 
minimal; it should be convenient to public transportation; it should be close to the existing civic 
institution and central support services; and the site should be able to provide at least 250,000 square feet 
of construction area.77
When the construction plan for a 500-bed adult facility was revealed the Chinatown community 
reacted strongly and urged the City to stop the plan and cede the site to the local development 
corporation. They argued that locating the jail in the middle of the Chinatown would threaten the safety of 
those who lived and worked in Chinatown. Especially for the female workers who worked in the garment 
 The selection criteria narrowed down the prospective locations whereupon the 
White Street site was immediately selected for its ideal location and convenient transportation to the 
Courts and public facilities. However, the selection committee deliberately ignored the fact that 
Chinatown was a residential neighborhood with one of the highest population densities in Manhattan. 
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factories and had to commute from and to Chinatown on a daily basis, their safety was particularly 
concerned. In addition to the safety issue, one of the major commercial streets of Chinatown, Baxter 
Street, was running across the proposed site. Thus the community members worried that the imposition of 
a jail on the site would also affect the economic vitality of the street and the neighborhood in general by 
arguing that undesirable visitors to the detention center would loiter in Chinatown, and in consequence 
affect the commercial, real estate, and tourism development of the community.78 Moreover, the 
Chinatown community was experiencing an explosive demographic growth in the 1970s and 80s. The 
community needed low-income housing, parking space, and public facilities, not a prison. The White 
Street Site was considered a prime location for new residential and commercial development, but it was 
clear that the construction of the detention center would take away one of the few large undeveloped 
parcels of the neighborhood.79
With respect to these concerns, the Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) of the jail 
construction pointed out that “the detention facilities have been a traditional land use” of the proposed site 
because the Metropolitan Correctional Center was located nearby at 150 Park Row (figure 30). It asserted 
that “direct negative impacts on the nearby neighborhood are expected to be less than would otherwise be 
the case.”
 
80 In other words, since there was already a prison in the area, it would not hurt to have another 
one. In rebuttal, one reviewer of the report argued that another detention facility might bring in 
“cumulative impacts,” which could also be damaging to the social and economic fabric of the 
neighborhood.81 Concerning the safety issues, the DEIR referred to the “modular unit” approach that 
would be adopted in the prison design as an effective way of preventing prison riots. The threat of 
violence was a grave concern, with the recent memory of major prison riots in Attica (1971), Oklahaoma 
(1973), and New Mexico (1980). The modular approach was claimed to improve “classification and 
security management, and provide for a more constructive social environment within the facility” by 
disaggregating the prisoners to smaller and more manageable numbers. 82 Meanwhile, scheduled visiting 
hours and two waiting areas would also help to eliminate the problem of visitors loitering in the 
neighborhood.83 But given the proximity of Columbus Park to the detention facility, the risk of overflow 
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into the neighborhood would still exist. 84 Given the potential disruption of the physical landscape of the 
Chinese neighborhood, the DEIR claimed architectural innovation would be adopted to neutralize the 
appearance of the prison to create “a secure, safe, and humane environment for those in custody.”85 The 
architectural design would blend with the existing building styles to make the prison’s bulk and visual 
impact “much less than that of the existing detention facility.”86 In other words, it would mitigate the 
visual impact of the “prison look” and make the prison “invisible” while standing harmoniously within 
the surrounding built landscape.87 
 
Figure 30: The Metropolitan Correctional Center at 150 Park Row is very close to the central area of 
Chinatown, ca.2009 (photo by Robert K. Chin, 
http://www.nychinatown.org/storefronts/chatham/150parkrow.html, accessed on Oct.5, 2010) 
 
In spite of the efforts made by the DEIR to justify the prison project, in 1982 about 12,000 
protesters marched to City Hall before the city would vote for final decision, chanting “No More Jails in 
Chinatown.” The leader of CCBA proposed six alternate usages of the White Street Site including 
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affordable housing, commercial building, parking lot, youth entertainment facility, community social 
service building, and hotel.88 However, Mayor Koch insisted that the city had a “critical need” for a new 
jail, especially one in the particular area for its proximity to the existing Manhattan House of Detention 
(also known as the Tombs) and the criminal courts. He asserted that the prison population in NYC had 
increased 25 percent in less than two years (probably due to the nationwide “War on Drugs"), which led 
to a decreased crime rate “because when criminals are behind bars they can’t commit crimes.” He openly 
reproached the protest against the construction of the new jail. Moreover, his reproach was directed not 
only at the Chinese, but also the Blacks’ objection to building a homeless shelter in Harlem and the Jews’ 
demonstration against the resource recovery plant in Brooklyn. Although these ethnic groups were simply 
trying to protect themselves from undesirable facilities that would never have been imposed on elite 
districts, he condemned the resistance as “selfishness” for putting “local interests above city interests.”89
With this kind of support from above, the City Hall voted to pass the White Street Jail proposal in 
1983. In order to minimize the “un-neighborly” impact of the jail, Charles Lauster, a private consultant 
hired by Community Board One, urged the city to build a mixed-used development of retail 
establishments, community facilities, and low and moderate income housing next to the detention center. 
The cost for the mixed-use project was estimated to be approximately $12,100,000, and it would be 
financed by private developers. Lauster suggested that “beyond the need for these additional facilities in 
Chinatown, it is even more important that the entire complex serve as an ‘anchor’ to protect the 
community from being washed away by what many residents fear is an overwhelming tide of criminal 
justice facilities.”
   
90 The forbidding presence of the detention center would disrupt the urban fabric around 
it, but the new development adjacent to the jail could help to reestablish the broken urban fabric and 
mitigate the disruption imposed on the “retail potential” of Chinatown.91 The project was designed to be 
able to self-support in the long run while the rents of the three lower floors of retail space could subsidize 
the operation of community facilities and low-income housing on the upper floors. However, Lauster also 
pointed out that opening the new development to market forces might “drive up real estate costs to a point 
ensuring major disruption of local land use patterns,” which would be “especially disastrous for the 
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garment industry and for housing for community residents.”92 He further asserted that the commercial 
complex would have a mixed impact on surrounding land uses. While new commercial space might, in 
the short run, lessen the tendency of converting garment shops and residences to commercial use because 
of the increasing supply, in the long run, a successful commercial zone could lead to rising rents. It would 
attract new businesses into the area, especially from those firms in midtown or the financial district which 
would seek lower rents in the surrounding areas, and firms, not linked to local communities, could easily 
bid up rents beyond the reach of local business and residents, which could result in the loss of jobs and 
homes.93
In the midst of these debates, in 1984, a compromise plan was finally reached between the city 
and the Chinatown community groups. The plan proposed an 11-story, 88-unit senior apartment tower on 
the northern part of the White Street site, in which commercial space would constitute the lower three 
floors of the housing tower (figure 31).
 Thus, even though the mixed-use project might provide some relief for the imposed pressures of 
the detention center on the social consistency of Chinatown, it also presented the threat of gentrification.   
94 Under the agreement, the city leased the site for the senior 
housing project to a local development corporation. Without the support of federal funding, the project 
had to rely on market-generated funds, for which the commercial space at the lower floors were rented for 
retail business, office, and community facilities. Regardless, the eventual erection of the White Street Jail 
made the Chinese believe that their insufficient voting power resulted in failure. As asserted by a member 
of the Chinese Progressive Association, the battle left “the community with the feeling that the Chinese 
have no political power in New York City. We get 10,000 people to march around City Hall to protest the 
jail, and yet the city still goes ahead with the plan. There’s a lot of frustration that has built up over the 
last year over the way the city deals with Chinatown.”95
In addition, the public discourse that constructed Chinatown as a liminal space associated with 
social marginality, poverty, and foreignness also enabled the practices and process of spatial production. 
Fanned by media publicity, Chinatown was associated with delinquency, illegal immigrants, disorder, 
violence, and crime which somehow made it permissible to locate the city’s defense against crime—a 
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major jail—in that neighborhood. The juxtaposition of the “slum” imagery and the notion of “model 
 
Figure 31: The White Street Jail with its lower levels facing Baxter Street used for commercial and 
community space, ca. 2008 (Photo by author) 
 
minority” convey contradictory passages of the Asian American experiences, but both have constituted 
the basis for discriminatory backlash as the image of “slum” was perceived as threat to the urban 
modernization and Asian American success became a potential threat to the White hegemony. Within 
such a context, urban planning was employed as a tool of social control. The imposition of White Street 
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jail manifested the consistency of the spatialized approach to manage racial, social, and class difference. 
Thus in New York City, the jail development in Chinatown was a predictable outcome of the play of 
power politics and competitive strength of territorially based polity. Similar to what happened in 
Chicago’s Chinatown where public housing projects and highways were constructed, the city and the 
dominant social powers gained access through spatial strategies to marginalize and control the 
subordinated groups.  
 
Cleaning Street Trade in Chinatown 
In the 1970s and 80s, New York City conducted a series of efforts to revitalize the streets of 
Lower East Manhattan. The Canal Street Flea Market, started in 1973, operated outdoors on a parking lot 
located at the corner of Greene and Canal Street in the SoHo (South of Houston) district every weekend. 
In the 1980s, the Greene Street Block Association had formed with the aim of closing down the market 
because it introduced garbage and “undesirable element(s) into the neighborhood.”96 By this they referred 
to some of the vendors who camped out on the street overnight, which increased crime and generated 
sanitary problem for the area. In addition, some 3,000 to 4,000 cars coming into the neighborhood each 
weekend aggravated street congestion. In 1984, the association successfully brought the city’s Building 
Department to investigate the market. According to the lease signed by the market operator, the market 
site was prohibited any use of the land but a parking lot, and it lacked a valid certificate of occupancy. 
According to the city’s zoning resolution, a permanent market with an ongoing retail function had to be 
operated in an enclosed facility. Despite these accusations, the market was widely perceived as a 
“browsers’ paradise” that provided an array of low-priced merchandise and attracted hordes of  tourists.97 
Shoppers, vendors, and supporters pleaded with the city to keep the market open and asserted that the 
market contributed to the city’s economy both as a source of employment and as a tourist attraction for 
shoppers coming from all over the world.98 In addition, most of the vendors were immigrants and elderly 
who relied on the market to make a living. Nonetheless, the city closed the market in 1986.99  
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Accompanying the closure of the Canal Street Flea Market, in June 1984 a new law banning 
stands and stalls on more than 250 streets in NYC was instituted. The law became controversial because 
street trades on some of the banned streets were deemed to be “economically essential or historically 
intrinsic.”100 The city formed the Inter Agency Task Force to execute the new regulation. They claimed 
that, although street trade was an essential part of New York life for the past century, illegal vendors 
ruined the tradition and negatively impacted on the city’s street scenes.101 Two major streets in the 
Chinatown, Canal and Mott Streets, were listed as banned streets, which was deleterious to the area’s 
economy. As an important economic constituency to Chinatown, street trade was prosperous at Canal 
Street, Chatham Square, and East Broadway Street, selling fresh foods and dry goods. 90% of the 
Chinatown vendors were new immigrants from Hong Kong, mainland China, and Vietnam, who didn’t 
have English language and professional skills.102 Thus street trade was an important way for them to enter 
the economy, providing them alternative ways of living with greater autonomy and possibility for 
economic advancement. Nevertheless, street vendors in Chinatown, especially on Canal Street, were 
perceived to cause street congestion and sanitation problem (figure 32). They also competed directly with 
store owners without sharing the burden of rent, property taxes, and street cleaning. Traffic congestion 
was one of the problems that most concerned. The unregulated “take over” of sidewalks by vendor’s 
carts, together with their large delivery trucks, worsened the already crowded conditions of Chinatown 
and presented threat to the pedestrian safety.  
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Figure 32: Street vendors on Canal Street that brought sanitary and traffic issues to the sidewalk, ca. 2008 
(Photo by author) 
 
In response to the new zoning regulation, multiple opinions were formed in the Chinatown 
community. One interest group constituted by the street vendors who were directly affected by the new 
law saw the enactment of the new regulations as a tactic to deprive them of their licenses and rights to the 
street. The city only gave the vendors two weeks to leave the streets and no settlement was arranged, 
which would leave many vendors unemployed. For the storeowners, however, the new regulation was 
very much applauded. They complained that the vendors stole their commercial traffic and competed 
unfairly. The eviction of street vendors would mediate the pressures on the established property-owning 
business community. The Chinatown residents also supported the institution of the new laws. They 
believed that the vendors had caused inconvenience for pedestrians and brought trash to the streets.103 
Regardless of the different responses to the street trader clearance campaign, there was a general concern 
for the newly unemployed vendors and the increasing unemployment rate within the Chinatown 
community. After the institution of the ban, the Chinatown vendors demonstrated at Canal Street, urging 
 151 
the city: “Don’t Ignore Livelihood of Chinatown Vendors.” In a public hearing, the Chinese vendors 
demanded that the city government to show some sympathy to the Chinatown vendors and postpone the 
execution of the new regulation. The CCBA also supported the street vendors by arguing the licensed 
vendors’ right to street trading should be protected, albeit on altered terms. They suggested the city 
government should build a market center at the northern part of White Street Jail for the evicted vendors. 
Otherwise, the evicted vendors might simply move to East Broadway, which was not a banned street, and 
disturb the existing order of the street.104
Only in 1993, the Community Board 3 passed a resolution to build a vendor market in a derelict 
section of Sara D. Roosevelt Park, located on Grand Street between Chrystie and Forsyth (figure 33). The 
plan was both a business venture and a community development project. Yet once again, a development 
project stirred controversy. As one of the few open spaces in the area, the conversion of the Roosevelt 
Park aroused concerns of the surrounding neighborhoods. Furthermore – and this was probably what 
worried them most – the vendor market was far from the central area of the Chinatown and might not 
attract tourists. Their concerns were justified, for the market soon turned out to be a great disappointment. 
Especially with the closure of the Grand Street subway station, there were only a few visitors to the 
market. The vendors who rented the space also complained about the poor facilities within the park – 
there was no running water and adequate drainage and the storage space and display carts were 
inadequate. Considering the poor management of the market, in 1996 Century 21 New Golden Age 
Realty took over the market and changed its name to “Dragon’s Gate” in order to appeal to tourists. The 
vendors built semi-permanent structures with metal frame and walls, and tapped into water and sewer 
lines. These acts aroused discontent of the neighboring communities. The Parks Department claimed the 
interventions were illegal by violating the rules of the park. After litigation, in March 1999, the Parks 
Department forcefully demolished the illegal structures with three bulldozers and a group of policemen. 
The vendors, who had invested thousands of dollars to build the so called “stores” in the park, became 
ultimate victims in this battle. Language deficiency, ignorance of the legal systems of America, and 
ingenuous trust of the management company contributed to their misfortune.  
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Figure 33: Sara D. Roosevelt Park on Grand Street is away from the center of Chinatown. As a location 
for a vendor’s market, it  did not attract visitors from Chinatown. (Graphic by author, based on GIS data 
provided by New York City government at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doitt/html/eservices/eservices_gis_downloads.shtml) 
 
In addition to the management of street trades and outdoor market place, the city also attempted to 
improve its streetscapes. In 1976, the New York City Department of Urban Planning had conducted the 
“Chinatown Street Revitalization” study in order to improve the street life in the area. The final report 
emphasized “pedestrian movement, safety and over-all cleanliness” as important qualities for a pleasant 
street environment.105 It observed that nearly all sidewalks in Chinatown were narrower than the standard 
streets in urban residential areas, which should be at least 15-feet wide. In Chinatown, the average 
sidewalk width was only about 13.3 feet while the roadbeds also fell far short of the city’s standard of 24-
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feet width. Throngs of pedestrians and heavy vehicle traffic presented another obstacle to the street life. 
Pedestrian volumes at the busiest intersection of Mott and Bayard Street reached 7,500 persons per hours 
on weekdays and on the weekends the number was even higher. Vehicle traffic on the major roads such as 
Canal and Bowery Streets was also exceedingly heavy. Chinatown residents identified “narrow, crowded 
roads and sidewalks,” “piles of waste and litter,” “too many tourists,” and “dangerous crossings” as the 
major problems of the streets, among which street vendors were also perceived as impediments to a 
pleasant street environment.106
Urban space management is at the centre of the issue of urban development. Through the 
regulatory processes, the city government deprived the street vendors of opportunities, so that they stayed 
on the bottom rung of the economic ladder while hoping to improve their socioeconomic status. The 
urban renewal machine was empowered by the government regulations and controls, which privileged the 
development of the upper-circuit economy while it restrained the “backward” lower-circuit economy. 
James Holston has argued that by eliminating the historic street system that was considered “too 
congested and unhealthy for the modern machine age,” the modern mechanism of urban planning also 
“eliminates the urban crowds and the outdoor political domain of social life that the street traditionally 
supports.”
 With respect to such conditions, the Chinatown Street Revitalization report 
suggested the city remove the street vendors from the sidewalk and open a “vendor market” in a 
triangular site bounded by Canal and Baxter Streets as a replacement (Figure 34). But the proposal 
appeared to be infeasible considering the insufficient area in the site to accommodate the replaced 
vendors.   
107 In a sense, the utopic paradigm imposed by city planners and government 
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Figure 34: A proposed vendor market at a triangle site at Baxter and Canal Streets (Source: Chinatown 
Street Revitalization, 1976, p.39). 
 
authorities tended to generate a dystopic version of the urban social life that they had wanted to avoid in 
the first place. Thus Holston calls for a mode of planning that would incorporate the ethnographic present 
and its contingent and unexpected social conditions. He highlights the importance of acknowledging the 
heterogeneous ethnographic practices and the insurgent citizenship of the new members of the city.108 For 
the Chinatown community, street trades have constituted an essential—albeit controversial—sector of the 
community’s economy. The city’s campaign to forcefully remove the street vendors solved one set of 
problems but it created another set in which the normative and institutional definition of the public space 
became a new category of exclusion. The development of informal economy in Chinatown is closely 
linked to the processes of globalization and urban redevelopment, the exclusion of the low-skilled 
immigrants from the benefits of these processes, and the increasing urban polarization. Street trading, in 
particular, as a controversial component of the informal economy, is complicated by the complete lack of 
effective local legislation or regulation to establish market and create space for the street vendors. The  
Chinese immigrants who seek their fortunes on the street become victims in the process by being 
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castigated as illegal. Such evidence indicates the contested meanings and uses of street and urban public 
space, and the control of public space as an essential tool in urban redevelopment.109
 
 It also reveals the 
play of class even within the Chinatown community, where the interests of propertied merchants clashed 
against the interests of more economically vulnerable street vendors.   
Conclusions 
During the 1960s, Chinatown political engagement had been suppressed because at that time 
community activists were labeled as Communist under the constant surveillance of the FBI and anti-
Communism groups. It was only after 1972 when Nixon visited China and normalized the diplomatic 
relations between the two nations that the Chinatown community could agitate for their civil rights and 
equal treatment in the social and political domains. A central concern of this chapter is to look Chinatown 
as a site of production, in which urban strategies such as zoning regulations, street trader clearance 
campaign, and imposition of public projects were used to reproduce the relations of production and 
capitalize the land of Chinatown.110 In the 1960s and 70s, the force of urban renewal tended to encourage 
the ascendance of finance and service industries, and attract transnational capitalist investment. As Saskia 
Sassen argues, “At the global level, a key dynamic explaining the place of major cities in the world 
economy is that they concentrate the infrastructure and the servicing that produce a capability for global 
control.”111
Landscape transformations in Chinatown cannot be understood in isolation from the primary 
changes in the larger context of urban socio-economic developments. The combined forces of production, 
politics, and globalization that led to the transformation of urban forms contributed to a spatial and social 
reproduction in the Chinatown. In addition, racial hierarchy and class differentiations continued to play a 
central role in the processes of urban reformation. Power struggle was essential in this process. The 
 New York City’s reconfiguration of the space of Chinatown through a series of special zoning 
regulations manifested the city’s embeddedness in the globalization of economic activities. As a strategic 
site for the city to draw oversea Asian capital, Chinatown also sustained and reproduced its transnational 
and global connections through the local mechanism of space.   
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presence of disadvantaged groups demanding new membership and democracy generated contradictory 
spaces, contestation, and internal differentiation within the cities.112
The cases in this chapter also illuminate the paradoxical conditions for the Chinatown in the 
processes of urban regeneration and globalization. On the one hand the influx of oversea capital brought 
prosperity to the community by revitalizing its commercial and real estate market; but on the other hand, 
the upper circuit of transnational capitalist development appeared to be incompatible with the lower 
circuit economy that traditionally dominated Chinatown as an urban ethnic enclave. The series of acts 
adopted by the city to encourage community redevelopment through the framework of gentrification 
entailed the appropriation and penetration of the geographical terrain and properties that previously 
belonged to the working-class Chinese immigrants in exchange for urban accumulation. Local interests 
were consistently subordinated to the interests of urban authorities and the non-local investors (both 
White and Chinese), which showed their unequal access to the benefits accrued from the urban 
redevelopment processes. The local initiatives to resisting the overridden representation from “above” and 
the wealthy outsiders revealed the local residents’ concrete responses to urban renewal and its adjunctive 
displacement and misrepresentation.  
 Lisa Lowe has argued that U.S. 
capital was maximized not through “abstract labor” that claimed to have no divisions marked by race, 
nation of origin, class, or gender, but precisely through the social production of differences.113 For her, the 
“abstract” citizen is an illusionary category, in which material differences cannot be dissolved into 
political representation.114 Thus, the accessibility to substantive rights of citizenship was associated with 
the material particularities of citizens. Similarly, in The Condition of Postmodernity, David Harvey argues 
that the logics of capitalism use the production of difference both in the real and symbolic forms as a 
means of profit making.115 In a sense, the persistence of racial and ethnic differences amidst the urban 
economic system continued to produce the space of Chinatown as marginal and deviant.   
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Chapter 4: Historic Preservation and the Politics of Identity in San Francisco’s Chinatown 
 
From the 1960s to 1970s, the downtown of San Francisco underwent the kind of extensive urban 
renewal that had been conducted in many American cities. Chapter One explained that San Francisco’s 
Chinatown experienced the encroachment of Financial District and a severe housing crisis because of the 
rapid development of the city’s core area. Acknowledging that the uncontrolled urban expansion might 
destroy the city’s historic characteristics, in the 1980s, the city planning department decided to preserve 
the old neighborhoods of the city and proposed San Francisco’s Chinatown as a historic district. This 
chapter examines the social processes of investing the constructed space of Chinatown with cultural 
meaning and ethnic identity, and explores how the dominant discourse of heritage and ethnicity has been 
continuously reproduced and appropriated with the changing needs of representation and issues of urban 
growth and development. Specifically, it focuses on divergent ideologies guiding the use of heritage and 
space in San Francisco’s Chinatown, which have been articulated by different social groups and 
stakeholders. While existing scholarship focuses on Chinatown’s spatial formations as associated with 
racial practices and shared ethnicity, this chapter highlights the internal dynamics of the ethnic 
community. It is particularly attentive to the intra-ethnic tensions regarding social, class, and generational 
differentiations, for it is not only the very formation of the identity of a place that must be understood by 
locating it within a context of outside forces, but also the internal diversity and variation of the area.1
From the early efforts to rebuild Chinatown after the 1906 earthquake through its evolution into a 
historic district and one of the most visited tourism destinations in the city, architecture and spatial 
configurations have played seminal roles by visually identifying the community as a preeminent symbol 
of ethnic culture. The prosperity of the tourism industry and mass cultural production in the modern era 
propelled the cultural consumption of enclaves of “ethnicity.” Yet the emphasis on an essentialized 
cultural identity tended to obscure the complex process of spatial reorganization through social relations 
of those both “inside” and “outside” of the community. The various efforts to recollect, and indeed 
regulate, the past of Chinatown revealed the ambiguous and contradictory ways that the past has been 
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represented and reimagined in contemporary space. In the process of spatializing historical resources, 
historic preservation was feared, resisted, and celebrated in San Francisco’s Chinatown, and the role of 
historic preservation was also questioned. In a sense, preservation can be a real challenge; at stake were 
the preservation of the city neighborhood as a heritage site and an inscription of memory, or maintaining 
it as a vital place evolving to incorporate the everyday activities pursued by its inhabitants.  
The very “ethnic enclave” that modern western society used to exclude undesirable others, in 
many ways, enabled the ethnic minorities to coalesce in order to renegotiate power relations in the urban 
landscape. The hegemonic discourse of tradition and heritage that accorded priority to the changing socio-
economy and dominant social values generated a “counter-discourse” that was solidly grounded on the 
ethnic empowerment and “insurgent citizenship” of the minority group.2
  
  Considering space as a key 
resource for identity construction, it is essential to understand how the ethnic enclave was bounded by 
frontiers that distinguish the inside from outside. Boundary consciousness is a mutual process that could 
also be internalized by the minority community, whose insecurity of its political economic territories 
accentuates its own boundary perception, where autonomy and independence were at stake. Thus the 
efforts of articulating “Chinese identity” in the built environment have proved to be an organizing tool 
that enabled the formation of a political unity of the Chinese groups. But meanwhile, it also masks a 
particular constellation of social relations that are produced by the histories of unequal and uneven power 
relations.  
Rebuilding Chinatown as an “Oriental City” 
Before the 1906 earthquake, the residents of San Francisco’s Chinatown made little attempt to 
express their cultural identity through architecture. The majority of Chinatown buildings were Italianate 
Victorian buildings that could not be distinguished from buildings in the surrounding areas. At that time, 
Chinatown was described as “neither picturesque nor Oriental” and “the pagoda as a building is wholly 
absent…the majority of the buildings are of brick, two or three stories high and with the cellars or 
basements… the architecture is thoroughly American…”3 Accordingly, of the four district association 
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headquarters that had been built in Chinatown, only the architecture of the Yeong Wo District Association 
seemed ostensibly Chinese because it had carved wooden lions standing by the entryway and a distinctive 
courtyard and portico.4
But Chinatown suffered badly during the 1906 earthquake in San Francisco, and the city proposed 
moving Chinatown to Hunter’s Point, a sparsely populated region at the edge of the city. The city officials 
optimistically envisioned the new Chinatown as an “oriental city, properly sewered, with paved streets, 
schools, and all the essentials of modern life, but also with features outwardly characteristic of a Chinese 
city, with its pagodas, its temples and its lantern-hung porticoes”(figure 35).
 A Chinese theater known as Hook Took Tong, built in 1852, had a pagoda-like 
façade. These were among the very few buildings in San Francisco’s Chinatown that evinced a Chinese 
architectural style in the nineteenth century.  
5  Although the relocation 
plan ultimately failed because of the resistance of the Chinatown residents, the exotic imagery created for 
the Chinatown perpetuated the essential ideas of the Orient and revealed the city’s desire to rebuild 
Chinatown as a stereotypical Oriental city. As Edward Said has argued, this kind of creation was “almost 
a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories 
and landscapes, remarkable experiences.”6 It was also a material result of a system of knowledge and a 
cultural history that had given the Orient a cognitive reality in and for the West.7
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35: The perspective of Hunter’s Point’s Chinatown (Source: The Unshakable—Rebirth of S.F. 
Chinatown in 1906, special issue of Sing Tao Daily, April 15, 2006, p.32) 
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Once it was clear that the Chinese would be allowed to rebuild Chinatown in its original location, 
many temporary wooden structures were erected there to house Chinese business, family and district 
associations. Accordingly, by June of 1906, two months after the earthquake, twelve Chinese stores 
opened in Chinatown on Dupont (Grant Avenue of today), Sansome, Sacramento, Washington, and Clay 
Streets. Even though commercial activities prospered soon after the earthquake, the merchants were 
hesitant to put up permanent structures because no official permits had been released by the city. The 
Chinese press acted aggressively to urge the Chinese merchants to hasten the pace of reconstruction, and 
they convinced the merchants that permits would soon be granted. The Chinese merchants, however, 
wanted to wait until the Six Company, the leading association of the community, started the construction 
of its headquarters, before the rest would go ahead with reconstruction. But because of the shortage of 
funding, the Six Company and other associations delayed construction until city permits were granted to 
forty-three Chinese businesses in Chinatown.8
Considering the vices and crimes present in the old Chinatown, the city insisted the new 
Chinatown should show a different physical and social appearance by eliminating the notoriously filthy 
alleys and brothels, opium dens, and gambling halls. They decided to widen the narrow streets of 
Chinatown and add 30 feet to Dupont Street, which was connected with Grant Avenue through a newly 
constructed 100-feet wide avenue. The project was completed in 1908, by which point Dupont Street had 
become part of Grant Avenue. With Dupont’s connection to one of the city’s major streets, Chinatown 
became more physically integrated with the city and less of an isolated enclave. The Chinese community 
leaders, who were keenly aware of racial prejudice, believed the first priority after the earthquake should 
be to rebuild Chinatown so as to reverse its reputation as a slum. To hinder the city’s plan of removing 
Chinatown from its central location and also recognizing the importance of tourism in securing the area’s 
survival, Look Tin Eli, a wealthy Chinese merchant and founder of the Bank of Canton, proposed to 
construct the new Chinatown as a place of “veritable fairy palaces.” 
  
9 The purpose was clear – they 
wanted to create a neighborhood “so appealing and idiosyncratic that no one would want to dismantle 
it.”10 The proposal corresponded perfectly to the idea of an “Oriental City” that had been drafted by the 
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city planners. Thus it received strong support from the San Francisco Real Estate Board, who passed a 
resolution recommending “all property owners… of Chinatown to have their buildings rebuilt with fronts 
of Oriental and artistic appearance…”11
The “oriental” style that had been used to great effect at the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair was a 
great inspiration to the architectural design of the new actual Chinatown. Pagoda rooflines and other 
Chinese motifs were used to accessorize buildings possessing standard western facades. At the corner of 
California and Dupont Street, two of the great bazaars, the Sing Fat and the Sing Chong, were designed 
by architect T. Patterson Ross and engineer A.W. Burgren, who successfully managed to create an 
“oriental” style of architecture within the city’s building code. The two buildings not only constituted the 
gateway to the Chinatown, but also became iconic landmarks (figure 36). Surrounding the two buildings, 
five other great bazaars – the Shanghai Bazaar, Canton Bazaar, Wah Sing Lung, Wing Sing, and Yan Wo 
– had been gradually erected and formed an early core area of the community.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: The Sing Fat and the Sing Chong Buildings at Grant Avenue, San Francisco, ca. 2007 (Photo 
by the author) 
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The design approaches adopted in these structures to ostensibly sinicize architecture also 
influenced the landscape constructions of Chinatown in the following decades. For instance, the South 
Grant Avenue, two blocks of Grant Avenue between Bush and California Street, was identified as a 
commercial street where the retailing of oriental goods and antiques constituted the major business. The 
appearance of the buildings on the street showed intensive “Oriental” styles: Chinese motifs, upturned 
eaves, and pagoda towers accessorized the exterior of the architectures. In 1925, during the Diamond 
Jubilee, lights were installed on Grant Avenue between Bush and Broadway Street in the form of Chinese 
lanterns resting atop dragon-entwined lamp posts. The community press proudly claimed the lanterns as 
the “most distinctive landmarks” in the Chinatown area that “pin point [our] Chinatown in the four 
corners of the earth.” Grant Avenue was also referred to as the “Street of Dragon Lantern.”12
In 1932, architect Julia Morgan also contributed to the interpretation of “Chineseness” in the 
design of the Chinese YWCA building on Clay Street of Chinatown (figure 37). Inspired by the Chinese 
things exhibited in Paris Exposition of 1900, Morgan designed a few buildings adopting Chinese-style 
motifs and decorations, which included the Ming Kwong Chinese Girls’ School in 1924 and the former 
Methodist Chinese Mission School at 940 Washington Street in 1910. The Chinatown YWCA was a 
community-based recreation and education center serving young Chinese women. The red-brick clad 
building accommodated a gymnasium, library, and other educational and recreational facilities. It still 
stands today: two octagonal towers project above the central entrance, one square tower rises above the 
west wing of the building, and the roof is covered by handmade clay tiles, reportedly imported from 
China.
   
13 The arched entryway is decorated with glazed geometric patterns, above which is a circular 
window with Chinese stone lattice work. Within the building, a narrow rectangular courtyard with a 
Chinese-style garden also reflects Morgan’s conception of Chinese traditional architecture. In the Chinese 
concept of space, there is no distinct boundary between the garden and the building – the garden is an 
integral part of the interior space through the framing of various windows and wall openings. Adopting 
the traditional approach of garden design, Morgan created a spatial sequence giving the visitor a 
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contemplative experience. Nothing is straightforward; instead, a meandering and teasing succession was 
unfolded in the organization of spaces. Although the building’s interior was subsequently remodeled by 
Chinese American architect Philip Choy to accommodate a space for the Chinese Historical Society of 
America Museum and Learning Center in the 1990s, the original aesthetic quality and Chinese 
characteristics have been carefully retained until today.          
 
Figure 37: The Chinese YWCA building, now is used as the Chinese Historical Society of America 
Museum and Learning Center, ca.2007 (Photo by author). 
 
H.A Crosby Forbes has suggested that the export of Chinese decorative arts greatly influenced the 
early American vision of China. The stateside construction of cultural icons such as Chinese-style garden 
pavilions and architecture, and what were known in the nineteenth century as “Museums of Chinese 
Curiosities” such as returning China trader Nathan Dunn’s Chinese Museum in Philadelphia, had also 
played an instrumental role in the formation of the imaginary China.14 Motifs like pagodas were adopted 
in American architecture when Americans were attempting to “create a romantic vision of Cathay by 
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erecting villas, gardens, amusement parks, and other public displays that were at least partially Chinese in 
their appearance or contents.”15 Regarding the Western fantasies toward the Orient, John Kuo Wei Tchen 
has identified three forms of Orientalism that took shape from the socioeconomic, political, and cultural 
conditions of American society in different historical periods. The first is “patrician Orientalism” that was 
driven by the passionate taste for Chinese luxuries to establish a culture of distinction among American 
elites in the early nineteenth century. Second, with the expansion of the commercial marketplace in New 
York and the decline of the Chinese empire by the end of nineteenth century, “commercial Orientalism” 
emerged as a form in which Chinese things, ideas, and people were commodified to gratify the American 
desire for exoticism. Both patrician Orientalism and commercial Orientalism facilitated a stereotypic 
representation of the Chinese and reinforced a construction of the culture of “otherness.” As Tchen has 
argued, “Neither the elite culture of distinction nor the market culture of commercial stereotypes allowed 
enough breathing room for real, cross-cultural Chinese individuals to thrive.”16 The racialized perception 
and representation of the Chinese immigrants as barbaric, alien, and unassimilated Others created a solid 
ideological ground in which the anti-Chinese agitation was cultivated. Tchen also explores the form of 
“political Orientalism” that was rooted in the national political debates about Chinese contracted laborers. 
The fear of job competition and degraded working conditions drove the leaders of White labor unions and 
politicians to categorize the Chinese as an “inferior” race and exclude them from the national polity. The 
practices of exclusion and segregation foregrounded racial and cultural differences, invented new 
hierarchies, and led to unequal power and domination. In these processes, space is a mechanism that 
reinforces the exercise of control and subjugation. Thus, as Tchen concludes, Chinatown “was shaped not 
so much by the actual presence of Chinese in the metropolis as by their systemic erasure and omnipresent 
‘otherness’ in New York before Chinatown.”17 Visual signs such as pagoda rooflines and ornamental 
street lanterns helped to produce this rigidly confined Oriental “otherness” that became both a social and 
racial construction. It is hard to define which specific form of Tchen’s Orientalism contributed to the 
reconstruction of San Francisco’s Chinatown as an “Oriental City” after the 1906 earthquake, because the 
three forms of Orientalism are closely connected and operate interdependently. Patrician Orientalism and 
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commercial Orientalism had prompted the popular interest in searching for an essentialized, romantic 
visual image of the Chinatown. To overturn the long-held perception of Chinatown as a filthy and 
immoral slum, the Chinese Americans and Chinese immigrants regarded the rebuilding of Chinatown as a 
strategy that would lead Chinatown to a brighter future. For them, exoticism was understood as a means 
to enhance the public image and viability of the Chinese community. The romantic vision provided 
favorable new ways for the mainstream society to view Chinatown, but it also obscured the actual being 
and socio-cultural composition of the community. The political Orientalism that was featured as 
exclusion, oppression, and exploitation was concealed in the romantic images of Chinatown to legitimate 
the institutions of inequality, marginalization, and segregation that imposed socio-economic control on 
the Others. But whether the new construction of ethnicity was a way of domination or merely a 
commercial decision, it is worth noting that the rebuilding of Chinatown was the product of a set of 
dynamics that had continued to shape the relations of power, race, and spatiality.  
While the built environment of the new Chinatown was intensively “Orientalized” in the post-
earthquake construction, the community’s social institutions continued to emphasize Americanization. 
Influenced by the American reform movement’s activities at Hull House, Tuskegee and elsewhere, the 
Chinatown elites promoted American virtues such as public hygiene, nuclear family and middle-class 
respectability. They established social organizations such as hospitals with western medical treatment, 
YMCAs and YWCAs, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and the Chinese American Citizens 
Alliance.18 As the journalist and photographer Louis Stellman argued, the destructive 1906 fire was 
“(p)erhaps the most powerful westernizing agency ever applied to the Chinese.”19 The year of 1906 was a 
turning point from which Chinatown became a kind of theme park designed to fulfill the westerner’s 
imagination of the Orient and also make the community an attractive tourist spot to make sure its survival. 
In addition, the disaster also opened up the once closed door of the Chinatown and transformed its 
relation to mainstream society through the force of confrontation. Art historian Anthony W. Lee has 
acknowledged two major transformations of Chinatown after the earthquake. One was the development of 
the quarter into a “full-blown tourist destination” for which otherness and exotica had been marketed as a 
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major attraction. The other was the anxiety caused by the replacement of existing social and cultural 
orders with revolutionary republican values, which reflected profound changes in China. Lee believes that 
the two forces of transformation were fundamentally at odds since the power of the tourism industry 
always tended to “freeze or preserve cultural and social practices,” especially when difference was being 
commodified, whereas the revolutionary force of republic, on the other hand, sought to advance society 
by abandoning its old values and traditions.20 Although the two forces of change seem incompatible due 
to their attachment to different values, they were both driven by the post-earthquake processes of contact, 
interaction, negotiation, and compromise between the Chinese community and the dominant society. 
Rather than freezing or preserving the traditional cultural and social practices, the production of ethnic 
tourism in Chinatown was actually grounded on the construction or invention of ethnicity and tradition, 
for which a particular “way of seeing” alleged power over the material world through the device of 
perspective.21 Dean MacCannell suggests that modernity consist of literally turning the “real life” of 
others into “a production and a fetish,” and says that the “emergence of a fascination for the ‘real life’ of 
others” becomes “the outward signs of an important social redefinition of the categories ‘truth’ and 
‘reality’ now taking place.”22 To sustain a firm sense of authenticity and reality, as argued by 
MacCannell, requires the trope of mystification. The social structure itself is automatically involved in the 
process of constructing the mode of mystification that supports social reality.23 Towards this end, tourism 
development in Chinatown has mobilized architectural arrangements, social and cultural resources to 
stage a scene accommodating the desire of the sightseers. Lee correctly suggests that it would be difficult 
to “measure a process of ‘Westernizing’ defined against ‘East’ whose meaning was itself in flux.”24
 
 For 
the Chinese Americans and Chinese immigrants, in post-earthquake Chinatown ethnicity and exoticism 
had been adopted as tactics essential for the survival of the community.   
Chinatown as a Historic District 
Concerned that the rapid Manhattanization was reducing the diversity and historic values of the 
built environment of the city, the San Francisco Planning Department proposed a Downtown Plan in 1985 
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that  highlighted the importance of historic preservation in the downtown area and proposed shifting new 
development to the South-of-Market districts.25 With increasing opposition to the uncontrolled 
proliferation of high-rise office buildings, a Proposition M was approved by local voters to moderate the 
expansion of office spaces and limit the construction of new office buildings to an annual city total of 
950,000 square feet.26
The San Francisco Planning Commission proposed interim controls on Chinatown development, 
seeking to preserve the historic character of the community by restraining new urban development and 
preventing the spread of high-rise building projects into the neighborhood. These controls not only set 
height restrictions on new non-residential and residential buildings, but also reduced the floor area ratio in 
core Chinatown from 10:1 to 6:1 and noncore area from 6:1 to 4.8:1.
 At the same time, the renewed appreciation of the cultural and economic diversity 
of the urban neighborhoods led the city to recognize officially the historical significance of San 
Francisco’s Chinatown.  Shortly after the Downtown Plan was published, the San Francisco Landmarks 
Preservation Advisory Board initiated a proposal to designate Chinatown as a historic district. According 
to the proposed codes, any alterations to the exterior of structures within the historic district would require 
city permits as well as the review by the Landmarks Board. New constructions on vacant sites would also 
require review and approval of the Landmarks Board and City Planning Commission.  
27 Some Chinatown groups supported 
the interim controls in hopes that they would overturn “overly liberal zoning rules that encourage owners 
to develop properties at the expense of housing.”28 The designation of a historic district provided tax 
incentives for rehabilitation costs, and the enactment of State Historic Building Code in 1985 also 
allowed a range of alternatives for evaluating the structures in historic districts in meeting the building 
codes. Nevertheless, those Chinatown residents who owned property protested the ordinances and 
legislations for demarcating a protected historic district because they feared that the restrictions of 
building heights and area ratio would reduce the future developmental opportunities of their properties. 
Headed by the Chinese Six Company, the Chinatown property owners objected to the proposed 
restrictions, declaring their desire for the right “to build to what the property here is worth.”29 In addition 
to this opposition, the particular forms of land ownership in Chinatown also made it extremely difficult to 
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process the preservation policies of the historic district. After WWII, with the relaxation of restrictions on 
immigrant land ownership, the clan associations and district associations bought many of the properties in 
Chinatown from the White owners. Accordingly the Chinatown associations owned about 35 percent of 
the properties in Chinatown in the 1970s and 80s.30
In New York’s Chinatown, as indicated in Chapter Three, the Special Zoning stressed commercial 
development and new development on vacant lots that would preserve the community’s existing 
character. It required the developers to provide community amenities in exchange for higher floor area 
ratio. The community’s resistance to the Special Zoning was largely grounded on concerns that the 
development of luxurious condominium complex would gentrify the area beyond the affordability of most 
of the community people. It was also partly a reaction to the influx of overseas capital from Asia that 
tended to treat Chinatown purely as a commodity without personal attachment. In contrast, in San 
Francisco’s Chinatown, the protest against the Historic District designation mainly came from the 
property owners who worried about imposed restriction on the development opportunities of their 
properties. As the traditional community organization had a high percentage share of the property 
ownership, the opponents to the Historic District regulation were able to launch a political campaign 
against it. However, without the status of historic district, San Francisco’s Chinatown slowly began to 
lose its historical flavors, a loss accelerated by fast economic development and the influx of new Asian 
capital from overseas. Some Chinatown activists and preservationists expressed their concerns over the 
ever-changing façade of Chinatown storefronts. For instance, Enid Lim, a previous Landmark Board 
member, claimed that San Francisco’s Chinatown was suffering the Hong Kong “mall-ization,” which 
destroyed the historical character of the old Chinatown. Especially on Grant Avenue, the major 
commercial street of the neighborhood, the glossy appearance of aluminum and plate glass was gradually 
replacing the wood frame windows and doors that had fronted Chinatown stores since 1906. The so-called 
 These associations now allied to protest the historic 
designation and interim controls. The political pressures from Chinatown organizations and their 
unwillingness to cooperate eventually obliged the Landmarks Boards and the Planning Commission to 
delay the designation plan and shortened the effective period of the interim controls.  
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modernization of the 1970s and 80s homogenized the facade of the commercial units, erasing the historic 
character that had made Chinatown a distinctive neighborhood at the start of the century.31 With the 
development of tourism, shops selling Chinese products such as fine jade and cheap curios gave way to 
camera and video equipment stores, all-purpose tourist bazaars, hamburger outlets, chain stores, and 
shops selling Wild West gear, all intended for non-resident consumers. The national president of the 
Chinese American Citizens Alliance was concerned for the future of Chinatown, asking “Is Chinatown 
going to remain a unique area with a special history, food and other attractions said or just another place 
full of camera and T-shirt shops?”32
The debates over the changing façade of Chinatown street fronts and historic preservation lasted 
for several decades. The idea of preserving Chinatown as a historic district was first inspired by a letter 
written by the New Orleans mayor in the 1940s to an architectural magazine, explaining how the city’s 
Vieux Carre Commission planned to preserve New Orleans’ French Quarter. San Francisco quickly 
decided to do something similar. Concerning the “westernization” of Chinatown, William T. Hogan, a 
realtor, and others formed a committee aiming to save the historic look of the community. They asserted 
that Chinatown was “slowly, but surely, disappear(ing) from our midst as a result of remodeling store 
fronts and buildings that will do away with the charm that is its greatest attraction.”
   
33 They observed that 
shops and restaurants on Grant Avenue looked the same as commercial enterprises found in any small 
shopping areas, with a full glass front, black marble, and cream brick façade With regard to the process of 
modernizing Chinatown’s main commercial street, the committee advocated adopting the preservation 
laws used in New Orleans and redefined the local ordinances. The proposed legislation would not 
mandate remodeling but would encourage new designs seeking “to preserve the Oriental flavor.”34 
Hogan’s proposal received support from a group of Chinatown businessmen, who themselves also formed 
the Committee for the Preservation of Architecture in Chinatown in order to preserve the historic façade 
of the Grant Avenue. The Chinatown group emphasized that the modern buildings were stripping the 
street of character, with “disastrous” results for commerce.35 Francis Lai Chinn, a Chinatown 
businessman, believed the Chinese themselves would wholeheartedly endorse the committee plan if they 
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realized it would help business. He candidly said, “Let’s admit we’re putting on a Hollywood façade to 
attract tourists, and admit we’re trying to preserve atmosphere because we think it will pay off.”36
In 1947, the Board of Supervisors proposed a city statute prohibiting any architectural changes in 
the modernization plan for San Francisco’s Chinatown. About one month later, a voluntary program was 
initiated by the Committee for Preservation of Architecture in Chinatown, seeking legal means of 
controlling construction and alterations in Chinatown. The program advocated that a local commission, 
similar to the Vieux Carre Commission of New Orleans, would ensure the retention of the Chinatown’s 
flavor by judging building and alteration plans and rejecting those practices that did not conform to 
“traditional” design. Although the proposal met with support from some business owners in Chinatown, 
the two most powerful Chinese organizations, Chinese Six Company and Chinatown Chamber of 
Commerce, withheld support, and so, despite the clear goals and agendas, unfortunately it didn’t succeed. 
The preservationists failed to penetrate the political autonomy of the Chinatown community and then 
failed to secure the support of the dominant Chinatown organizations.   
 The 
Chinese merchants clearly knew what they were selling and to whom. The Chinese things, buildings, and 
images, were thus commodified to gratify the Western fascination with exoticism, so as to facilitate the 
economic development of Chinatown.  
The effort to maintain the spatial orders of Chinatown in the 1940s was also opposed by local 
architects and Chinese businessmen who saw “progress” as essential for the community’s future 
development. For instance, the president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce said “Like everything 
else, Chinatown must keep up with the times. It is past time that many of our stores were modernized.”37 
An architect said, “New Orleans’ French Quarter is an architectural gem. There are no architectural gems 
in Chinatown. Most of the buildings are so rotten they should be torn down instead of being preserved.”38 
Architects Worley Wong and John Campbell, who had designed some of the modern buildings in 
Chinatown, were also among the first to rally to oppose the preservation statements. They commented 
that the “fake sheet metal pagodas aren’t going to help anybody… If Chinatown citizens want modern 
store fronts on their buildings, that’s their business.”39 Unlike the preservation proponents who viewed 
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the exotic Chinatown architecture as something with value for its unique Oriental character and a tourist 
attraction, the arguments of the pro-development groups were grounded on the ideology that constructed 
Chinatown as an impoverished slum that required “progress” and “modernization.” 
Although the conundrum of whether the old structures should be preserved or modernized is a 
universal concern in heritage management, in the case of San Francisco’s Chinatown the issues are 
complicated by the community’s particular history of immigration and racial discrimination, and the 
politics of ethnic identity. The exotica of Chinatown was appreciated in society as a whole not only as an 
important attraction for tourists, but also because it signified the ideology of multiculturalism that has 
been celebrated by Western liberal society. The city thus used ethnic iconization to construct itself as a 
tolerant, international, and diverse cosmopolitan city.40 However, critics of multiculturalism have pointed 
out its inherent structure of racism.41 For example, Slavoj Zizek has argued, that “multiculturalism is a 
disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a ‘racism with a distance’ – it ‘respects’ the Other’s 
identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed ‘authentic’ community towards which he, the 
multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered possible by his privileged universal position.”42 In other 
words, the drive to preserve the Oriental and exotic architectural environment of Chinatown was a 
ramification of modern society’s mass cultural consumption of ethnicity and difference. The emphasis on 
the essential or essentialized elements of ethnicity reflected the superficial attempts of multicultural 
policies and rhetoric to interpret and control cultural difference.43
In addition to the debates on the best future of Chinatown, the substandard living environments 
and scarcity of affordable housing and outdoor recreational spaces also greatly influenced the 
community’s perspectives on preservation and development. The terrible conditions of the old structures, 
with outdated layouts originally designed for bachelor laborers, later became obstacles to renovation. The 
large influx of Chinese after WWII produced great pressure on housing in San Francisco’s Chinatown. 
 The success of the tourism industry and 
the advancement of mass media technology further encouraged the enduring official discourse that 
defined the ethnic minorities as essentialized Others in which a truly engagement with the real life of the 
people inhabiting in Chinatown was unfortunately ignored.   
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According to a 1976 national survey, Chinatown residents were far less satisfied with their neighborhood 
than U.S. citizens overall. Only 2% of Chinatown residents indicated “very satisfied” with their 
neighborhood while the national distribution was 46%.44 Most expressed “neutral” feelings towards their 
living environments, among which qualities such as “filth,” “crowding,” “noise,” “traffic jams,” and 
“parking problems” were considered undesirable attributes of the neighborhood.45 The attempts to 
preserve the historic structures of Chinatown have occurred amidst these perceptions of degraded living 
standards. For instance, a member of the Chinese Six Company complained that the old buildings in 
Chinatown were always overcrowded and lacked necessary sanitary facilities. The leaders of many 
Chinatown community groups were also concerned that the historic district designation “would block 
progress” by preserving buildings that were unfit for modern habilitation.46 Thus preservation and 
modernization were set in opposition to each other. Gordon Chin, a prominent leader in Chinatown’s low-
income housing movements, stated that “it would be a mistake to consider the losses to historical design 
without also seeing projects intended to make Chinatown a more pleasant place.” To Chin, priority should 
be placed on improving substandard living conditions such as constructing desperately needed outdoor 
recreational spaces and low-income housing in Chinatown.47
In some cities and towns, the adaptive use of the historic structures has sometimes ignored public 
needs, and therefore is criticized for its role in gentrification and the displacement of low-income 
residents.
  
48
The ideological construction of Chinatown as an impoverished slum that has been historically 
associated with poverty, crime, prostitution, and opium trade, has been profoundly transferred into the 
spatial language of the community and affected the residents’ perceptions towards the historic remnants 
 Chinatown was a living community with a large population of poor immigrants and 
vulnerable tenants, and the residents worried about preservation’s impact on their everyday life. Even 
though preservationists suggested that historic preservation was not necessarily contradictory to 
development, and that tax credits and subsidies rewarded to historic designation could provide enough 
funding for rehabilitating historic buildings, community members were still concerned the preservation 
would not address the current pragmatic needs of the residents and would pose a barrier to future progress. 
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of Chinatown. The anxiety over preservation’s potential to hinder growth and modernization shows that 
space is far more than a neutral physical container, but is encoded with rich social connotations and 
unfolding social relations. Dominant society saw a link between place and race, morality, social behavior, 
and cultural difference. Within such a system of knowledge, the space of Chinatown was naturalized as a 
living repository of uncivilized and inassimilable Oriental others.49
    
 For instance, in 1885 the city created a 
map for San Francisco’s Chinatown, specifically indicating the locations of brothels, opium dens, and 
gambling halls (Figure 38). The map not only was the material result of the constant  
Figure 38: An official map indicating the locations of brothels, gambling halls, and opium dams in San 
Francisco’s Chinatown, ca. 1885 (Source: Historical Society of California Pioneers)  
 
effort to monopolize and define minority space as deviant, imperfect and marginal; it also produced the 
hegemonic narrative that defined the place of Chinatown as other. The bachelor society of Chinatown was 
considered immoral and dangerous to the respectable domesticity of White society, which further justified 
the racial hierarchy and discriminatory practices toward the Chinese immigrants. Through such practices 
as mapping, zoning, knowledge production, identity construction, and meaning regulation, the idea of 
Chinatown was produced and reproduced within the rigid confines of inferior “otherness.”50 This 
unpleasant aspect of Chinatown’s history confirmed to community members that the place was unworthy 
of preservation. They saw the buildings as reminders of a shameful history that ought to be condemned. 
Defined thus, the past became something to escape, and the prospect of upgrading and modernizing the 
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physical environment of the community was eagerly embraced. The depreciation of the past was deeply 
rooted in the racial hierarchy and the ideological ground of “otherness” constructed in the dominant 
society but accepted in the Chinese community.  
The disparity between the ideology of the Chinese community members and the city institutions 
over the interpretation and management of Chinatown’s heritage reveals the continuing need for 
negotiation and compromise with respect to the politics of ethnicity. The social cleavages between the 
enthusiastic guardians of mainstream values and the excluded others are accentuated by connecting social 
memories with place memories. The awareness of social time – “a time defined by both formal 
relationships and daily interaction” – combined with historic preservation efforts focusing on the 
monumentalization of history are entangled in the complex processes of engagement with heritage and 
identity discourse.51 Michael Herzfeld argues that social and monumental time separates the popular from 
the official understanding of history. While social time addresses everyday experiences of ordinary people, 
monumental time tends to focus on the categorized and stereotyped past.52 In a similar vein, Dolores 
Hayden observes “place trigger memories for insiders, who have shared a common past, and at the same 
time places often can represent shared pasts to outsiders who might be interested in knowing about them 
in the present.”53 The disparity between insiders’ social memories and outsiders’ needs often leads to 
conflicting views towards history and preservation. To the larger society, Chinatown is significant not 
only for its unique history of immigration, but also for the exotic built environment that stimulates the 
Western fantasy of the Oriental Other. However, for the community members, the impoverished past and 
the awkward present complicate their feelings toward the place. Chinatown, to them, is not simply a 
historical repository, but the community where they live. Thus, the argument over the future of the 
Chinatown is ultimately a contest over social identity and belonging. It raises fundamental questions: 
Whose Chinatown is it, and who is authorized to speak for the community and interpret its heritage? 
David Lowenthal has argued that we have treated the past as a “foreign country” and a “marketable 
commodity” that is nearly irrelevant to modern concerns and our own presence.54 For the Chinatown 
residents, the past never fades away; rather it is entrenched in their everyday bits and pieces of landscapes. 
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Thus the future of the past might lie in how the heritage and inhabited landscape is embraced as an 
evolving historical and social process.  
 
Staging Ethnicity 
While historic preservation met controversies in San Francisco’s Chinatown in the twentieth 
century, ethnicity and constructed cultural tradition continued to play a key role of promoting the 
community as a unique urban attraction. Ethnicity, as urban sociologist Sharon Zukin has argued, is “an 
aesthetic category” that shapes an urban public culture that produces difference and stimulates 
inclusion.55 The use of cultural icons and signs to develop an ethnic cityscape provides contemporary 
Chinatown a competitive advantage in its efforts to rebuild and market the community. For Christopher 
Mele, successful urban redevelopment requires the reinvention of place identity in order to appeal to 
middle-class consumers.56
In a historical survey conducted in the 1970s, Philip P. Choy and Christopher Yip studied a 36-
block area of the core area of Chinatown, an area roughly bounded by California Street on the South, 
Pacific Avenue on the North, Mason Street on the West, and Kearny Street on the East, to understand the 
architectural, historical, and environmental merits of the community.
 From the efforts of rebuilding Chinatown as an Oriental city in the early 
twentieth century to the practices of erecting the Chinatown gateway in the 1970s, there was a clear desire 
to highlight the area’s exoticism.           
57 Focusing on buildings and 
structures “of exceptional merit and deserve(s) serious consideration for inclusion,” Choy and Yip defined 
five zones of the area where historical architectures with certain values concentrated (figure 39). The five 
zones included South Grant Avenue (zone 1), Portsmouth Square (zone 2), Commercial Street (zone 3), 
Waverly Place, Spofford and Ross alleys (zone 4), and North Grant Avenue (zone 5). Dean MacCannell’s 
concept of staged authenticity is relevant to their study.  MacCannell defined staged authenticity in  
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Figure 39: Map shows five zones of the Chinatown historic survey area (Source: San Francisco 
Chinatown Historic Survey, 1979) 
 
reference to Erving Goffman’s analytical model of front and back regions. The structural division of front 
and back regions is not only mobilized through architectural arrangements, but the types of social 
performance and the social roles that are staged in a place. He argues that tourist settings can be arranged 
in a continuum starting from the front and ending at the back, each stage of this process offering different 
degrees of accessibility to the tourists. The front region, most accessible to the tourists and outsiders, is 
designed to generate a firm sense of reality and authenticity, while the back region that supports the 
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performances conducted in the front region is usually concealed from the visitors, so as not to impede 
their quest for authenticity.58
The division of the front and back regions is manifested in the physical setting of Chinatown. 
Choy and Yip’s five zones with a concentration of historic buildings can be identified as the front regions 
in which the authentic Chinese experience is manufactured as an attraction for tourist consumption. These 
zones are centered at Grant Avenue, which constituted the commercial core of Chinatown. The Chinese-
style architectures, curio stores, restaurants, and ethnic ornaments on Grant Avenue are legacies of the 
post-earthquake plan to build an Oriental City in Chinatown. Buildings in the area are characterized by 
curving eaves, pagoda towers, recessed balconies, and other Chinese motifs and decorations. Before the 
1906 earthquake, North Grant Avenue mainly served community-oriented businesses and service 
activities. Afterwards, it was integrated with South Grant Avenue and became major arterial for the 
community. Commercial Street was also one of the earliest settlements for the Chinese immigrants. The 
buildings were rebuilt after the 1906 earthquake and adopted a typical downtown building style at the 
early twentieth century (figure 40). Though as a corridor connecting Grant Avenue with the Financial 
District at the east side, Commercial Street is no longer as active as in the past, the original mixed-use 
character and store-fronts still reflect the historical architectural fabric of the Chinatown. While Grant 
Avenue and Commercial Street are historically know as the major commercial area of the Chinatown, 
Waverly Place and its surrounding alleys are well recognized by local residents for the famous Tim How 
Temple and numerous other temples. Many headquarters of traditional social organizations such as 
district and clan associations are also located in the area (figure 41). According to MacCannell’s model, 
this zone was historically one of the back regions that worked as the institutional core of the community. 
But nowadays, it has become the major attraction for tourists. Of the five zones of historic districts, 
Portsmouth Square is unique, for it is mostly used by local residents as recreational and gathering space. 
As the first public square established in the city, Portsmouth Square is a historically significant site where 
the first American flag was raised during the Mexican-American War in the 1840s. The plaza was 
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Figure 40: Mix-use buildings on Commercial Street. The original brick paving on the street was replaced 
by concrete in the late 1990s, ca.2008 (Photo by author).  
 
completely cleared in 1963 to accommodate a four-story underground parking garage because of the 
general lack of parking in the area. In the 1970s, the square was redesigned as a community park during a 
redevelopment project that included the building of the Holiday Inn and the Chinese Cultural Center. As 
the only park in the Chinatown area, Portsmouth Square is an important social space for the Chinese 
residents, especially the Chinese elderly who congregate to chat and play chess (figure 42).   
While the five zones of historic district that are centered on Grant Avenue and located to the east 
of Stockton Street can be classified as front regions, the areas to the west of Stockton Street have different 
characters that can be identified as back regions. Stockton Street is dominated with neighborhood-related 
activities including ethnic food, grocery stores, and Chinese banks.59 The concentration of Chinese 
grocery stores, food markets, goods shops, post offices, Chinese book stores, and the headquarters of 
traditional clan associations suggested the area as the living hub for the Chinese community. 
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Figure 41: View of Waverly Place that has a large concentration of association headquarters with flags 
standing on the rooftop showing the political affiliation of these organizations, ca.2007 (Photo by author) 
 
Apartment buildings line the street, with a variety of building styles including newly-built high-rises, four 
to five-storied modern buildings, and renovated historic structures (figure 43). Many of the Chinese 
immigrants and Chinese Americans who live outside of Chinatown visit Stockton Street regularly on 
weekends for grocery shopping, authentic Chinese food, Chinese newspapers, and meeting with friends. 
Especially for the Chinese elderly, the Hong Kong-style tea houses and bakery stores are the social clubs 
where they go frequently to meet up with old friends. They also come for the Chinese-speaking services 
in post-offices, banks, insurance companies, and hospitals. In spite of the increasing tendency of the 
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Stockton Street to be visited by the tourists, the front-back division in Chinatown remains valid in 
sustaining the community both as a tourist destination and a real living community. The existence of the 
back region also has helped to increase the sense of authenticity for the front region.  
 
    
 
Figure 42: Portsmouth Square is primarily a sitting and gathering area that is connected to the Chinese 
Cultural Center with a pedestrian bridge, ca.2007 (Photo by author).  
 
Given that the desire for traditional environments and tourist practices are always congruent with 
cultural production and reproduction, the homogenizing development of ethnic landscapes through the 
manipulation of images and experiences becomes an essential way for policy-makers to generate income 
and stimulate markets.60 According to the 1961-1964 Land Use Survey conducted by the San Francisco 
Department of City Planning, the core area of Chinatown was categorized as a commercial area. To 
maintain the character and scale of the area, the survey suggested establishing a Special Height Districts 
by imposing a height limit of 88 feet, twice the width of the street, along Grant Avenue; a limit of 160 
feet in the area bounded by Bush, Powell, Washington, and Kearny Street; and 105 feet for the area north 
 187 
of Washington Street. The height constraints effectively limited the development of high-rise commercial 
buildings in Chinatown and subsequently preserved the historical scale of the streetscape. But they also 
placed great pressure on residential land use because the height limitation made residential development  
 
 
Figure 43: Stockton Street has a wide variety of architectures that could be dated to different historical 
periods from the early 1900s to contemporaneity, ca.2007 (Photo by author). 
 
even less profitable than before. The real estate developers thus often preferred to build commercial 
buildings, rather than residences, in order to maximize profits. The development of commercial activities 
and tourism in Chinatown also discouraged the maintenance and construction of residential units by 
greatly enhancing the real estate value of the area. Compared to the Chinatowns in Chicago and New 
York, San Francisco’s Chinatown has the least proportion of land devoted to residential use and largest 
proportion of land used for commercial activities. According to Chinatown USA Survey 1992, half of San 
Francisco’s Chinatown’s land was used for residential purpose and 25% for commercial activities, 
whereas the Chinatowns in Chicago and New York had 70% of land allocated to residential area and 20% 
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for commercial.61 Moreover, the overcrowding and lack of parking and open space due to dense 
commercial development made the Chinatown an undesirable place for living. The census reports of 1950, 
1960, and 1970 all indicated a tendency of the Chinese residents to move from the core Chinatown into 
the surrounding areas such as Nob Hill, Russian Hill, North Beach, and the neighborhoods at the west 
side of the city.62
In 1977, the Nob Hill Neighbors requested the city to conduct a drastic downzoning in the Nob 
Hill area that is located at the west side of Chinatown. More specifically, they proposed reducing the 
height limit to about 40 feet in an area bounded by Powell, Larkin, and Bush Streets and Pacific Avenue 
in order to protect the environment and the existing views. In a public hearing held for the downzoning 
application, 75% of the 500 participants were Chinese who owned many of the properties in and around 
the Nob Hill area. The Chinatown Coalition for Better Housing declared its strong opposition to the 
proposal because the height limit would prohibit construction of new low-income housing in the area. 
They criticized the Nob Hill Neighbors’ disregard for the well-being of the Chinese American residents. 
Other community groups also contended that existing zoning and height limitation had already effectively 
discouraged high-rise developments. In addition, the area of east of Taylor Street and north of Clay Street 
that was included in the downzoning request was perceived as part of Chinatown. Thus they insisted the 
area should not be included in the Nob Hill Neighbors’ application. Considering the strong opposition 
from the Chinese community, the City Planning Commission decided to reject the downzoning 
application.  
 The continuous conversion of housing units to offices and stores thus not only 
significantly changed the demographic and socioeconomic patterns of Chinatown, but also transformed 
the dynamic and heterogeneous “lived” landscape.   
In 1978, the City Planning Department proposed a Preliminary Plan for the Chinatown 
Redevelopment Project. The plan was dedicated to improve the housing conditions in the core area of 
Chinatown and called for the rehabilitation of 13 buildings and new construction on three sites including 
935-945 Stockton Street, 814-848 Stockton Street, and two parking lots on Joice Street. The new 
construction on 814-848 Stockton Street, accordingly, would provide more than 60 housing units for 
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elderly persons, commercial and community space, and a covered public plaza. The proposal also called 
for the demolition of a private Chinese school, 14 households, six commercial units, and two club houses 
including the local Chinese Nationalist Party headquarter and the Ning Yang Family Association building. 
Rather than obtaining federal grants for community development, the plan attempted to induce property 
owners to improve their buildings at their own initiative by providing low-interest federal loads. It 
adopted a new strategy that “require(d) less public outlay and reduce(d) development costs to a 
minimum.”63 However, obtaining community support for the project became highly politicized. The 
Chinese Six Companies attacked the plan as a “communist plot” because it was prepared to use “brute 
force” to remove unwilling landlords from their properties.64 Landlords of the affected properties such as 
the Chinese Nationalist Party vowed to fight the plan. Meanwhile, the tenants also worried that landlords 
would take advantage of rehabilitation loans by increasing rents or converting their buildings for 
commercial use. This worry was well grounded because rents did increase significantly after renovation, 
from  $14 per month for the average unimproved unit to $25 per month for the average rehabilitated 
unit.65
In addition to the decrease of residential land use, certain industries were forced out of Chinatown 
to preserve the integrity of Chinatown as a commercial area. In the 1960s, Chinatown was designated as a 
Special Garment Shop District in order to confine the development of garment industry in the area.
 Concerning a potential loss of housing units, displacement of residents, increasing rents, and the 
uncooperative property owners, the Planning Department decided to withdraw the redevelopment plan.  
66 
Chinatown’s garment factories had already become a major economic component by 1875.67 In 1958, 
there were about 125 garment factories with over 2,000 Chinese workers, most of whom were women. 
The garment shops in Chinatown flourished by demanding long working hours and paying low wages. 
But this was somewhat offset by the short walking distance between the garment shops and the living 
units which allowed flexibility of working hours, during which the workers could take care of their 
families. Meanwhile, the sociability of the working environment also generated an intimate relationship 
between individual social life and work. These conditions were critical for the survival of the garment 
shops and for those immigrants depending on the garment shops to make a living. A similar situation was 
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also found in New York’s Chinatown. While the city government of New York wanted to move the 
garment shops from Chinatown into an independent industrial area, the proposal was contested by both 
the industry owners and the immigrant workers. However, in San Francisco, the presence of garment 
shops in a commercial and residential district was a violation of the General Zoning Regulations of the 
City Planning Code. In commercial districts, only manufacturing “clearly incidental to a retail business 
conducted on the premises or light manufacturing conducted on any floor above the ground floor of a 
building” was allowed.68
To “cleanse” the spatial environment, the city policy-makers had demanded Chinatown remain a 
commercial area according to the regulations of the Code, at the cost of eliminating an important dynamic 
of its social environment. San Francisco Chinese community citizens’ survey and fact finding committee 
asserted that the purpose of the community planning was to “enhance the values of the community, which 
include the desire and right of Chinatown to preserve its character, its commercial activities, its landmarks, 
its inherent value to the community and the City as a tourist attraction.”
 Thus, in the 1960s, about 93 garment shops in Chinatown acquired legal status 
as to zoning, while 28 factories had to be removed from the Chinatown. Unlike New York City which 
instituted Chinatown Garment Industry Zone to protect the garment shops in Chinatown from 
displacement, the zoning ordinance in San Francisco effectively constrained the development of light 
industry that relied heavily on the cheap labor resources of the Chinatown.  
69
The entire nation was affected by the trauma of Sept. 11, 2001, but the impact on San Francisco’s 
Chinatown was especially hard because tourism and economic development stagnated. To revitalize the 
area, the Chinatown activists proposed to build four gates in the four entryways leading to Chinatown. 
 The emphasis on commerce and 
tourism in Chinatown planning revealed the intentions underlying the reorganization of the space: 
consumption was maximized, with limited thought to the consequences for social life. Given the 
sustained interest in promoting Chinatown as a place of consumption, architects, planners, and 
community stakeholders developed the built environment not only as an explicit reproduction of what 
they took to be traditional symbol and images, but also in response to a changing market economy relying 
on the commodification and consumption of ethnic culture.  
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The idea was inspired by the traditional ways of Chinese town planning with two axes running from the 
north to south and from the east to west, and having four doors located at each end of the axes. Realizing 
that four gates would be very costly, the activists decided to push for only one gate at the intersection of 
Grant Avenue and Broadway Avenue, near North Beach area, to complete the north-south axis of 
Chinatown, and complement the existing gateway at the south end of the axis. A gateway already existed 
(figure 44) at the intersection of Bush Street and Grant Avenue, having been built in 1970 and funded by 
the Taiwan government. It is not only a symbolic structure standing for San Francisco’s Chinatown, but 
also a national landmark signifying the presence of Chinese communities in the United States. However, 
it was to be replaced by a new gateway designed with “light (and) cheery colors.”70 Further improvements 
such as “widening of sidewalks in the area, restoration and relighting of vintage streetlights shaped like 
dragons, planting of new trees and the construction of a brick walkway” would also be incorporated to 
bring more pedestrian traffic to the northern blocks of Grant Avenue and stimulating businesses in the 
area.71 As indicated by a community-based organization, A Better Chinatown for Tomorrow, the project 
was dedicated to “promoting the historical roots, architectural beauty, cultural vitality and economic 
vibrancy that expresses the unique character” of San Francisco’s Chinatown.72
Gateways were one of the most widely promoted and most often used architectural types in nearly 
all of the American Chinatowns.  In addition to the permanent gateway, a temporary Oriental-style 
wooden gateway was constructed every year in San Francisco’s Chinatown on Commercial Alley leading 
to an “Old Shanghai” exhibition for the annual Moon Festival. The iconization of the gate embodied the 
process in which the immigrant group strived to create and reinforce a notion of place identity, and it 
marked a real or imagined enclave border that linked to the past. It also appealed to tourists in search of 
the exotic.  Jennifer Craik has argued that “…the cultural experiences offered by tourism are consumed in 
terms of prior knowledge, expectations, fantasies and mythologies generated in the tourist’s original 
culture rather than by the cultural offerings of the destination.”
 Nevertheless, for financial 
reasons, the project hasn’t been built.  
73 Thus, for the Chinese immigrants, 
although they have been recognized as multicultural Americans and have free will to express their 
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identity, they are restrained by prescribed ways in which formal stereotypes have been deeply entrenched. 
They are also situated within a complicated web of identity politics and hierarchically entrenched power 
relations, wherein social memory of the Chinatown and their own cultural roots have been displaced by a 
particular or invented version of the cultural past that they are no longer familiar with.  
 
Figure 44: The existing Gateway of San Francisco’s Chinatown is a landmark structure of the Chinatown, 
ca.2007 (Photo by author). 
 
It should be noted that the staging of ethnicity is not limited to the construction of ethnic 
monuments, but includes the reinvention of ethnic events, rituals, and ceremonies. The operations such as 
the annual parades for Chinese New Year and Chinese Moon Festival organized by Chinatown Chamber 
of Commerce or other community-based organizations signaled the staged ethnicity by using essentialist 
notions of ethnicity to facilitate an oblique sense of belonging. Identity is a subjective representation or 
construction of reality bounded in time and space.74 As asserted by Jonathan Friedman, “consumption 
within the bounds of the world system is always a consumption of identity, canalized by a negotiation 
between self-definition and the array of possibilities offered by the capitalist market.”75 In promoting 
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products, images drawing upon dominant cultural values of a society and ethnocentric stereotypes reflect 
and reinforce the existing power structures and the relations between the White and the other. In 
Chinatown, celebrations of ethnic festivals are anchored with the desire of Chinese Americans to 
incorporate their culture into mainstream ideologies of democratic and multicultural America. But at the 
same time, the festival celebrations are continually staged in an Orientalized and ahistorical setting in 
order to appeal to the dominant market that requests novelty and exotic performances.76 Such events also 
suppress the hybridity of Chinese American culture and downplay the political representations of Chinese 
American group.77 With the Chinese New Year Parades in San Francisco telecasted on national channels 
since the 1980s, the local ethnic celebration has been further commodified to cater to the taste of a 
national audience instead of local street spectators. Through the camera lens, Chinatown ironically lost its 
central position as the backdrop of the parades which now is set amidst the high-rises and upscale 
shopping district in downtown San Francisco (figure 45).78 Corporate sponsorship also tended to privatize 
the ethnic celebration events by conflating Chinese and Chinese American, aiming to penetrate the global 
ethnic-Chinese market.79 Susan G. Davis has observed that with the increasing privatization of parades, 
“parades are no longer performed where people live and work, but, for reasons of traffic flow, in special, 
denuded spaces designated by the city.”80
By a variety of measures, San Francisco is one of the most popular urban tourist destinations in 
the United States. Tourism, together with finance, investment, communications, and media, constitute the 
leading service clusters in San Francisco.
  
81 In a survey of “101 Reasons to Love San Francisco,” the 
diversity of the city as a “melting pot” was listed as one of the favorable attributes of the city.82 As the 
multicultural and multiethnic landscape became a major attraction, San Francisco’s Chinatown was 
ranked as the second most popular spots in the city (after Fisherman’s Wharf). According to the San 
Francisco Convention and Tourist Bureau reports, there were about 2.5 million tourists in San Francisco 
from 1980 to 1982, and three out of four of them visited Chinatown.83 Not only Chinatown itself is a 
tourist attraction, but numerous tourist agencies providing transnational tourist information and services 
constituted a crucial component of the community economy. Especially with the increase of Asian 
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tourists from mainland China and Taiwan, Chinatown has played an increasingly important role in 
transnational tourism industry. Within such a context, San Francisco’s Chinatown has launched an 
aggressive campaign to stage ethnicity in the built environment.  
  
Figure 45: The Chinese New Year Parade in San Francisco downtown, ca.2009 (Source: San Francisco 
Social Diary, see http://www.newyorksocialdiary.com/node/299832, accessed Nov. 30, 2010) 
 
In Chinatown, the national media coverage and the officially designated performance space have 
made the ethnic celebration parade much more than a neighborhood event, but a carefully monitored 
experience to maximize consumption by giving a prefabricated appearance of a genuine community life.84 
Ling-chi Wang correctly points out that the cultural identity of Chinese Americans is not based on “an 
uncritical, wholesale transplant of Chinese culture” nor is it rooted in “the wholesale denial of the Chinese 
American past.” Instead it is grounded in “the concrete collective experiences of Chinese in the United 
States, in a newly conceived community with shared interests and a common destiny in America.”85 Thus, 
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the tendency of the ethnic leaders and the Western institutions to superficially promote ethnic imagery of 
Chinese American community has severely limited the scope and context of the cultural and political 
representations of Chinese American identity.     
 
Conclusion 
Instead of being a fixed and homogeneous ethnic community, Chinatown is a complex social 
space containing diverse groups of people and dynamic interactions and relations. Many Asian American 
writers emphasize the disruption and transmission of traditional culture as part of immigrant life in 
America. For instance, the narrative of generational conflicts between first generation parents and the 
American-born second generation conveys the loss of their cultural root and the permeation of American 
culture.86
Far from being a stable culture with one shared identity, Chinatown is a terrain of contested 
meanings, subject to pressures from both inside and outside of the community. We have seen in this 
chapter that in the course of fighting against the historic designation of Chinatown, the Chinese 
Americans and Chinese immigrants demonstrated their ability and determination to reclaim their lives, 
insisting on their own terms for doing so. By emphasizing ethnic identity and territory identification, the 
Chinese resisted the spatial orders of an urban form that prioritized the dominant values. Through 
reasserting the right of ownership and the need to improve their living environment, the Chinatown 
residents disrupted the official attempts to impose a structured order on their spatial activities. Yet, 
another kind of structured order was imposed:  tourism facilitated the cultural consumption of enclaves of 
 In a sense, Chinatown has experienced a constant transformation of its socio-cultural 
composition, demographics, and cultural landscape. Not only the early “bachelor society” has evolved to 
embrace immigrants varied in class, gender, and national origin, but also the shifting relations of power, 
culture, and economy of the cities also shaped Chinatown as a different place. The historical processes of 
staging San Francisco’s Chinatown as a fixed, homogenous, and essentialized symbol of exotic enclave 
reveal some of the ways that changing discourse and ideology have continuously reproduced and 
reconfigured the space of Chinatown.  
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ethnicity – a consumption that tourist shops and other Chinese business encouraged – promoting a 
superficial or even staged interpretation of the neighborhood without true engagement with the social life 
of the inhabitants.87 Yet the Chinatown residents have challenged the established meanings and official 
discourse that structures and manages them as an essentialized Other, and have instead managed to 
convert their marginalization into political power. 88 Roxane Caftanzoglou has observed that the internally 
oriented and symbolically produced spaces that are assigned distinct values, meanings and functions, and 
the creation of internal boundaries that demarcate and uphold the differences do not necessarily comply 
with hegemonic construction of space and the meanings that assigned them. She believes that it is central 
to recognize the dynamic whereby immigrant settlements were seen as “a disorderly and polluting 
irruption of social time in the midst of the isolated and well guarded ‘buffer zone’ designed to surround 
and isolate” the immigrants from the dominant society.89
In response to the imposition of a top-down spatial order, Chinese immigrants have constructed a 
counter-discourse of heritage, space, and race that is grounded on a distinct political economic system and 
collective memories that gave the community its sense of social and cultural identity. The history of racial 
exclusion and various forms of dispossession have generated strong feelings of belonging and self-
identification for the Chinese immigrants. The series of massacres that took place on the west coast in the 
1870s, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Acts, and other ongoing threats of dispossession and displacement 
made their attachment to the place of Chinatown particularly intense. They worked hard to maintain the 
livelihood of the community. In this, the symbolic construction of boundaries protected them from racial 
oppression and job discrimination in the larger spaces of the modern metropolis.
 There is a disparity between the dominant 
discourses about what Chinatown should be, on the one hand, and on the other a collective self-
identification of the community. It reveals the often-conflicted discourses of hierarchically allocated 
spaces formulated by unequally empowered social groups. 
90 It then became a 
mechanism of political empowerment for the enclave. The sense of inequality that endured in the 20th 
century and the unevenly distributed spatial powers encouraged the erection of boundaries. These 
historical boundaries – emblematized by the gates – were then adapted in response to the present politics 
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of heritage and race. The Chinese community’s rejections of either the forceful power of urban renewal 
(as discussed in Chapter One) or the official imposition of historic preservation are statements of their 
distinct socio-cultural values that greatly differ from the widely held values of mainstream society. In this 
sense, space became an important mechanism for the dominated to address their insurgent citizenship.   
The series of practices to stage ethnicity are actually involved in the “imaging” of the socio-
cultural continuity and stability of Chinatown that was grounded on the socially constructed process of 
identity formation. The creation of ethnic structures and spaces in Chinatown is driven by an aggressive 
market force to commodify ethnic traditions that were strategically (and artificially) reinvented as an 
expression of a pure, fixed, and consistent culture in a new spatio-temporal context. Such packaging of 
ethnic themes is partly grounded on the logic of the dominant culture that fixes Chinese American identity 
and denies the social complexities of Chinatown as a living community. The spatial reproduction of the 
area has entailed the essentialization and idealization of the scenes and experiences by excluding those 
elements that do not conform to the existing categories of ethnicity. Specifically, the city institutions and 
Chinatown stakeholders stipulated an Oriental theme for the public audience and thus transformed the 
physical and social environment of Chinatown into a stereotypical prospect, regardless of the area’s 
heterogeneous reality. Such reductions have contributed to aesthetizing the market-based reproduction of 
Chinese culture, while obscuring the particularity and precise recollections of the diverse people who live 
in Chinatown. But at the same time, the vibrant community life has been successfully sustained in the 
Chinatown through the special food, grocery shops, and services that particularly catered to the needs of 
the Chinese. With its front region dedicate to the tourists and visitors, the back region of the Chinatown is 
preserved for the Chinatown residents and the Chinese living elsewhere of the city. Thus despite a 
popular tourist destination that has been manipulated to show an invented and essentialized ethnic identity, 
San Francisco’s Chinatown has continued to play an important role in the Chinese American community 
as a cultural, social, and political center.   
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 Chapter 5: Landscape Imagery and Community Building in Chicago’s Chinatown   
 
Before the 1950s, the everyday environment of Chicago’s Chinatown was marked in ways that 
signified the unique cultural tradition of the Chinese community, but the signs were subtle. The city did 
not yet have the exotic architectures, curio stores, and ethnic restaurants that later provided Chicago’s 
Chinatown with a unique identity. Prior to World War II, the association buildings owned by the powerful 
tongs and family and district associations were the only structures that reflected their functions through 
symbolic trappings characterizing ethnicity. But in the 1960s, with the emerging trend of symbolic 
differentiation in the American cities and as built form was increasingly becoming a product packaged for 
the purpose of tourism, Chinatown began to deploy essentialized representations of Chinese traditions. In 
a sense, the ethnic structures that have been erected since then in Chinatown such as Chinatown gateway 
and Chinese pavilions epitomize a cultural production hat seeks to boost local distinctiveness and attract 
both visitors and capital by laying claim to the history and architectural traditions of the immigrant 
community. Kay Anderson has argued that “Chinatown” is “a social construction with a cultural history 
and a tradition of imagery and institutional practice that has given it a cognitive and material reality in and 
for the West.”1 In a sense, Chinatown is used as a category to interpret the racial ideology and manipulate 
consciousness of the society. With the development of urban economy, the image construction of 
Chinatown is also tied to the capital accumulation and identity making in the city’s production systems. In 
this period, the City of Chicago made efforts to maintain its reputation as the nation’s supreme trade show 
and convention center. In face of the challenges by the rival cities that lost industry payrolls and sought to 
reboot local economy through developing their own convention facilities, Chicago strove to project a 
positive place image by means of place advertising and cultural manipulation. Especially as more and 
more criticisms were made of the increasingly homogenized urban environment, ethnic neighborhoods 
were recognized as one of the key features on making a city unique. Alongside with the city’s traditional 
visitor sites such as the Sears Tower, Navy Pier, the Museum campus and McCormick Place, the ethnic 
neighborhoods were promoted as tourist attractions that would give the city a lively and diverse character.  
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The local development organizations actively engaged in the advertising campaigns to attract tourists to 
the neighborhoods’ restaurants, cafes, bakeries, art galleries, and other cultural institutions. Accordingly, 
restaurant business occupied 54% of Chicago Chinatown’s business types in 1992, compared to 26% in 
San Francisco’s Chinatown and 30% in New York’s Chinatown. Thus Chicago’s Chinatown tended to 
rely more on the tourism and restaurants for the  economy, while San Francisco’s Chinatown had diverse 
businesses including professional services (21% of community business types) and New York’s 
Chinatown had a large manufacturing foundation (40% of community business types). 2
Within such a context, the invention and consumption of ethnic culture in the ethnic enclave was 
facilitated for the sake of tourism and commercial development. However, it also produced a mode of 
symbolic architecture that served community needs by creating an “imaged community” for the Chinese 
immigrants.
 In 2005, more 
than 3200 tourists participated in the Chicago Neighborhood Tours series, which included tours of 12 
ethnic neighborhoods in the city, including Chinatown, Greek Town, Pilsen and Little Village (Mexican 
neighborhoods), Bridgeport (Irish neighborhood), Little Italy, Devon Avenue (Indian neighborhood), and 
others. 
3 . Diaspora was increasingly used in the transnational context to articulate an inclusive 
ethnicity through claiming a common racial and cultural ancestry.4 As Chinese Diasporas, Chinatown was 
affected by, incorporated, and participated in the construction and global marketing of Chinese culture. 
Through the myth of common descent and a shared history and culture associated with a specific territory, 
the ethnic community transcended the bond of kinship to embrace a broader sense of ethnicity that was 
fundamental to the modern construction of a deterritorized nation-state. In addition, Chinatown was (and 
is) produced by the interrelation of spaces, in which the relation of production and the networks of capital 
and labor market have been hierarchically and unevenly distributed.5 The history of socioeconomic 
oppression and exclusion of the Chinese immigrants from the national polity led to the growth of 
“informal political structures” in Chinatown, and aggravated the unequal labor/management relations 
within the community.6 The construction of a cultural representation of “Chineseness” and the 
reconstitution of patriotism, Confucianism, and ethnic solidarity in Chicago’s Chinatown showed that the 
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Chinatown elites tried to fix the meaning of the place and interpret it as bounded enclosed space that was 
defined against the “outside” society. In this sense, the landscape imagery of Chinatown served not only 
the dominant society’s desire for an Other, but also as an active agent of reinforcing and reproducing the 
power relations of the Chinese community itself. Ethnic solidarity and nostalgia, in a way, became the 
essential means to consolidate the hegemony of the Chinatown elites. 
 
On Leong Merchant Association Building                                                                                             
The first Chinatown in Chicago was built at Clark and Madison Streets in the late 1880s. By 1912, 
due to the conflicts between On Leong Tong and Hip Sing Tong,7 as well as the urban revival of the 
downtown area, Chinatown was forced to move to Wentworth Avenue and Cermak Road. The On Leong 
Tong (later known as On Leong Merchants’ Association) contracted a series of ten-year building leases 
and had built this area as the hub of Chicago’s Chinatown. The majority of the buildings standing in the 
area were standard Western structures, the legacy of German, Irish, and Italian immigrants who had 
successively occupied the district before the Chinese arrived.8
The On Leong Association Building was designed by Chicago architects Christian S. Michaelsen 
and Sigurd A. Rognstad in 1926 and completed in 1928. It is a three-story building constructed on a steel 
and concrete frame and clad with brick (figure 46). The symmetrical form of the building with two 
 Because of the restriction of the Alien 
Land Laws of 1913, 1920, and 1923, the Chinese made very few cultural imprints on the built 
environment of Chinatown. With a few exceptions of notable association buildings and commercial 
structures, most of the buildings in Chinatown remained unaltered from the period of the early settlement 
of the European immigrants. When the new Chinatown in Armour Square was established, the On Leong 
Tong became the dominant social group, thoroughly controlling the economic, political, and civil life of 
the ethnic community. Meanwhile, the Hip Sing Tong, who stayed in the older Chinatown, began to 
decline along with the general dwindling of the neighborhood. To celebrate its prosperity and growth of 
power, the On Leong Tong built the On Loeng Merchants Association Building on South Wentworth 
Avenue as the association headquarters.  
 205 
pagoda towers reveals the influence of the Chinese Theater located on the Midway during the World’s 
Columbian Exposition in 1893, which was initiated by the local Chinese and designed by an architectural 
firm known as Wilson and Marble (figure 47).9 The structure was demolished after the fair, but it 
influenced many Chinatown architectural designs. For instance, similar layout and pagoda framework of 
the Chinese theatre can also be found in the Sing Fat and the Sing Chong building in San Francisco’s 
Chinatown and the On Leong Tong headquarters in New York’s Chinatown (see Chapter Six). For the On 
Leong Association Building, the main portal at the center of the first floor is decorated with an elaborate 
terra-cotta canopy with upturned corners. The portal opens to a small lobby and a staircase that leads to 
the upper floors. The first floor was occupied by stores and the façade is entirely covered by terra cotta. 
Green and cream colored glazed terra cotta is also used to frame the windows and doorways, as well as 
decorating the towers. The decoration of terra cotta imitates the traditional form of glazed terra cotta, 
known in Chinese as Liu Li, a popular material often used in high-style  
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Figure46: The Symmetrical form of On Leong Association Building, ca.2004 (Photo by author) 
 
 
Figure 47: The Chinese Theater and Temple was erected for the World’s Columbian Exposition in 
Chicago in 1893. The building was one of the earliest structures built in American showing the peculiar 
idea of Chinese architecture, ca.1893 (Source: The Chinese-American Museum of Chicago) 
 
architecture. The design of the terra cotta on the On Leong building also followed the forms of Chinese 
prototypes of “animals, figures, foliage, and geometric patterns” that would protect the building from bad 
spirits and signify longevity and fortune.10 However, at the same time, some of the materials and 
ornamental elements echo neo-mudejar (Spanish Islamic) style--also popular in this period--suggesting 
that in the minds of Michaelsen and Rognstad, the exotic may not have been firmly located.   
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Residential rooms on the second floor were designed to accommodate single male immigrants, 
while a lounge, offices, and classrooms were used as an after-hours Chinese language school. The third 
floor of the On Leong building was equipped with a kitchen, a dining room, and three meeting halls to 
accommodate the activities of the On Leong Association; one of the meeting halls was specially 
decorated as an ancestor shrine.11
With the completion of the On Leong building, Michaelsen and Rognstad and their successor 
firm became the most popular architecture firm in Chicago’s Chinatown for the next several decades. 
Besides the commissions of the new commercial structures built in the style similar to the On Leong 
building, the architecture firm was also responsible for renovating existing buildings’ storefronts and 
interiors.
 The building adopted the vivid color scheme of Mandarin red, the 
traditional color of joy and fortune, and jade green symbolizing affluence and peace. The color scheme 
prevailed in the royal and institutional structures in ancient China, where its purpose was to demonstrate 
the authority of the imperial powers over the ordinary people.  
12 Architecturally, the On Leong building has been considered significant for possessing typical 
“Chinese” traditional characteristics in North America, and it was nominated as a Chicago Landmark in 
1988. Socially, the building not only served as headquarters of the On Leong Tong, but also functioned as 
the “City Hall” of the enclave. During the heydays of the On Leong Tong, the building was a symbol of 
wealth, power and authority for its commanding presence. However, despite its historical significance, the 
On Leong building has a checkered social history. In the 1980s, the government forced the building to 
close down because of illegal gambling. In 1992, the Chinese Christian Union Church purchased the 
building and renovated and converted it to a space of worship, a renamed as Pui Tak Center.13 The first 
floor of the building nowadays still houses commercial units, while the second floor has been renovated 
as offices, classrooms, and a library serving the needs of the church. On the third floor, the former 
ancestor shrine and meeting halls were transformed into a Christian hall of worship. With its original 
storefronts, essential architectural elements, and the exterior facades remaining mostly intact, the 
historical integrity of the building has been well preserved.14  In 2007, the Pui Tak Center was awarded a 
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$100,000 grant from the Partners in Preservation Program to renovate the terra cotta exterior and clay 
tiles on the roof.  
Although highly regarded as the “oldest and most prominent physical symbol of Chicago’s 
Chinese heritage,”15 the On Leong Association Building is subject to the debates regarding “authenticity.” 
Dell Upton, for example, questioned the authenticity of these kinds of architectures built in Chinatown, 
arguing that they are not vernacular since their styles were derived from high-style Chinese architectures 
that had little connection to the old-country life ways of the Chinese immigrants. He defined this form of 
Chinese heritage as an “invented tradition” (borrowing the term from Hobsbawm and Ranger) that has 
been “mythicized” and “commodified” to fulfill the Westerners’ fantasy about the Orient.16  The 
arguments illustrate that the production of Chinese American culture is not simply a process of 
transmission, but a practice of recreation and rearticulation. As Lisa Lowe has suggested, the making of 
Asian American culture includes practices that are partly inherited, partly modified, as well as partly 
invented; Asian American culture emerges in relation to the dominant representations that deny or 
subordinate Asian and Asian American cultures as Other.17 In the case of the On Leong Building, the 
strategy of ethnic iconization defined the identity of Chinatown by emphasizing essentialized 
characteristics of Chinese architecture. Architects Michaelsen and Rognstad were both trained in the 
Beaux-Arts tradition and excelled in large-scale public projects.18 For the design of the On Leong 
Association building, they researched the classical masterpieces of Chinese “high-style” architecture, 
including Chinese temples, palaces, gardens, and other institutional structures. Since the architects had 
never visited China and were unfamiliar with Chinese culture, their understanding of Chinese 
architectural style and its embedded philosophy was limited to the literary and graphic materials to which 
they had access. These then were the primary sources of inspiration for the design of the On Leong 
building and its ornamentations. Additionally, the Chinese Theater of the World’s Columbian Exposition 
was also an important inspiration for the design of the On Leong building, even though the theater was 
kitsch architecture built for the enjoyment of the Exposition visitors and based on stereotypical 
representations. By choosing a few highly recognizable visual signs of “Chinese,” the architects 
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combined with the On Leong Association’s formal needs to create a so-called “novel architectural 
solution,” in which tradition, as the architects understood it, was evoked to create a unique cultural 
identity for Chicago’s Chinatown.19
Although Orientalized to appeal to popular non-Chinese taste, the On Leong building also 
expressed the cultural and political ideology of the Chinese community. For instance, a 1943 postcard by 
a Chinese tourist company portrayed an image of the On Leong Association building (figure 48). The 
façade facing South Wentworth Avenue was covered with colorful flags, while the name plate of the 
building was exposed. The application of various bright colors in the picture – jade green roof with 
mandarin red edge and light blue sky – imparted a joyful and celebrating atmosphere to the environment. 
The flags of the United States and the Republic of China stood on the roof of the building to indicate the 
dual nationalities of Chinese Americans, while the colorful American flags decorating the front façade 
conveyed patriotism. They also expressed a concept of transnational citizenship – in the sense of “dual 
citizenship” and “dual loyalty” – which was experienced by the immigrant communities.
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Figure 48: A postcard from 1943 shows a colorful and ostentatious image of the On Leong Association 
Building, ca. 1943 (Source: Curt Teich Postcard Archives, Lake County Discovery Museum)  
 
The postcard highlighted the On Leong building as a cultural symbol of the Chinese community 
by emphasizing its grand commanding appearance, elaborate decoration, and vivid colors. The expression 
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of local pride is also evident in the construction of the open loggia dominating the upper stories of the On 
Leong building. Open loggias were functional architectural elements that prevailed in the multi-story 
commercial and residential buildings in Hong Kong and the Guangdong province of Southern China. For 
the hot and humid climate of those areas, the open loggia was essential to keep interiors cool. As a semi-
open social space, it also gave people the opportunity to interact with each other or to watch parades and 
events on the streets below. Because most of the early Chinese immigrants came from the villages of 
Guangdong Province where the open loggia was popular, the adoption of the element in the On Leong 
Association Building reflected the link between the Chinese immigrants and the living traditions of their 
home country. Although the loggia in the On Leong building in Chicago was far from the natural and 
social context of the past, such a strategy of self-presentation reinforced a collective identity of the 
community in which internal diversity was suppressed for the sake of a new need for solidarity.  
 
Postwar Construction of Landscape Imagery in Chinatown 
If Chinatown of the time period from 1850 to World War II can be characterized by racial 
segregations, political disenfranchisement, and legal exclusions, the repeal of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion 
Act in 1943 and the institution of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965 began a new era for the 
Chinese immigrants, in which the structural transformation of the U.S. economy required reconfiguration 
of the nation’s racial policy and immigration legislation. To renew the domestic labor supply, the state 
had lifted some of the legal and political bars restricting Asian immigration, which produced more diverse 
and stratified immigrant groups among the Asian community. With shifting demographics and American 
democratic ideals, the social and political composition of Chinatown was significantly transformed. The 
kinship relations that were fundamental to community building in the early ages of Chinese immigration 
history had been gradually dissolved and replaced by political unity based on ethnicity and cultural 
identity. Meanwhile, there arose a new generation of grass-root social organizations, comprised of well-
educated young Chinese Americans. These began to compete with the traditional Chinatown associations 
by seeking to build a democratic political structure in Chinatown and fight for inclusion and equality in 
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the national polity. The articulation of a Chinese identity – although emerging through internal dissension 
rather than consensus – became an important organizing tool to advance the political and socioeconomic 
rights of the Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans. With the goal of constructing Chinatown as a 
political unity, the Chinatown elites reproduced the traditional forms of the built environment and thus 
contributed to the construction of an essentialized ethnic imagery.    
After the war, the increasing domination of marketing interests and the fast growth of the tourism 
industry also contributed to the proliferation of ethnic consumption. The marketing of ethnic culture and 
exoticism was promoted by mass media advertising and the reigning ideology of difference and diversity. 
In contrast to the prewar Chinatown in which the constructing of ethnicity was concentrated on a few 
individual works of architecture, the postwar Chinatown self-consciously created an array of symbolic 
images and a themed built environment to appeal to the mass market. From the 1970s to the present, 
many structures adhering to Chinese prototypes have been constructed in Chicago’s Chinatown with the 
goal of endowing it with historical cohesion and continuity. The ornamentations applied to architecture, 
open spaces, and public art works give Chinatown a unique ethnic stamp. Although it is difficult to define 
a cohesive uniform style for the architectural landscape, the structures possessing Chinese characteristics 
usually contain display features such as sloping glazed roofs with upturned corners, cantilevered clusters 
of beams (called Dougong in Chinese), carved columns, and various decorative patterns adopting the 
forms of animals or plants.21
Tradition was a key semiotic instrument in recreating the space and defining the place identity of 
Chicago’s Chinatown. It is evident in the construction of the Chinatown gateway in 1975, which marked 
an entryway into Chinatown and provided a dramatic visual experience for visitors. The gateway idea was 
conceived by George Cheung, a former civil leader of the Chinatown, who suggested that a gateway as “a 
symbol of Chinese culture, good will, and friendship” would attract more visitors to learn about Chinese 
culture and Chinatown.
 The traditional building forms of Chinese pavilion, gateway, and the temple 
also enframed Chinatown at a visual level that distinguished it markedly from the rest of the city. In terms 
of color, red is prominent.   
22 Thus, designed by Peter Fung, a Chinese American architect, the gateway was 
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built by the community developers to promote a pure, exotic, and authentic image for the ethnic enclave 
(Figure 49). The steel-framed, red-painted gateway structure is 60 feet wide and 35 feet tall, spanning 
South Wentworth Avenue and facing Cermak Road. Three gabled roofs are covered with glazed green 
tiles, of which the main central roof is placed higher than the other two smaller side roofs to create a 
symmetrical tiered structure. A Greek mason was in charge of the tricky job of setting the tiles because it 
was impossible to bring in a native craftsman from China at that time. The roofs are placed on top of a 
row of cubes, which is an architectural element derived from Dou Gong, a wooden assembly deployed in 
traditional Chinese architectures to transfer the weight of the roof to the supporting columns. Beneath the 
Dou Gong is a panel decorated with auspicious patterns, underneath which a nameplate is inscribed with 
four Chinese characters, Tian Xia Wei Gong (“The World is for All”). This proclamation of unselfish love 
for the world was made by Sun Yat-Sen (1866 -1925), a founder of the Nationalist Party who initiated the 
revolution overthrowing Qing Empire to establish the Republic of China. A similar statement can also be 
found on the “dragon gate” in San Francisco’s Chinatown that was designed by Clayton Lee in 1970. This 
reveals the connection between these different Chinatowns in terms of political representations when the 
Nationalist Party in Taiwan was a dominant power in most major Chinatowns in America and funded the 
construction of these gateways. On the side of the nameplate facing Wentworth Avenue, there is an 
inscription quoting Chiang Kai-Shek, another former leader of the Nationalist Party. His words -- 
“Propriety, Justice, Integrity and Conscientiousness”--represent Chinese traditional values and also 
indicate the political affiliation of the communities.  
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Figure 49: Chinatown Gateway on South Wentworth Avenue, ca.2008 (Photo by author) 
 
The gateway’s form was derived from a freestanding Paifang (or gateway). In ancient China, such 
gates were built as symbolic entrances to tombs, temples, palaces, or cemeteries. In some cases, they were 
also constructed to memorialize and venerate persons of great virtue or of vital contribution to the country 
or local community. Usually there would be four columns to support the entire structure. But in the case 
of the Chicago gateway, there were only two columns, a design that might reflect accommodation of 
vehicular traffic on South Wentworth Avenue. The gateway was supposed to be flanked by two stone 
figures of lions, symbols of the Guardian of the Law, but due to a lack of funds, this part has never been 
completed. Even though the gateway is relatively simple compared to the original form of Paifang in 
China or the gateways that have been built in San Francisco’s Chinatown and Vancouver’s Chinatown, it 
has been regarded as “original” and “an authentic derivative of old Chinese structures.”23 This begs the 
question of what makes it authentic. Here tradition has been repackaged to represent a community identity 
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that sees itself as stemming from a pure and discrete culture. In this sense, the Chinese Americans were as 
active as any of the external forces in casting themselves as a homogenous group. 
The creation of ethnic monuments tends to transform Chinatown into a “themed park,” a place of 
staged cultural production and consumption.24 This process of theming the landscape is not unique to the 
Chinatown. It has happened in other cities and other ethnic neighborhoods. Greektown in Chicago, for 
instance, built a symbolic entryway in the form of the peristyle temple in 1998. Designed by a local artist, 
the temple represents Greek heritage. The Puerto Rican community at Humboldt Park, in a similar way, 
has been marked by two Puerto Rican flags that are cast in steel and stand 59 feet tall. In 2002, the city 
resumed the trolley cars running on Cermak Road that were retired from service in 1958, in order to link 
the tour line of Chinatown with the Mexican American neighborhood, Pilsen. The new loop is the first 
route in Chicago’s Free Trolley System that travels into the city’s South Side neighborhoods away from 
the lakeshore. The project, as a combined effort of the neighborhoods of Chinatown and Pilsen, was an 
unusual collaboration in a major urban area.25 The city’s efforts to raise the visual identity and tourist 
interests of these ethnic neighborhoods are linked to the rhetoric of “the spectacle of multiculturalism,” 
which promotes ethnic culture and tradition as spectacles for the city’s residents and tourists.26
The promotion of ethnic iconization in Chicago’s Chinatown has been complicated by the 
community’s transnational political networks and the need to institutionalize the various political 
communities of the Chinese Diasporas. In 1977, a community park dedicated to the Chinese political 
figure, Sun Yat-Sen, was built at the southern part of the Chinatown on a strip of land donated by 
Chinatown Redevelopment Assistance. Funded by the City of Chicago and the Community Improvement 
& Development Program, the project featured a stone arch entrance with a crossbeam supported by two 
columns (Figure 50). A statue of Dr. Sun was placed atop a stone cylinder, on which a brief biography 
was inscribed. Underneath the statue is a rectangular pool dotted with small fountains. The small 
memorial park also includes a pavilion in Chinese traditional style and a children’s playground 
 This 
strategy has proved a great success to the city’s economic development because tourism has boomed and 
the city downtown reemerged as a popular residential settlement in the 1990s.        
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accommodating the community’s need for open spaces. Benches and the settings of one stone table with 
four stools are particularly arranged for seniors to play chess and have small gatherings. As a leading 
figure in the national republic revolution of China, Sun was widely admired and highly regarded by the 
overseas Chinese communities. His political success in China had been facilitated by his close ties with 
the Guangdong villages where the early Chinese immigration originated and by generous financial 
support from overseas. Thus the park dedicated to Sun not only displayed the signs of ethnicity, but also 
expressed enduring socio-political ties to the homeland country by reinforcing national memories.                                                                       
Deploying the nationalist discourse of patriotism, the Chinatown elites have tailored and 
institutionalized the ideology of the nation in order to forge an “imagined community” that would inspire 
a sense of local attachment and identity. Because political and legal disenfranchisement excluded Chinese 
immigrants and Chinese Americans from national representation, they were defined as “alien.” In 
response to a political system of racial exclusion and labor exploitation, the Chinese immigrants have 
organized themselves under a collective cultural identity that rests on transnational experiences that 
exceeded the rigid confines of national boundaries. 27 With the Communist Party dominating mainland 
China since 1949, the political uncertainty, social movements of the country, and the shifting international 
geopolitics challenged the relations between the Chinese immigrants and the Old World. Another statue 
of Sun Yat-sen can also be found in St. Mary Square of San Francisco’s Chinatown, which was designed 
by sculptor Beniamino Bufano in 1960. These designs of monument and public space helped to bridge the 
gap, reasserting the emotional ties of the Chinese community in America to a homeland that was, in 
actuality, not the same as the place they had left behind. More importantly, the creation of ethnic 
monuments memorizing selected political figures based on an invocation of a nationalistic regime of the 
past was a strategy whereby the political groups used architectural representations to materialize the 
cultural and political imaginary and reinforce certain political ideology for the community.  
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Figure 50: The entrance to the Dr. Sun Yat-Sen Memorial Park, ca.2003 (Photo by author)    
 
In 1958, the headquarters of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA), also 
known as the Chinese Community Center, was constructed in Chicago’s Chinatown with financial aid 
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from the Nationalist Party of Taiwan (figure 51). By then, CCBA had the dominant position once held by 
 
Figure 51: The CCBA building is decorated with two stone lions at the entrance and the statue of 
Confucius on the side. The national flag of America and the Republic China of Taiwan indicate the 
political connection of the agency to the Nationalist Party in Taiwan. ca. 2003 (photo by author) 
 
the On Leong Tong and had become the official authority and representative of the Chinatown 
community. The two-story building adopted a symmetrical form to emphasize its institutional nature, 
while two stone lions--symbols of power and prestige--flanked the main entrance. A green pitched roof 
with a couple of upturned fish-shaped decorations at each end of the roof ridge was intended to inspire a 
nostalgic sense of ethnic identity. A large expanse of glass on the first floor defines the main entrance of 
the building. The portal opens into a large foyer and a staircase that leads to the large meeting room at the 
ground floor. Offices and classrooms for Chinese language school are located on the second floor. In 
2002, a statue of Confucius was erected at the east side of the building, a strategy promoting the 
traditional cultural values of loyalty, modesty, and obedience. Aihwa Ong explains how the rationality of 
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Confucianism and reconstitution of patriotism have been employed by the Chinese state to incorporate 
overseas Chinese into the national project of constructing Chinese modernity. She suggests “cultural 
solidarity, filial piety, and everlasting loyalty” to the home country has become the essential language of 
“overseas capitalism” and “investment-scouting meetings.”28 In the case of North America, such a 
strategy was also used to facilitate a notion of ethnic solidarity and unification, which contributed to the 
political and cultural hegemony of the elites in those communities.29
Some of the conceptions of “cultural nationalism” are discussed pointedly by Lowe in her book 
about Asian American cultural politics.
   
30 Lowe observes that within Asian American discourse there are 
two genres of discussion about the concepts of identity and culture with respect to race. One places 
cultural nationalism in an opposite position to assimilation by essentializing cultural identity as the 
“cornerstone of a cultural nationalist politics,” while the other trend emphasizes the material hybridity and 
multiplicity of Asian American culture by criticizing the static and pure notions of culture.31 As a form of 
cultural representation, architectural style often engages in the first discourse to assert a cultural 
nationalism in Chinatown. The Chinese sense of racial identity had been shaped by their designation by 
Western colonizers as the “Sick Man of East Asia,” referring to the plague on the Chinese body incurred 
when opium was imported into China at the end of the 19th century. For a century, that negative 
stereotype loomed above the Chinese and Chinese immigrants. Such construction of race is also linked to 
nation building in modern China. The official rhetoric has asserted that Chinese people were finally able 
to get rid of the label of “Sick Man of East Asia,” and that China was rising as a great power in the 
world.32 In this way, national identity was forged upon a colonized past in relation to Western 
constructions of race. The elements of “revolution” and “anti-Western sentiment” play a big part in 
Chinese national identity.33
In addition, the process of essentializing also helped to aestheticize the material inequality and 
differentiation among the social groups. Perceived by outsiders as an urban ethnic enclave, there had not 
been much direct governmental involvement in managing the social and economic order inside the 
 The recovering racial pride contained in the national building of the 
deterritorialized nation-state of China accentuates notions of ethnic unity and common cultural roots. 
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community. Instead the Tongs and clan associations had played a vital role in organizing Chinatown’s 
space. The form of autonomous governance, on the one hand, protected Chinese immigrants from 
oppression and discrimination by external forces. But on the other hand, it also produced an informal 
political structure that maintained the privileges of a small group of elites and the subjugation of the 
majority of laborers. On these grounds, Peter Kwong criticizes the stereotypical construction of Chinese 
Americans as a “model minority” with respect to the class and labor. He suggests that the Chinese 
merchants and business owners were able to exploit laborers with low wages, long working hours, and 
harsh working conditions because the sociopolitical patterns of Chinatown discouraged access to the 
outside world. Labor/management disputes were often perceived as internal issues, for which the 
disadvantaged and oppressed rarely sought outside support.34
Indeed, the strategy of essentialized ethnicity in the built environment was only one aspect of a 
larger scheme of community building pursued by the Chinatown elites. The restructuring of economic 
models, the democratization of institutional structures, and the functional reorganization of planning 
 The political hegemony of the traditional 
organizations, the resistance of grass-root social organizations, labor/management disputes, and the 
emergent issues of illegal immigrants determined the complicated character of the social life in 
Chinatown. There were differences and asymmetrical power relations embedded in these relations, but 
they were hidden behind a benign face of cultural homogeneity. Chinatown was often described as being 
an emblem of homogeneous culture and population. The myth of cultural homogeneity implies an 
essentialized construction of community that denies the differences and diversity among the community 
groups. It thus can be experienced as a political strategy to depoliticize the intra-ethnic relations. This 
phenomenon is not unique in Chicago. As we can also see in New York’s Chinatown, a statue of 
Confucius was erected in the community’s entry way – the busy intersection of Chatham Square and 
Bowery Street. The creation of such landscape imageries relied on producing the narrative of “cultural 
nationalism” and promoting harmonious and unproblematic aspect of ethnic identity. It reduced cultural 
politics to the representation of a static culture that denied the uneven power relations that existed within 
the ethnic community.  
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policies were intended to package the community as an ethnic tourist destination and a commercial center. 
As portrayed in a popular postcard, a bilingual signboard with a dragon head as decoration above the 
prominent word “CHINA” highlighted at the foreground of the picture, along with the two pagodas of the 
On Leong building and the green tiled roof of Chinatown Gateway provides an exotic image that sharply 
contrasts with the Sears Tower at the background (figure 52). The multiple layers of representation reveal 
both the harmony and the tension between two distinctive cultural systems – Western civilization and 
Oriental tradition, or modernity and China. As multiculturalism has become a central trope to mobilize 
the local cultural and social resources for place consumption, ethnic diversity and the cultural presence of 
others contribute to build attractive and distinctive place images. To promote harmonious relations 
between the ethnic groups and mainstream society, the multicultural agenda has emphasized cultural 
differences that are separated from political conflicts and struggles of the ethnic groups. However, the 
sharp contrast with the ethnic structures and modern high-rises conveys a sense of tension that serves to 
flatten Chinatown into a stereotype. Such a stereotype was not only an outcome of the western imagery of 
the Orient imposed from the outside, but also resulted from a process of self-Orientalization. Employers 
and those who controlled the tourism industry and commercial development in Chinatown labeled the 
workers with the same stereotypes as the outsiders imposed on them. They were asked to behave 
according to “what Americans want.”35 These schemes of operation were also manifested in architectural 
representation. The community organizations and business owners actively promoted a staged 
performance of Chinese tradition, the purpose of which was to serve not the community but rather the 
needs of tourism.    
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Figure 52: A Postcard of Chicago’s Chinatown with Sears Tower at the background, ca.2002 (Distributed 
by Smith-Southwestern, Inc., author’s collection) 
 
“Go More Orient” 
The different waves of Chinese immigrants coming from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland 
China after World War II dramatically reconfigured the Chinese settlement and complicated its cohesion 
with homeland politics, economic ability, and various levels of cultural affiliation to the native culture. 
The differences among these immigrant groups were reflected in the built environment where the Chinese 
themselves constituted a major force of consumption in addition to the Westerners. For example, since the 
1980s, while growing numbers of the typical curio stores and ethnic restaurants served the western 
tourists, Chinese grocery stores, book stores, and banks also mushroomed in Chicago’s Chinatown to 
serve the Chinese customers. The burgeoning community sought a way to grow when it was walled in by 
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expressways and railroad tracks on three sides and the only viable option for expansion was to the north. 
By 1984, there were about 8,000 people living in the Chinatown with about 500 more arriving annually.36
Aiming to revitalize Chicago’s Chinatown, a study for Commercial Revitalization of Chinatown 
was conducted in 1980, funded by the Department of Human Services under the City of Chicago’s 
Community Development Block Grant Program. The study advocated revitalization through enhancement 
of ethnic character: “Oriental-looking shopping street with equally Oriental-looking stores should please 
the patrons and increase sales.”
 
The influx of new immigrants placed pressure on the limited space of Chinatown and generated economic 
and social issues in relation to housing, traffic, and community services. Most Chinatown residents lived 
in the neighborhood’s original buildings, some of them dating to 1907. But to accommodate the growing 
number of immigrants, these original housing units were divided into smaller units, in which multiple 
families shared kitchens and bathrooms. Although income levels were low, the scarcity of land and 
housing led to higher property values in Chinatown compared to those of surrounding neighborhoods. 
Because housing and outdoor recreational facilities were inadequate and usually in poor condition, those 
who could afford to move outside of the enclave always preferred to do so. Some of them moved 
southward and westward into Bridgeport and other nearby neighborhoods. For young Chinese 
professionals with adequate financial sources, the suburbs and wealthier neighborhoods in the city were 
favorable choices. With the flight of the wealthy to the suburbs, who were in turn replaced by new waves 
of much poorer recent immigrants, Chinatown has become a vulnerable and unstable neighborhood. 
37 To make the commercial areas more appealing to tourists, the study 
proposed a construction plan that incorporated “a giant pagoda, an Oriental-looking parking garage, 
Chinese ‘friendship gardens” and ethnic decorations on everything from little news shacks, telephone 
booths to flower planters and restaurant directories.38 It also suggested building a pagoda at the 
intersection of Wentworth Avenue and Cermak Road as a cultural symbol of Chicago’s Chinatown. The 
busy intersection was hazardous to pedestrians, and thus the pagoda with an approximately 15 foot island 
around it was expected to provide a midway refuge for the crossing pedestrians. In order to mediate traffic 
congestion in the Chinatown area, the plan also recommended building a parking garage at the northeast 
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corner of Wentworth and Cermak, a site that had been originally vacated for the construction of the 
Franklin extension of the Dan Ryan Expressway. The multi-story parking structure would accommodate 
about 400 cars and commercial space on the first floor, and it would feature a roof of curved Chinese-
style overhangs (figure 53). Another major project proposed by the study was to convert the several 
vacant spaces in Chinatown into “mini friendship gardens” that would provide space for social gatherings.  
 
Figure 53: Drawing shows the Oriental design of a parking structure and a pagoda at the intersection of 
Cermak and S. Wentworth Avenue (Source: An Agenda for Commercial Revitalization of Chinatown, 9). 
 
The revitalization plan gained support from private Chinese developers, who actively sought 
governmental funds and the participation of local business owners. Even though it was not unusual for a 
partnership between the government and the local ethnic groups to play a vital role in neighborhood 
improvement, it did not succeed in this case. The plan went nowhere. Yet, despite this unsuccessful 
attempt, the commercial revitalization plan fostered a sense of public expectation and approval for a 
development direction that would depict Chinatown as an ethnic icon. Compared to the community plans 
for San Francisco’s Chinatown and New York’s Chinatown, the revitalization plan for Chicago’s 
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Chinatown tended to place more emphasis on the creation of an exotic environment. This reflected the 
singularity of its economic structure, which relied heavily on tourism and services, while the Chinatowns 
in San Francisco and New York both had strong components of professional industries and light 
manufacturing. The proposal was designed as to an aggressive marketing campaign aimed at attracting 
tourists and drawing business opportunities. However, it didn’t help to promote the community economy 
in a more sustainable and diversified way.   
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the growth of Chicago’s Chinatown was hampered by railway 
trails and expressways on its three sides. Thus when a 32-acre rail-yard site owned by the Santa Fe 
Railway at the north side of the Chinatown went up for sale, the community was eager to incorporate the 
site in its future development. The site consisted largely of abandoned railroad yard and tracks, extending 
from Cermak Road and Archer Avenue on the south to 18th Street on the north. Although there was 
competition for the site from the U.S. Postal Service and the Chicago World’s Fair 1992 authority, the 
Chinatown neighborhood redevelopment groups eventually purchased the site for a housing and 
commercial development in 1988. The site was economically stagnant, with dilapidated structures that 
could not easily be readapted to contemporary use due to their inflexible configurations that had been 
originally designed for industrial use. But this condition made the site an ideal location for Chinatown’s 
expansion, especially when the city’s McCormick Place convention and exhibition center was constructed 
at the east side of the site. With support from city officials, the City Planning Commission and the City 
Council soon approved a special zoning for the area. Meanwhile, the City planning department proposed 
to designate it as Chinatown Basin Tax Increment Redevelopment Area, in order to forge its 
redevelopment by using new tax revenues generated by the redevelopment itself.39
The project adopted a model of public-private partnership, in which the City of Chicago, the 
Chinese American Development Corporation (CADC), the Chinese American Development Foundation 
(CADF), and a group of concerned Chinese businessmen cooperated to acquire the Santa Fe railroad land 
to construct commercial, residential, and parking facilities. The original proposal for the site development 
was to build 150 town houses, a 130-unit apartment building for elderly people, and 60,000 square feet of 
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space for retail stores and restaurants. However, hoping to lure well-to-do immigrants  from Hong Kong 
due to the reversion of Hong Kong to China, and also to accommodate the need for professional and 
business space, the plan was later revised to accommodate larger spaces for commercial activities and 
market-priced housing, by reducing the senior housing to a 120 – unit apartment building (Figure 54).40 
The construction on the Santa Fe railroad site was started with a 200,000-square feet retail and 
commercial center known as Chinatown Square in 1990. To attract tourists, the architecture of the retail 
center was given an Oriental theme. In the middle of the complex, the designer placed a plaza surrounded 
by twelve marble statues of the zodiac animals, imported from China, and decorated with two three-story 
pavilions. Each pavilion had red roofs and seven green columns with a revolving stair leading to the top. 
Facing to Archer Avenue, an 8-feet high wall covered by a mosaic painting is flanked by two archways. 
The mural portrays two chapters of Chinese immigration history.  One depicts the early Chinese 
sojourners who arrived in the United States and worked as mining workers and railroad constructors; the 
other is about the new generation of Chinese immigrants who united with their families and gradually 
integrated into the mainstream society. The two archways are embellished with four panels, showing the 
Four Great Inventions of ancient Chinatown – the compass, printing, gunpowder, and papermaking. Both 
the mural and the gateways convey a strong sense of pride of the Chinese community towards their 
culture and history. Unlike the old Chinatown gateway that advocates values of two political leaders of 
the Nationalist Party, the symbolic structures in Chinatown Square embrace a broader notion of 
“Chineseness” that transcends political and national boundaries and assumes an integration of ethnic 
Chinese beyond a specific territory. Beside the central plaza are the outdoor shopping malls with 
boutiques and restaurants on the first floor and office spaces on the second floor. The shopping street 
running across the site adopts a courtyard style with bridges leaping across the second floor and two 
archways located at each end. The sidewalks are covered by overhanging balconies on the second floor 
that are supported by columns (figure 55). Diamond-shaped windows and geometrically patterned metal 
screens along the stairs and balconies add Oriental touches to the shopping structures.  
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Figure 54: Development plan for Santa Fe Railroad site. The commercial units of Chinatown Square 
constituted the first phase of the development and 45 townhouses were included in Phase III construction. 
(Source: Chinatown Basin Tax Increment Redevelopment Area: Redevelopment plan and Project, 1986). 
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Figure 55: The shopping street in Chinatown Square adopts a courtyard-style design, ca.2007 (Photo  
by author) 
   
The six-acre development of the commercial center was completed in 1992, and by then 80 
percent of the stores had already been sold. The second phase of the redevelopment project focused on the 
construction of town houses and the Jade Garden condos. Most of the town houses had three-bedroom 
units and one-car garages. To accommodate the particular needs of the Chinese families, some larger 
town houses included detached “in-law” units designed for the elderly who wish to live close to their 
children. In designing the Jade Garden Apartments, feng shui was incorporated as a salient element for 
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spatial configuration with respect to the needs of Chinese clients. For instance, to produce a “good” feng 
shui for the Jade Garden, a road that aligned directly with a residence was relocated since it was 
considered bad feng shui to have a street pointing at the front of a building. The last phase of the 
development was the construction of four mid-rise apartment and condominium buildings that included 
condominiums, subsidized apartments for seniors, and some market-rated apartments.       
Despite its great impact on the social and economic life of Chinatown as a whole, the new 
development has not really served the interests of low-income workers who formed a majority in the 
population. While this sector needed affordable housing, the redevelopment project instead aimed to 
attract middle and upper-middle class Chinese clients. The new constructions constituted the core of a 
new way of economic restructuring and organizing exclusion in the community by boosting the resale 
values of the older housing units. In consequence of this gentrification, rental apartments in Chinatown 
became scarcer and the rents remained high. According to the 1990 census, 70% of the housing stock in 
Chicago’s Chinatown was rental units, which is lower than San Francisco’s Chinatown (which had 84% 
rental). But the rental vacancy rate in Chicago’s Chinatown was only 3% while San Francisco’s vacancy 
rate was 4%.41 And from 1990 to 2000, the ratio of property owners decreased from 66 percent to 37 
percent.42 In 1988, the average home value in Chicago’s Chinatown was $171,407, while the media 
family income was $28,961.43 This shows that there was a severe need for affordable housing in 
Chicago’s Chinatown. Issues such as housing shortage, lack of outdoor recreational space, and 
overcrowdedness remained unresolved through the new development. The poor continued to be 
segregated in the old core of the Chinatown, but social differentiations and inequalities were now 
produced and inscribed in a new way. From the perspective of housing the poor, the development was a 
failure. However, it was successful with respect to economic diversification. The construction organized 
around the maximization of market and consumption generated different spatial distribution of social 
classes and economic activities, in which greater heterogeneity in income and social status became a 
characteristic of the newly expanded Chinatown.            
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In addition to the redevelopment of the Santa Fe railroad site, the city of Chicago also decided to 
create a 5-acre park on a strip of land on the east bank of the Chicago River as part of the city’s plan to 
revitalize the riverside area. Though the main agent of the park construction was the government, the 
launching of the river park system in Chicago’s South Loop was partly driven by real estate interests. The 
aim was to enable the sale of the new housing and commercial properties and help increase real estate 
values of the area. In the late 1980s, the Chicago Park District acquired the land along South Branch of 
the Chicago River and the railway line of the Burlington-Northern and Santa Fe Railroad, from Stewart 
Avenue on the south to 16th Street on the north, which was a switching yard for the railroad. The first 
phase of the project included removing debris, stone, and concrete blocks from the Chicago River and 
upgrading about 1,000 feet of seawall. The second phase focused on the development of the park site 
itself. Designed by landscape architect Ernest Wong, the park was completed in 2000 and was named 
after Ping Tom, the late Chinese community leader and developer who was pivotal in Chinatown’s 
expansion on the Santa Fe railroad site. The design of the park was derived from ideas of a feng shui 
master, and then blended with different perspectives of the community members, some of whom wanted 
traditional design that would reflect Chinese culture, while others asked for a modern design “reflecting 
the exuberance and diversity of contemporary American life.”44 The design called for an approach that 
would “establish cultural identity for the greater Chinatown community” by “developing the cultural 
elements of the park.”45 The entry plaza was designed with a central axis, along which four columns 
etched with images of dragons and a riverfront pagoda-style pavilion was incorporated in order to indicate 
the cultural identity of the community.”46 Off to the north side of the entry plaza is a playground 
surrounded by guardrails. The playground is equipped with the traditional slides and monkey bars, hands-
on games, little dragon-style tools for toddlers, which indicates the growth of Chinatown as a family-
oriented community. To the south side of the plaza is an open lawn placed with large boulders in 
groupings. Two pathways meander across the site. One route is paved with asphalt and used for 
maintenance and security vehicles. The other is covered with fine crushed granite and serves a walking 
trail. The routes end in a memorial plaza arranged with steel benches and planting beds. At the center of 
 230 
the plaza, a tree becomes substitute for a sculpture originally planned to mark the space.47
In 1998, the Chicago Department of Transportation launched a face-lift project for Chinatown’s 
major streets, Wentworth and Cermak. The project included improvements of sidewalks, streetlights, and 
the creation of a small “town center” on Wentworth as a gathering space. The “town center” at 23rd and 
Wentworth was a small garden decorated with stone benches and plants with the Chinese symbol of 
happiness inlaid in the ground. But perhaps with too much hard surface and also sandwiched by the 
Chinese church and a gift shop, the space has not been used as it was intended. Instead, it is now used as a 
parking lot. The improved sidewalk featured a geometric design running at curbside and new pavers. A 
20-foot-tall column entrenched with a pattern of dragon was placed at a median near 24th Place and 
Wentworth. Ernest Wong explained that the column was “actually similar to a piece (I saw) in Beijing. 
It’s a cast-stone piece which has a dragon that is going to be wrapping around the column all the way to 
the top in bas relief. The dragon… is really the essence and the livelihood of the Chinese people.”
 Along the river, 
willows are planted on the sloped grass area to provide a picturesque look of the riverside. Though cut off 
from Chinatown by an Amtrak line and an elevated segment of a Chicago Transit Authority line, the Ping 
Tom Park has become important social space by hosting Chinese traditional festivals such as the annual 
Dragon Boat Festival and special events including music festivals and boating and fishing events. In 
many ways, the symbolic design around cultural themes was no longer passive cultural icons representing 
ethnic traditions, and it has increasingly taken an active role in manipulating and claiming cultural 
identities to address community demands. As the construction of the Dan Ryan Expressway in the 1960s 
took away the only park space in the area, the creation of the new park signaled the quest for an 
innovative and adequate depiction of the contemporary identity and experiences of the community in 
landscape design.   
48 For 
the Cermak Road, Wong envisioned a group of 18 spheres decorating the newly constructed median on 
Cermak in front of the Chinatown gateway. He explained that the gray orbs sitting in planters would 
represent the pearls in an ancient Chinese fairy tale. But some Chinatown residents feared that the design 
would attract graffiti and the spheres would be vandalized like the phone booths resembling Chinese 
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pagodas that once dotted the neighborhood. Emphasizing that community people should be incorporated 
in the decision making process, the executive director of the Chinatown Chamber of Commerce then 
proposed to build a topiary garden with trees planted in the median cut into the shapes of dragons and fish 
because “the trees would be less attractive to vandals.”49
With the unsettled debates, the plan to upgrade the median on Cermak was laid aside. But 
considered as a link between the historic Chinatown and the new expansion of Chinatown, the section of 
Cermak Road in front of Chinatown gateway remained a central focus of community improvement. In 
2003, a pavilion was built with funding from the Taiwanese government. And soon thereafter the 
Chinatown Chamber of Commerce constructed “Nine Dragon Wall” next to the pavilion (figure 56). Both 
structures are located opposite the Chinatown Gateway with a clear intention to evoke nostalgia for an 
ethnic past. 
  
 
Figure 56: The pavilion facing to the intersection of Cermak and Wentworth is surrounded by guardrail to 
prevent vandalism, but also deny the visitors’ access to the pavilion. ca.2007 (Photo by author) 
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Traditionally the pavilion was a structure that usually appeared in Chinese gardens, mountains, or scenic 
spots, providing a shelter for viewing the scenes of the garden or picturesque landscape. But in Chicago, 
the pavilion can’t serve its traditional function, because it is located at a busy traffic intersection. Cermak 
Road, a parking lot, and the train station constitute a very different landscape from the romantic settings 
of the pavilion historically. The spatial decontextualization and dislocation of the pavilion transforms it 
into an image without its original purpose, which results in a sort of “simulacrum” or “kitsch.”50
The practice of kitsch architecture can also be found in the construction of the Nine Dragon Wall, 
which mimics a wall of the same name that was placed in the royal garden—Beihai Park—in Beijing. The 
Chinatown version is smaller and much less exquisite than the original (figure 57). The number of nine is 
a prestigious number in ancient China, and the dragon was a symbol of the soul of all things of creation 
and represented royal power and authority, possessing divine meanings in the ancient Chinese Empire. In 
the past, only the royal families had the privilege to use dragon images to signify their superiority and 
powers. With the collapse of the Empire of China, dragon has gradually evolved into a sign signifying 
Chinese national culture and identity, especially when the Chinese government endeavored to construct a 
marketable semblance of national heritage for political necessity and economic feasibility in the global 
market. In the new global context, the replica of the Nine Dragon Wall in Chicago’s Chinatown does 
seem to reproduce a sense of place and sense of community in a way that inspires a nostalgic attachment 
to the authentic tradition of Chinese culture. However, dissociated from its cultural and historic context, 
the original meaning of the structure has been diluted. It is a mimicry, one that unsettles the relationship 
between place and tradition by employing a cultural symbol created by the nationalist agendas to compete 
in the global web of tourist consumption. In a sense, such practice is part of the processes involved in the 
manufacture of global cultural products of “Chineseness.”   
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Figure 57: The Nine Dragon Wall in Chinatown is displayed as a representation of the self-striving 
characters of the Chinese all over the world, ca.2007 (Photo by author) 
 
Despite being patently fabricated for modern purposes, an ethnic monument can make tradition 
adapt to local life and community needs. For instance, the Nine Dragon Wall lies across the exit of 
expressway of I-55 and I-94, a location that is considered to produce bad fengshui for the community. 
Placing the Dragon Wall in its location thus was an effort to minimize the negative influence and provide 
a better fengshui that would bring fortune and prosperity to the community. In addition, the Wall is also 
claimed to have a piece of brick originated from the Great Wall of China, which accentuates the local 
pride of their cultural heritage. In a sense, the process of creating ethnic icons, even when stereotypical, is 
driven by local agents. These agents do not perceive the ethnic monument simply as a passive expression 
of market-driven cultural differentiation, but as an active force with the power to transform the space to fit 
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the local conception of place and community. When this happens, the meaning of heritage is reinterpreted 
to inspire a new identity and a sense of ownership for the community itself.  
To comprehend the social agenda of modern design projects in Chicago’s Chinatown, it is 
important to know that the use of architectural styles and spatial configurations not only represents 
cultures, but also validates the process of identity claiming and regulating relations of local cultural-
political environments. The relation between built form and culture is affected by the need to construct 
identity and the manipulation of images for commercial consumption.51 The conscious intent of the local 
forces to “orientalize” Chinatown and make the area distinct incorporated the process of manipulating a 
particular form of tradition to attain the local-specific spatial product. James Ferguson proposes the notion 
of “isomorphism” of space/place/culture and argues that we need to go beyond the conception of culture 
as a spatially bounded phenomenon in order to explore the identity of a place within hierarchically 
interconnected spaces with “its cultural construction as a community or locality.”52 Thus, even though 
Chinatown appears to be deviant and inconsonant with the national space, the transformation of its built 
environment is testimony to the nation’s shifting socio-economic structure and a global culture of image 
consumption. In the era of globalization, there is a decreasing congruence between tradition and place, 
and identity and tradition are becoming “less rooted in place and more informationally based.”53
 
 Thus in 
the case of Chicago’s Chinatown, instead of searching for the authentic and enduring ethnic tradition 
manifested in the built environment, the local agents placed emphasis on the process of reinterpreting, 
packaging, and manipulating cultural tradition to encompass the politics of spatial reproduction in both 
the local and global context. 
Conclusions 
The making of ethnic landscapes in Chicago’s Chinatown manifested the relationship between 
space, race, heritage, and power in the context of rapid urban transformation. The ethnic projects 
undertook in the Chinatown strategically engaged in the process of urban redevelopment, in which 
community amenities and the economic and social vitality of Chinatown were improved. But meanwhile, 
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it created a problem in urban neighborhoods undergoing gentrification by privileging the needs of the 
well-to-do families and marginalizing the poor from the newly revalued land. Without the full 
participation of the lower-class community members, the new projects in Chicago’s Chinatown came to 
serve an aggressive economic interest that catered to the needs and expectations of the Chinatown elites 
and the city officials. These took control of spatial reconfiguration and representation to boost the local 
economy by attracting tourists and capital. Aestheticization and image-making were at the central stage of 
community development; landscape thus served as a tool of manipulating consciousness, reproducing 
political and racial ideology, and naturalizing power relations.   
The imposition of a narrow definition of “Chineseness” on the images, architecture, and parks of 
Chicago’s Chinatown demonstrates that Chinatown itself is an emblem constituted in relation to the 
instability, multiplicity and hybridity of the process producing cultural identity. The reduction of the 
community to a landscape of visual consumption reflects its relationship to the global tourist market but 
also to practices of economic restructuring and social development. As the city of Chicago was 
transformed, its idea of ethnicity changed from an older model based on rigid racial segregation and ward 
politics (as demonstrated in Chapter Two) to the idea of new ethnicity that celebrates an ethnic mosaic, 
and ethnic identity became a spectacle with particular meanings for urban planning and design.54 The 
ethnic markers created for the city’s ethnic neighborhoods such as Greektown and the Puerto Rican 
neighborhood reflected such ideas of urban development. Within that context, Chinatown in particular 
created an image of itself in its architectural and park projects that entailed not only the commodification 
of ethnicity, but aestheticization of social inequality and exclusion. As the concretization of institutionally 
defined categories of “Chinese,” the essentialized image of Chinatown consolidated the elite hegemony 
and promoted unequal social relations through its logic of patriotism, loyalty, and ethnic solidarity. The 
partnership of government officials and Chinese real estate developers that was formed to control the 
spatial use and expansion of Chinatown effectively excluded the working-class majority of the ethnic 
community. The latter lost the opportunity for upward mobility, and this intensified the growing spatial 
differentiation among social classes.      
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The notion of Orientalist “others” operates in the space of Chinatown and is reflected in 
stereotypical representations of the minority group, which provide clues about power relations and social 
control. But at the same time, the process of rearticulating and reproducing cultural traditions is also 
subject to the community’s own internal political and economic transformations. The celebration of ethnic 
identity in the built environment of Chinatown is not produced solely for tourists. It reflects the yearning 
for a new kind of collective ethnic identification that is integral to the lives of the ethnic community, no 
matter how artificially produced. By highlighting the cultural aspects of “Chineseness,” an ethnic identity 
grounded on a common tradition and cultural ancestry embraces--and indeed invents--a new notion of 
community that shares interests and destiny in America.   
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Chapter 6: Demystification and the Spatial Division of New York’s Chinatown 
 
New York’s Chinatown presents a case study of the contemporary transformation that has taken 
place in relation to both global geo-political changes and urban economic restructuring. Illustrating the 
way discourses of identity and heritage function to reinforce the very power structure of domination, the 
chapter examines the socially and materially constructed demarcations of the ethnic neighborhood 
through the lenses of architectural and landscape representation. As in San Francisco and Chicago, a 
remarkable, self-conscious process of community building took place in New York and other U.S. 
Chinatowns in the period after the civil rights movements of the 1960s, especially when the institution of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 led to the eventual abolition of Asian quotas. New York’s 
Chinatown, in a similar vein, has increasingly become a site of conflict between U.S. global economic 
imperatives and the construction of a coherent national identity.1
Since the 1960s, the Chinese population in New York has been continuously growing. In 1989, 
there were about 300,000 Chinese scattered across Queens, Brooklyn, and a vastly expanded Manhattan 
Chinatown. The new settlers represented the diversity of the immigrants who came from mainland China, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia, and dramatically reconfigured the Chinese settlements in the 
city. Meanwhile the overseas Asian investments and immigrants into New York’s Chinatown also 
brought about an economic and social restructuring of the ethnic neighborhood. Unlike earlier immigrants 
whose investments were relatively small in size, the new immigrants brought capital that effectively 
fueled the economic boom and caused a significant growth of real estate industry. The arrival of affluent 
Chinese investors coincided with attempts by New York City to court transnational capital and to 
encourage the new Asian immigrants to revitalize Chinatown. With the support of the city’s agenda of 
growth, the infusion of overseas capital produced a contested form of the ethnic social life wherein the 
 Within a peculiar narrative of ethnic and 
localist distinctiveness, the political acquisition of the very concept of cultural heritage and ethnic identity 
in the built environment in New York’s Chinatown is examined through the understanding of their 
underpinning social agendas, cultural and political implications. 
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Asian entrepreneurs were accused of developing the community by the means of gentrification. Thus 
through a series of spatial constructions and reconstructions, Chinatown made a transition not only in its 
self-image and claims on a notion of ethnic identity, but in its quest for adequate and tailored solutions to 
the community issues.  
In addition to the conflicts between developers and local residents, there is a vital continuity 
between the politics of the home country in the past and community issues of Chinatown in the present, 
and it is visible in the troubled relationship between the long-term residents who came from rural areas of 
Guangdong Province and the new immigrants from Fujian Province of Communist China. Their 
encounter is a story of contestation and context-specific struggles over space. Doreen Massey writes that 
places do not have single and unique identities, but are “full of internal conflicts.” This, however, does 
not deny the uniqueness of place, for its specificity is continually produced by multiple sources. 2 Hence it 
is the conflicts themselves, rather than “some long, internalized history”3
 
 that make a neighborhood 
distinct. Compared to the themed landscape of the Chinatowns in San Francisco and Chicago, New 
York’s Chinatown appears plain, without Oriental embellishment. Despite the efforts of the city and the 
Chinatown elites to Orientalize the built environment, their attempts were not successful because of the 
particular forms of local economic and social conditions. Thus instead of the expressive intention of 
endowing place with unique character, the identity-making of New York’s Chinatown was largely shaped 
by the contested process of spatial construction within which discourses of development and tradition 
have been employed by different social groups to address their interests and political ideology. The case 
provides an insight into the complex community dynamics and the changing significance of ethnicity and 
tradition in building an ethnic community. 
A Chinatown without Pagodas 
In the 1950s and 60s, the World Trade Center was constructed to launch a resurgence of Lower 
Manhattan, and the downtown waterfront was subsequently converted into a vast residential and 
commercial development.4 At the same time, the city decided to transform its central city slums through 
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extensive urban renewal planning. The Lower East Side was one of the prime locations for several urban 
renewal projects, and in particular, Chinatown, as one of the notorious urban slums. A project proposed 
by New York State Housing Commissioner, Herman T. Stichman, called for a vast, new housing project 
and enhanced commercial architecture to be implemented in the Chinatown area. Existing buildings in the 
central Chinatown would be demolished and replaced with a modern public housing project to be called 
“China Village.” The residential project would be surrounded by shops, restaurants, and museums, and a 
Chinese-style gateway would mark the eastern entrance of the village (figure 58).  
 
Figure 58: Drawing by Harold Thompson that shows an Oriental look of the China Village. (Source: The 
New York Times, Jun 25, 1950) 
Chinese architectural features would be emphasized as a cultural and tourist attraction. Stichman 
invited the director of the China Institute, Chih Meng, to lead the design, who pledged to “bring the best 
of Chinese culture” to the project.5 However, Stichman’s efforts to orientalize Chinatown’s architecture 
were criticized by Robert Moses, the City Construction Coordinator who was in charge of slum clearance 
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and the construction of public housing. Moses complained that Stichman’s attention to the needs of the 
city’s minority groups obstructed his efforts to modernize the city and attract middle- and upper-income 
Whites. He and his staff ridiculed Stichman as “Chow Mein Houses Architect,” and insisted that the 
project was too expensive for the city and the state.6 In response to Moses’ critique, Stichman insisted 
that the China Village project was not only financially feasible but also very important in preserving the 
Chinese culture in an international context. In a letter for President Truman, Stichman wrote that “Today 
the people of China are struggling in the Communist vortex, but their culture which has progressed over 
scores of centuries should not be permitted to be extinguished.” He perceived the project would be “a 
valuable indication of the desire of the United States to see China restored to democracy” as the 
Communist Party had dominated China since 1949.7
In addition to the city’s opposition, the Chinatown residents also reacted indifferently to the 
redevelopment project. For instance, one Chinese woman interviewed by a local newspaper simply denied 
the possibility of redevelopment, declaring that there were no vacant lots available. There was truth to this 
statement. During the 1950s, 193 buildings with 2502 apartment units housed 25,000 people in 
Chinatown, and the overcrowding and scarcity of land became a major obstacle to redevelopment. 
Furthermore, the redevelopment plan for New York’s Chinatown represented an effort to infuse 
Chinatown with a sense of exoticism that would attract visitors. It claimed for the ethnic enclave distinct 
architectural characteristics that were uniquely “Chinese.” Regarding the official attempts to showcase the 
unique character of the Chinese settlement, the community members worried that the plan might change 
Chinatown into a “Chinese Broadway,” as had happened in San Francisco. They asserted that as there was 
no earthquake, New York could not build new Chinatown with “balconies and pagodas.”
 Regardless, the New York City Housing Authority 
and the Citizens Housing and Planning Council agreed with Moses and rejected Stichman’s project.  
8 The lack of 
political alliances and community support obliged Stichman to scale down his plan. Instead of 
constructing eight public housing towers on the 15-acre land, the new China Village plan proposed to 
build two public housing towers with pagoda-shaped roofs and a low-lying museum and recreation center 
on a 2-acre site at the corner of Worth and Baxter Streets. The reductions, however, still weren’t enough, 
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as Moses had predicted that the state and the city would not finance a project for low-income tenants on 
such a valuable property.9
Despite the failure of China Village, some sympathetic business and association leaders in 
Chinatown continued to make efforts to orientalize the community. For instance, they renovated the On 
Leong Merchant Association building at the southwest corner of Mott and Canal Streets in 1950. A new 
three-roofed pagoda was added on top of the three-story brick building,as well as balconies with white 
rails and engaged red columns (figure 59). In spite of these efforts, only a handful of structures in 
Chinatown, such as banks and association buildings featured Oriental architectural elements. Greg 
Umbach and Dan Wishnoff have argued that New York’s Chinatown appears to be “so authentic in its 
grittiness that any exoticism would have to be in the wishful eye of the beholder.” But it was not because 
the community leaders were not willing to stage ethnicity for the tourists.
 Instead, by the end of the 1960s, Chatham Towers, the market-rated 
condominiums, were built on the site, with modern and concrete-surfaced façade.  
10 Their unsuccessful attempts 
were partly due to the lack of political and commercial forces to promote a kitschy version of the ethnic 
neighborhood. The lack of success was also due to the particular form of enclave economy that thrived in 
New York’s Chinatown.11 Restaurants and garment shops constituted the most industries in Chinatown 
and occupied 70% of the community businesses, in which a large pool of cheap labors became the key for 
successful operation. Tourist-oriented business such as gift shop comprised less than 1% of the 
community business types, while it was 10% in San Francisco’s Chinatown and 5% in Chicago’s 
Chinatown.12 In addition, the large influx of overseas Asian capital facilitated the fast growth of real 
estate industry. Thus, compared with Chinatowns in San Francisco and Chicago, New York’s Chinatown 
tended to be more self-sustained with its thriving industries and real estate development, and tourism was 
not as crucial.  In consequence, there was more desire to solve practical issues such as housing and 
employment and address the needs of the residents, rather than simply catering to tourists. 
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Figure 59: The pagoda roof and delicate balconies of the On Leong Merchant Association building 
indicated the efforts of the Chinese elites to Orientalize Chinatown, ca.2008 (Photo by author) 
 
The construction of Confucius Plaza and the conflicts surrounding the project provide insight into 
the local dynamics of social transformation and identity-making. Confucius Plaza was one of the first 
major housing projects built in New York’s Chinatown. In 1966, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of 
New York and the Association for Chinatown Housing approached City Hall seeking to construct a 
cooperative housing project to accommodate the growing population. The Housing and Development 
Administration of New York City approved the development proposal and subsequently formed a 
 245 
cooperative corporation known as Chinatown Apartments to manage the project. A majority of the Board 
of Directors of the corporation was constituted by community leaders of the Chinatown. The project site 
was bounded by the Bowery, Division Street, and the Manhattan Bridge. As a middle-income and 
Mitchell-Lama housing project,13 Confucius Plaza was completed in 1976. It included a 25,000-square 
feet landscaped plaza and 762 living units, of which 10% were reserved for low-income tenants. The 
lower two floors of the complex were designed to accommodate office spaces and community facilities, 
while a three-story public school and a playground adjoined to the structure14
Despite the successful implementation of Confucius Plaza, the actual construction process was 
controversial. In May 1974, several hundred demonstrators marched outside the housing project site to 
protest against alleged discrimination towards Asian American workers. Headed by the community-based 
organization, Asian-Americans for Equal Employment (AAFEE), and supported by the Black and Puerto 
Rican Coalition and U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the demonstrators castigated the project’s 
contractor for not hiring any Asian American workers, even though more than 100 qualified Asian 
Americans had submitted applications. The construction company defended its compliance with minority-
hiring regulations, pointing out that more than 40 percent of the workers at the construction site came 
from minority groups. But most of the minority workers were imported from other construction sites, a 
practice known as “checkerboarding.” During the protest, 57 people were arrested and charged with 
criminal trespass. The confrontation had lasted for over a month, when the construction company 
eventually agreed to employ 12 Asian workers on their construction sites across the city and to hire 12 to 
13 Asian American trainees from the list provided by AAFEE. The agreement was believed to be “the 
first in which a government compliance agency established goals specifically for Asian Americans.”
 The project proved itself a 
triumph for the community. It not only showed a successful partnership between city government and the 
neighborhood organizations that effectively used governmental funds for a housing project, but it was 
also a winning business operation: all the housing units were sold within five months after the building’s 
official opening in 1978.  
15 
The petition for equal opportunities of employment was signed by some 8,000 Chinatown residents and 
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obtained wide support from the Chinese community. It was one of the few times that the city had 
witnessed the insurgency of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans fighting for their benefits. 
Because the struggles were grounded in and reflective of the specifically place-bound locality, they 
signaled a conscious link between the ethnic group and the place of Chinatown, which integrated in a 
positive way the political empowerment and a clear geographical dimension of ethnicity.  
In a sense, the articulation of a Chinese American identity is constructed out of a persistent 
identification with Chinatown that is extroverted and connects with the wider world, rather than its 
segregated and introverted history.16 Moreover, as an organizing tool for facilitating a concept of political 
unity, the process of identity-making in New York’s Chinatown didn’t call upon the spectacle of ethnicity 
in transforming the built environment. Confucius Plaza, for instance, is a modern high-rise, without any 
obvious traditional Chinese characteristics (figure 60). There were critics who lamented the plaza as an 
intrusion onto “a treasured Oriental scene.” In response, the president of the Association for Chinatown 
Housing stated that, “The older people like the old ways. But I myself saw no sense to put this up looking 
Chinese. It should be practical, to let people live comfortably; for the people here, not for the tourist.”17 
The architect of the plaza, Horowitz & Chun, also asserted that a Chinese treatment “would basically have 
been cosmetic and superficial.”18 Their rejection of ornament to represent Chinese characteristics 
suggested that the building of place identity does not necessarily draw on race or ethnicity to transform 
the built environment into a themed setting. Instead representation of place is intrinsic to the political 
economic process of urban restructuring, including producing higher-end commercial and residential 
spaces, encouraging acts of consumption, and facilitating community-based social reproduction.19  
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Figure 60: The modern high-rise of Confucius Plaza with no obvious architectural efforts to show its 
connection with Chinese traditional architecture, ca.2008 (Photo by author) 
 
Some critics pointed out that the streetscape of New York’s Chinatown was incapable of 
representing Chinese identity, and that except for advertisements and festival decorations, the streets in 
general lacked signs of Chinese character.20 The Chinatown Street Revitalization Plan, conducted in 
1976, in a similar vein, asserted that one of the limitations of Chinatown was its lack of space for cultural 
and artistic displays. Thus it proposed designating portions of the streets for temporary exhibitions of art, 
sculpture, music and festivals, as well as forming a community cultural council that would be responsible 
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for scheduling outdoor sculpture and art shows, street theatre and concerts. The street revitalization plan 
also proposed to build an outdoor cultural park that would feature distinctive street signage and banners 
with Chinese characters (figure 61). Moreover, a merchants-supported tourist information kiosk was 
recommended to accelerate local tourism development.21
The events were organized by the Chinatown Street Fair Committee, which was a community 
group of activists, students, and professionals who shared common concerns for the critical conditions of 
the Chinese community. Influenced by the American Civil Rights movements, the street events not only 
served the community people in solving practical issues, but also as a political campaign aiming to 
educate Chinese Americans and Chinese immigrants to fight for their civil rights by revealing the history 
of racial discrimination, oppression, and resistance. The street fairs have become a traditional event for 
the community. They continue to provide Chinatown residents with information and services, and this 
exemplifies how the specificity of a place is, in Massey’s words, “constructed out of a particular 
constellation of social relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular locus.”
 In addition to the official efforts of highlighting 
ethnic characteristics in the physical environment of Chinatown, street events such as the annual 
Chinatown Street Fairs that have been held on Mott and Bayard Street since the 1970s also reflected such 
intentions. In the fairs, firecrackers and dragon dances provided exotic ingredients that drew large 
audiences. But for the most part, the fairs were mainly oriented to the community’s residents by imparting 
information and counseling on health, housing, education, legal issues, and the elderly programs. Thus the 
traditional performances can be understood as a way of celebration and assertion of the particular cultures 
of the ethnic community in order to attract local residents rather than visitors.  
22 The attempts to 
impose a Chinese identity in the built environment of Chinatown were rooted in the assumptions that 
identity of place is produced from the invocation of past forms based on internalized cultural origins. In 
this interpretation, a unique sense of place is created through nostalgic references to tradition, a process 
that is necessarily distorted by stereotypical essentializations that reduces cultural complexity to basic 
representations.23 In New York’s Chinatown, such attempts didn’t succeed because iconic signs of 
profitable exoticism failed to address the community’s concerns over the resident’s social and cultural 
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needs. Especially given that the thriving enclave economy did not depend on tourist trade, the Chinese 
community tended to be more attentive to the growth of identity politics and the “authentic” 
representation of the ethnic group.  
    
Figure 61: A drawing of the proposed Outdoor Cultural Park that was featured with pagodas, lanterns, 
and banners and signage with Chinese characters, ca.1976 (Source: Chinatown Street Revitalization).                                                                                                          
 
Historic Preservation in Chinatown  
Throughout the 1970s, there had been preservation efforts implemented to save historically 
significant structures in New York’s Chinatown. The city’s Landmarks Preservation Commission, for 
instance, dedicated the First Chinese Presbyterian Church on Henry Street as an official New York City 
landmark in 1976. The Gothic edifice was built in 1817 as a Dutch Reformed church. When the Dutch 
church dissolved in 1864, the New York Presbytery took over the building, and then in 1972 presented 
the church to the Chinese community, which renovated and refurbished it as the First Chinese 
Presbyterian Church. However, after these early attempts to preserve the actual historic buildings of the 
Chinatown, the focus of historic preservation shifted to the reconstitution of the diluted social and cultural 
memories of the Chinese community in the 1980s. These preservations of community documentations 
changed from built fabric to something more intangible. 
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With the progress of urban renewal, many of the old-fashioned stores in New York’s Chinatown 
became too expensive to sustain. Especially in the early 1980s, many leases expired and were replaced 
with shorter ones requiring higher rents, which resulted in the closing of several longtime businesses in 
Chinatown. In 1980, Wah On Lee’s dry goods store on Mott Street, for instance, closed after 101 years of 
operation as one of the community’s unofficial post offices and medicinal herb stores. The family who 
owned the store proclaimed that they could no longer afford the ever-increasing rent. Upon its closing, 
New York State Museum offered to buy the interior and storages of the store with the aim of making it 
part of an exhibition on New York City neighborhoods. The physical remnants of the store included store-
front windows imprinted with gold Chinese calligraphy, spice cabinets built by the great-uncle of the 
store owner in 1879, an accountant’s cage, and a threadbare chintz mailbag that was used for the Chinese 
laborers to pick up letters from their home country. The whole retail store was disassembled and hauled to 
the museum, where it was precisely re-erected as an integral part of the exhibition called “New York 
Metropolis.” To make the exhibition an authentic representation of the early Chinatown stores, no major 
renovation works were conducted, and supplies from the 1940s, the heyday of the shop, were displayed 
on the shelves. As in preservation strategies elsewhere, there was an emphasis on physical rather than 
social fabric. Although the physical artifacts of the old store were well preserved in the museum, the 
closing of the store itself indicated a significant social transformation of the Chinatown community. Until 
the 1950s, the Chinese residents had been used to visiting this kind of old stores for their mails, medicinal 
herbs, and also socializing with friends. When the urban revival started, with the simultaneous economic 
restructuring, the traditional socio-economic system of Chinatown was no longer sustainable. Some of the 
longtime stores and companies sought development opportunities by shifting to new modes of business. 
For example, Harold Lee & Sons, a grocery and curio store established in 1888, expanded existing 
services to include new businesses like foreign exchange to fulfilling the needs of increasing numbers of 
tourists and new immigrants. Quong Yuen Shing & Company, founded in 1891, abandoned the original 
grocery business and reorganized itself as a gift shop and travel agency.24  With the displacement of the 
old stores by the new, high-volume businesses targeting tourists and new immigrants, the traditional way 
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of life in Chinatown that was based on kinship relations and intimate social interconnections among the 
community members, had been gradually replaced.  
The shifting of the physical environment of Chinatown – associated with social transformations at 
various levels – was also a result of technological innovations. With the popularity of videotapes and 
Chinese cable television programs, movie houses in Chinatown became anachronisms and many were 
swept away in the process of community redevelopment. The Pagoda Theater, for instance, was 
demolished in 1992 to make a way for the Glory China Tower office building. The Sun Sing Theater was 
closed down in 1993, and the Rosemary was turned into a Buddhist shrine by 1996 (figure 62). The 
Music Palace located on Bowery Street remained the last Chinese-language theater to survive in New 
York City (figure 63). However, by 1999 the three-story structure had closed for business, and in 2007 it 
was torn down to make place for an office building. These movie theaters used to play an important role 
in the community’s social life, bridging the Diasporas with the homeland and facilitating a sense of 
community and belonging. In the late 19th century, live Chinese opera was performed in Chinatown 
theaters. From the 1930s to 60s, Chinese theaters were an essential social space in the everyday life of 
Chinatown – not only the screenings of movies from Hong Kong were popular entertainment for the 
Chinese immigrants, but some theaters also hosted community events such as Chinese New Year 
celebrations. Nevertheless, since the 1970s, the theaters began to lose out to other forms of 
entertainments. New generations of Chinese Americans and Chinese immigrants grew more familiar with 
mainstream American culture, while at the same time Hollywood movies were exported to China and 
elsewhere, dominating the global market. The demise of Chinatown theaters showed how globalization 
and the growth of the global cultural economy could affect neighborhood change in a way of altering the 
local cultural landscape.  
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Figure 62: Sun Sing Theater located at East Broadway was opened in 1911 and featured performances of 
Yiddish vaudeville and motion pictures (Source: 
http://s158562511.onlinehome.us/BlogImages/SunSingTheatreExt.jpg, accessed in Oct.11, 2010)      
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Figure 63: The Music Palace at Bowery Street was the last of the Chinese movie theatre. It was listed as 
the Universal Theatre in Film Daily Yearbook from the 1920s to 50s (Source: 
http://www.nychinatown.org/photo3/bowery1.html, accessed on Oct.11, 2010)                                                                                                                                                      
With the rapidly changing forms of social life, there was a perceived need to preserve the heritage 
and memories of the old Chinatown. A group of historians, community workers, photographers, artists, 
and writers thus conducted the New York Chinatown History Project in the 1980s to collect oral stories, 
old snapshots, historic documents, and artifacts that would represent the multifaceted living experiences 
of the Chinese immigrants in New York. The project included a program known as “Old Chinatown 
Streets” that interpreted the community’s physical evolution, and designated buildings with historical 
significance. The program also explored the indoor components of the Chinatown architecture by 
documenting how the Chinese immigrants transformed and adapted existing building interiors to serve 
their particular needs. As another part of the programs in the history project, the Chinatown History 
Museum was founded in 1980. Collections in the museum had a vernacular focus that explored the value 
and meaning of objects through stories and everyday life of Chinatown rather than the objects 
themselves.25
Such preservation practices are worth noting not only because of the need to document the 
memories of old Chinatown, but also because of what the memories represent in terms of the politics of 
ethnicity and place identity. Tchen has argued that, “Once racial identities become understood as 
changing cultural phenomena, then bicultural heritages can be understood as much more nuanced and 
 The museum was dedicated to saving the discarded belongings of the old stores that 
exemplified life in Chinatown before 1965. For instance, it collected material from the Mee Heung Chow 
Main Company, one of the oldest noodle manufacturing companies on Mott Street that was sold in 1991 
and later replaced by Ten Ren’s Tea and Ginseng Company, a Taiwanese-based company with chains of 
tea emporiums located throughout North America and Asia. The Chinatown History Museum made 
efforts to preserve the old equipment of the Mee Heung Chow Main Company and some of its historic 
items such as boxes of stationery, labels, containers, and noodle bags with the company name printed on 
them. Such objects have little value, except insofar as they represent a bygone way of life through 
material culture. 
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variegated experiences.”26 Comparing with the preservation efforts in San Francisco’s Chinatown which 
was featured with the elitist practice of a top-down approach that stressed an essentialist and even quasi-
genetic characteristic of the ethnic enclave, the community-based history project in New York’s 
Chinatown uncovered the heterogeneities and rich array of differences among Chinese Americans and 
their settlements. 27 By preserving “a more integrative and inclusive community history,” the preservation 
practices in New York’s Chinatown emphasized the history of the Chinese community as part of the 
cultural formation of the Lower East Side and New York City as a whole.28
 
 Such inquiry was urgent and 
necessary, as the physical environment became increasingly commodified and homogenized, washed over 
by the rhetoric of community revitalization and urban renewal.      .         
From “Chinatown” to “Chinamall” 
Rather than an exotic tourist attraction, Chinatown has grown into a flourishing self-contained 
center of manufacturing and service industries run by the Chinese. But with the aggressive growth of 
Chinatown real estate (as demonstrated in Chapter Three), many sweat shops were forced to move out of 
Chinatown to more affordable areas in Queens or Brooklyn in the 1990s. Replacing the original 
monopoly of restaurants and sweat shops, a variety of new commercial activities prospered in the ethnic 
community, such as long-distance transportation and remittance businesses. With the establishment of a 
bus transportation network across the United States, New York’s Chinatown has also become a social and 
cultural center for the new immigrants who exchange job information and commute between different 
areas, with New York as the central point. For the Fujianese immigrants in particular, Chinatown is a 
focal place for job searching, networking, holding wedding banquet, taking wedding pictures, and 
purchasing jewelry. They rely on the network and resources of the Chinatown to expand their social life 
and maintain their connections. Within such a context, Chinatown has gradually transformed from a place 
of industrial production to a service-oriented community. The constant stream of immigration and the 
growing market to fulfill the daily needs of new immigrants has facilitated more complex, diverse, 
extensive spaces of consumption in Chinatown. As traditional ethnic shopping streets still thrive with 
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curio stores, restaurants, and imported goods, large-scale shopping malls and commercial buildings 
emerge as important sites of community lived experience, in which new identity and social practices are 
formed.                  
According to a study conducted by the Hunter College Neighborhood Planning Workshop in 
1992, there was a dramatic increase of Asian occupancy at the central areas of Chinatown including Canal 
Street and Grant Avenue in a space of twenty years: the Asian population increased from 55 percent in 
1970 to 84 percent in 1990. However, despite the population growth and the fast development, more than 
75 percent of the residential buildings in the area were built prior to 1939 and were in dilapidated 
condition. The rents remained high, usually demanding 25 percent of the household income.29 From 1985 
to 1990, about 28 new residential developments had been constructed in Chinatown, which varied from 
small projects of condominium conversions to large-scale developments such as Mandarin Plaza.30 
Nonetheless, these developments were mostly targeted at middle- and upper-income population. Very 
little affordable housing had been built for the low-income community to mediate its housing crisis. Since 
the 1990s, the process of community redevelopment that promoted luxury housing development has 
slowed because of the controversies regarding the Manhattan Bridge Special District plan and 
community-based resistance to residential displacement. In addition to the socio-political dilemmas of 
developing luxury condominium complex in Chinatown, real estate developers also realized commercial 
buildings were generally more profitable than housing projects because the city zoning law favored 
commercial over residential development, as commercial buildings allow a Floor Area Ratio (FAR) of 6 
and residential only of 3.44. This means that on the same lot the developer could build a commercial 
building with a larger floor plan than a residential building. This stimulated an upsurge of developing 
commercial complexes in the Chinatown area. Accordingly, although commercial spaces occupied only 
22 percent of the overall land use in Chinatown, 70 percent of ground floors were used for commercial 
operations by 1992.31
The commercial development of Chinatown has occurred in three general stages.
 
32 The first stage 
was small-scale street-front stores operated by Chinese families that congregated at the old core of 
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Chinatown on Mott, Bayard, and Elisabeth Streets. These stores served as informal social center in the 
early times with a variety services such as grocery stores, post offices, herb stores, and tea houses. The 
second stage of commercial devolvement started in the 1960s, when a more liberal immigration policy 
accommodated the process of economic restructuring in U.S. cities. In this stage, the traditional grocery 
stores in Chinatown were revitalized with enlarged windows and open store fronts. The modernized steel-
glass look of these stores dominated Canal, Bowery, and Catherine Streets, where an expansion of a new 
shopping district came into shape due to the fast growing immigrant populations and overseas 
investments. Since the 1990s, large-scale shopping malls constituted with small commercial units have 
prospered in Chinatown. It is often referred to as the third stage of Chinatown commercial development. 
The large-scale shopping malls carry a wide variety of clothes, housewares, groceries, and electrical 
supplies, at low to moderate prices. Although they are equally devoted to ethnic consumption, these 
shopping malls indicate the transformation of the ethnic neighborhood from an intimate and insular 
enclave to an economic entity embracing the dominant commercial culture of a global political economy. 
Locally, the ethnic shopping malls have to deal with the booming real estate development in Chinatown 
and the standing high rents of commercial properties. The small units within the malls make it possible 
for the Chinese business owners to operate their businesses with relatively low rents by sharing the costs 
of storefronts and commercial spaces. New waves of immigrants from Asia and growing numbers of 
tourists also bring in more diverse consumers to the ethnic market, wherein the locally based commercial 
cultures meet global culture to generate a new identity for the by no means homogeneous community.                   
Following the lead of market forces and commercial development, there have been constant 
efforts in Chinatown to enhance local growth through re-enacting the process of landscape construction. 
In 1978, the New York Transportation Commission started a test program in Chinatown, turning Pell and 
Doyer Streets into a pedestrian mall in the evenings for a two-week experimental period. The program 
was part of the city’s commitment to clean up the air in accordance with the provisions of the 
Transportation Control Plan. It was also an endeavor to accentuate the commercial development in 
Chinatown by “creating a pedestrian oasis in a heavily congested downtown Manhattan area” and 
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“providing a pleasant shopping environment for New Yorkers who frequent the shops and restaurants in 
Chinatown.”33 The process of “mallizing” the Chinatown was also manifested in the conversion of an 
asphalt parking lot under the Manhattan Bridge into a modern shopping mall in 1983, as part of the plan 
of providing more retail space in the crowded Chinatown. Under the 33-feet bridge arches, a four-story 
mall with two levels sinking below the ground provided 41,000-square feet of retail space. The 
Chinatown Chamber of Commerce optimistically envisioned the city-sponsored project would become a 
major boost to Chinatown’s tourist industry and generate more business opportunities; but they 
disregarded concerns regarding increased traffic and the high rental charges that would exclude the local 
small business owners. In 2002, the construction of Oriental Square, a large-scale shopping center at 75 
East Broadway, indicated the climax of “mallization.” The site was originally occupied by Sun Sing 
Theater (see figure 5), which was destroyed in 1993 and remained vacant until 1996 when a developer 
purchased the site, planning to build a two-story multi-functional commercial center that would include 
retail, food wholesale, and restaurant businesses. It was estimated that the project, started in 2000, would 
provide 300 jobs for the Chinese community. Together with the landmark shopping center, Yi Dong 
Marketplace, the Oriental Square caused profound changes in the social and physical compositions of the 
area surrounding East Broadway, which was perceived as a fast developing area and a new settlement for 
the Chinese immigrants (figure 64).34
In addition to the expansion of the market for the trading of goods and commodities, flows of 
international capital required a supportive infrastructure to provide specialized services for transnational 
investment transactions.
 
35 Chinatown thus became a strategic node within the transnational economy, in 
which banking services and financial institutions were concentrated, engaging in the circuit of capital 
flows between Asia and the U.S. Michel Laguerre asserts that the “transnationality” and “globality” of 
Chinatown had long existed. He defines Chinatown as “ethnopole,” that is a “localized global space” 
produced by transnational experiences and practices.36 In a similar vein, Jan Lin describes Chinatown as a 
nexus of transnational and local markets of capital and labor.37 New investment patterns and a new 
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geography of transnational financial flows have fed the growth of New York’s Chinatown as a crucial site 
for the implementation and management of the transnational financial operations. As these advanced  
 
Figure 64: View of East Broadway Avenue, which has gradually become the new center of New York’s 
Chinatown with fast development of shopping malls and banking services, ca.2008 (Photo by author) 
 
services have developed, they have facilitated the spatial transformation in Chinatown. Chatham Square, 
for example, has served a banking center in which a cluster of financial institutions congregated, 
including the Abacus Federal Savings Bank, Asia Bank, Bank of China, Chinese American Bank, 
Citibank, and several other banks that are based in New York, Hong Kong, Taiwan, or China. In 1988, 
Glory China Development Ltd. of Hong Kong purchased the land on East Broadway that was originally 
occupied by the Pagoda Movie Theater. The company built the 15-story Glory China Tower and rented it 
to the Ka Wah Bank of Hong Kong, owned by the China International Trust and Investment Corporation 
based in Beijing, with the vision of developing East Broadway as the Chinatown’s Wall Street.38 With a 
fast economic development, China has played an increasingly important role in the global economy since 
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the 1980s. The involvement of the financial institutions from China conferred a new dynamicity to the 
economic system in the Chinatown. The opening there of China Bank in 1985 signaled that New York’s 
Chinatown had become one of the key sites for the Chinese to form a new institutional framework to 
conduct the transnational economic operations.  
The space of Chinatown has changed in response to transnational activities and specifically trade 
and investment. This includes the development of large-scale shopping malls, financial services, and 
zoning regulations aiming to facilitate commercial development in Chinatown. These spatial 
reorganizations had mixed consequences: one was the rising values of the real estate properties that had 
the effect of displacing low income residents by making housing less affordable; another was the 
devaluing of manufacturing as a sector, such as the decline of garment shops as factory buildings were 
converted into more profitable loft or office spaces. These spatial changes and the framework through 
which socio-economic transformations were implemented, in a sense, contributed to the establishment of 
Chinatown as a strategic site in the growing transnational trades and activities.  
 
Conflicts and Divided Spaces   
A series of political events led to new waves of immigrants from China. These included mainland 
China’s “Open Door” policy, instituted in 1978, the U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
which granted amnesty to certain illegal immigrants, and the 1989 Tiananmen protest in China. Together, 
these significantly changed the demographics, languages, and populations of New York’s Chinatown. 
Though there were immigrants from various regions of China, many of the newcomers sought 
employment and settlement in Flushing, Queens, instead of the Cantonese-dominated Manhattan 
Chinatown. Since the early 1990s, with the dramatic increase of Fujianese immigrants, however, the 
situation has changed. The shared dialect and cultural traits reinforced the desire of the Fujianese group to 
live together and facilitate contacts and ties in the Chinatown. When the descendants of the early 
Cantonese immigrants followed the immigration pattern of other ethnic groups and gradually moved out 
of the ethnic enclave to merge into the mainstream society, the Fujianese immigrants filled that void, 
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appearing as the new political and economic power in the ethnic community. Their settlement in Chatham 
Square, an area surrounding East Broadway Avenue, has created a new spatial order for the Chinatown. 
Chatham Square was formerly a thriving Jewish neighborhood filled with low-price clothing 
stores and hotels. But after World War II, the Jewish merchants and residents started to move out of the 
area. Especially with the construction of a new subway system in the city in the 1960s, Chatham Square 
no longer functioned as one of the city’s major transportation centers, which greatly impacted the local 
business and led to the neighborhood’s decline. As the Jewish people fled to the suburbs and other areas 
of the city, the Chinese immigrants gradually took their place, occupied Chatham Square, and established 
Chinese businesses there. In 1962, the Chinese American Veteran Memorial was constructed at Chatham 
Square to memorize Jin Liu, a second lieutenant of U.S. army, who died in the World War II. Designed 
by the Chinese American architect Jin-Pei Lee, the Memorial not only was an expression of patriotism 
and the ethnic pride, but also an effort of the ethnic leaders to create images that would  stamp their 
cultural presence and political ideals. It offered a place for the symbolic expression of an ethnic identity in 
a form that showed loyalty to political regimes of the host society.   
Since the end of the 1980s, immigrants from Fujian province of China began to take root at East 
Broadway. With the prosperity of Fujianese business in the area, a new Fujianese-flavored Chinatown 
emerged that was different from the old core of Chinatown, where Cantonese had dominated the 
economic, social and political structures. While today the old section of the Chinatown tends to be more 
tourist-oriented, with businesses such as souvenir and curios stores, East Broadway offers herbal stores, 
grocery shops, and supermarkets that mainly serve the Chinese. Like the division in San Francisco’s 
Chinatown where Grant Avenue serves as the “front regions” and Stockton Street is the “back regions” 
(as described in Chapter Four), New York’s Chinatown is also divided by the types of social 
performances and social roles staged in the place. But the geographic division in New York’s Chinatown 
is somehow unique in terms of its affiliation to particular social groups differentiated by areas of origin, 
language, and levels of assimilation. Restaurants specifically catering to the taste of Fujianese spread out 
on East Broadway, wherein the presence of the headquarters of Fujianese organizations such as the 
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Fujianese-American Association and the United Fujianese-American Association indicates a new socio-
political order of the landscape controlled by the dominant Fujianese group.  
The Fujianese immigrants faced many challenges as they settled in New York’s Chinatown. First, 
the language barriers between the Fujianese and the well-established Cantonese immigrants excluded the 
newcomers from the existing socio-economic resources of Chinatown. It was very hard for the new 
Fujianese immigrants to find employment or operate their own businesses at the old core of the 
Chinatown. Furthermore, there were clear political differences. Their support for the People’s Republic of 
China appeared to be incompatible with that of the early immigrants who generally supported Taiwan, the 
Republic of China. But with the fast growing number of Fujianese immigrants in New York, the 
traditional leadership of the Chinatown was being challenged. The intra-ethnic tension started to become 
noticeable in 1978, when the United States decided to build an official diplomatic relation with 
Communist China. In recognition, about four out of sixty regional and family associations in Chinatown 
declared their support by erecting the national flag of Communist China above their association 
headquarters. The shifting political situations aroused heated debates among the community members and 
suddenly Chinatown became a divided community. The local merchants who looked forward to the 
resumed Pacific trade applauded the normalization of U.S.-China relations, while the old-timers insisted 
on the allegiance to the Nationalist Party of Taiwan.  
The Nationalist Party had dominated U.S. Chinatowns for several decades. The party members 
constituted the governing core of Chinatown’s traditional leadership by holding the permanent “inner-
circle” voting seats of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA). In New York, the 
hegemony of the Party was also evident in its power over the ethnic media. The World Journal, 
Chinatown’s best financed daily newspaper, for instance, was owned by T. W. Wong, a prominent 
member of the Nationalist Party Central Committee. The newspaper was widely circulated and was a 
loyal and influential advocate of the Party. The Chinatown Daily News, a popular left-wing newspaper, 
had a very different destiny. It was forced to suspend publication in the 1950s because of its critiques of 
the Nationalist Party.39 In addition to the media control, the particular political circumstances in the U.S. 
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after World War II also helped to consolidate the power of the Party in the Chinese Diasporas. With the 
defeat of the Nationalist Party and the establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949, there were 
posters calling for Chinatown residents to report neighbors or acquaintances they suspected of 
“Communist leaning.” Chinese who attempted to contact relatives in the mainland were harassed. 
Especially during the Korean War in the 1950s, Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans had 
cautiously avoided any contacts with mainland China to prevent the suspicion of taking a political stance 
of Communism, in fear of losing their properties and being sent to internment camps, as occurred to the 
Japanese Americans during the war. When the consolidation of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and 
China in 1972 deformed the power structure of Chinatown, the Nationalist Party pressed on with its 
domination by raising the capital investment in the community, intensifying media control, and even 
resorting to violence to enforce the party’s interests and ideologies. This is when the Chinatown gateways 
in Chicago and San Francisco were constructed with the support of the Taiwan government. In response 
to the violent clashes that occurred between the Nationalists and supporters of Community China, the 
Subcommittee on International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee became involved 
in investigating the activities conducted by the Nationalist Party’s intelligence services in the United 
States.40
In addition to the tensions among the political groups, personal experiences also prompted 
community members to decide which side they would take in the process of political transitions. For 
those who had families and relatives in China, normalization presumed family reunion and the possibility 
of revisiting their hometowns. But for those who had lost their possessions and families during China’s 
Communist revolutions, the bitter life experiences made them steadfast supporters of the Taiwanese 
government.
   
41 At the same time, the new-generation of Chinese Americans, who were influenced by the 
American civil rights and antiwar movements in the 1960s, constituted a revolutionary force to reform 
Chinatown. However, the domination of the Nationalist Party in Chinatown served to dampen political 
activism since the long-entrenched order was carefully preserved to retain the existing power structure. 
Accusing the traditional community organizations of being more interested in anti-Communist and pro-
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Nationalist activities than dealing with community issues and problems, the new-generation Chinese 
Americans perceived the reestablishment of U.S.-China relations as a force that could terminate the 
Nationalists’ domination of Chinatown and allow the community to address its needs for improved social 
services and democratic political infrastructures.42
The arrival of Fujianese immigrants in New York’s Chinatown in the 1980s and 1990s intensified 
the political divergences that had existed within the community after World War II. The new diversity of 
power was manifested in the disputes over the selection of parade routes celebrating the National Day of 
the People’s Republic of China in 1994. The route was designed to start at Columbus Park, across East 
Broadway, and run through the old core of Chinatown at Bowery and Mott Streets (figure 65). 
Historically, the core area of Chinatown was the prerequisite route for the annual parade celebrating the 
National Day of the Republic of China, Taiwan, usually referred as “the Double Ten” Parade on October 
10th every year. However, the traditional groups supporting the Nationalist Party feared that if the parade 
were patronized by Fujianese immigrants they would celebrate the National Day of the Communist China 
and demonstrate the new Fujianese political power, and thus, the traditional groups drastically rejected the 
parade’s route through the old core. At the same time that the Chinese were fighting over political 
symbolism, the city police denied the route based on the concerns of traffic jams, because the San 
Gennaro Festival in Little Italy was scheduled to be held on the same day as the Fujianese parade. 
Although the police granted the “outer” route along East Broadway and St. James Place to the parade, the 
Fujianese immigrants regarded the police’s decision as unduly influenced by the authority of the old 
governing elites of the Chinatown.
 Thus the desire for change and the mood of expectancy 
facilitated the support of the new generation Chinese Americans for the resurrection of the U.S.-China 
diplomatic relations.  
43 The controversy over the parade route for celebrating the National 
Day of China served as a reminder that space is an essential subject of political and social concerns.  
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Figure 65: A map showing the routes for National Day parade for Taiwan, Republic of China and 
Mainland, People’s Republic of China (Source: New York Times, Sep. 11, 1994) 
In addition to space, the objects placed within that landscape could have symbolic input. The 
dedication of a statue of Commissioner Lin Ze Xu, a native Fujianese, at Chatham Square in 1997, 
represented the major opportunity for the Fujianese immigrants to publicly assert the distinctive virtues of 
their own identity (figure 66). Lin was a national hero of China because he burned tons of opium 
imported from Britain in 1839 and sparked the Opium War of 1840. As a patriotic symbol of law and 
order, the statue of Lin was designed to convey the determination of the Fujianese immigrants to make 
Chinatown safe and drug-free area, especially when the notorious activities of Fujianese gangs had been 
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widely publicized in the U.S. in the 1990s. After the erection of the memorial, the City Council approved 
naming the triangle plot where the statue was located at the intersection of East Broadway, Katherine 
Street, and  
 
Figure 66: The statue of Lin Ze Xu and Commissioner Lin Ze Xu Square located at Chatham Square, ca. 
2008 (Photo by author) 
 
Oliver Street as Commissioner Lin Ze Xu Square. The creation and naming of the Lin Ze Xu Square was 
accompanied by an aggressive political campaign to foster a new cultural identity in the Chinatown. In 
many ways, Lin Ze Xu was a nationally important cultural figure in China – his rebellion against the 
British opium invasion was virtually a defense of his country and homeland nationalism.44 But 
meanwhile, Lin was symbolized local pride, because he was from Fujian Province. Thus with the 
selection of such a commemorative figure that had guarded the ideals of the homeland, the Fujianese 
leaders attempted to please both their cohabitants in the ethnic enclave who were interested in the ideals 
of patriotism and cultural nationalism and their Fujianese peers who still were emotionally attached to the 
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homeland. The commemoration of Lin was actually an attempt to reconcile the intra-ethnic division in the 
community by weakening the political implications of the commemorative symbol and emphasizing its 
cultural attainments. It was an interesting and strategic choice because it sustained an interest in cultural 
identity that was not threatening to other political parties in the host society.45
Although the growth of China as a new world power has led to the gradual blurring of political 
lines between the old-timers and the emerging community of new immigrants from the mainland, New 
York’s Chinatown still remains socially and spatially divided according to the differences of languages, 
regional origins, and cultural affiliations. The homeland geopolitical processes have tremendous impact 
on the social formation and spatial configurations in the Chinatown. However, the fragmentation of 
community formation is not only a legacy of the political processes of the homeland countries, but also a 
response to the new order conforming to the structure of domination in the Chinatown. Thus the spatial 
identities deployed by the social groups are perhaps more crucial to their self-expressions than are 
attempts to proclaim pride in their native cultures. Architecture and other modes of representation 
intensified efforts to augment community self-esteem and restructure the identity discourses for the new 
diversity of power in the Chinatown. 
      
 
Post-911 Constructions 
Located to the east of the World Trade Center, New York’s Chinatown was one of the 
neighborhoods most profoundly traumatized by the terrorist attack in 2001. With an estimated loss of 
7,700 jobs, the Chinatown community suffered economic decline as well as health and environmental 
problems. However, Chinatown was not a priority for the federal Emergency Management Agency and 
other public or private relief foundations. Indeed, many Chinatown residents and businessman were 
excluded from assistance after 911, because Canal Street was marked as one of the boundaries for federal 
relief and many Chinese lived at the north of Canal Street. In addition, language and cultural barriers also 
prevented the Chinese immigrants from receiving outside help and relief funds. With a growing 
awareness of the community’s plight and difficulties, the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation 
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(LMDC), the major agency in charge of rebuilding plans in Lower Manhattan, started to reach out to the 
community and work with the community-based organizations, even though the initial blueprint produced 
by the agency rarely mentioned Chinatown.46 Chinatown was the nearest poor neighborhood to Ground 
Zero where almost a quarter of the workers lost their jobs and the unemployment rate was 10 percent.  
Recognizing this,  the City Council voted to create an “Empire Zone” in Chinatown in 2002 to offer tax 
credits to the neighborhood businesses.47 The community-based organizations such as Asian Americans 
for Equality applauded the plan and launched a community-wide effort to develop a proposal of 
rebuilding and recovering the community. In the Rebuild Chinatown Community Survey, four key issues 
– sanitary conditions, affordable housing, employment opportunities, and senior housing – were 
highlighted as the most urgent tasks for the post-911 community rebuilding efforts. Traffic congestion 
and lack of parking space were also considered immediate dilemmas for community revitalization.48
After the 911 attack, in fear of possible truck bombs and other terrorist attacks, the city closed off 
Park Row that runs from City Hall to East Broadway and lies behind the police headquarters. The 
barricades set up on Park Row might have effectively removed the potential threatens to the governing 
center of the city, but they created predicaments for the Chinatown community by detouring emergency 
vehicles, keeping away tourist buses, and generating traffic congestions in Chatham Square. Representing 
the residents of Chinatown, the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF) filed a 
lawsuit in an effort to reopen Park Row, citing the negative environmental impacts caused by the closure 
of the street. They alleged the previous environmental assessment statement ignored the traffic effects of 
the street barricades, because it failed to consider the consequences of rerouting buses, closing an exit 
ramp near the Brooklyn Bridge, and shutting down a municipal garage. The Court denied the AALDEF’s 
request because it was believed that the security measures were necessary and there were no signs of 
significant impact at areas within 1,500 to 2,000 feet of the street closures. 
      
49 This is an example of what 
Mike Davis calls the “post-liberal” city that has been torn by oppressed social control, racial enmity, and 
class disparity. Under the name of security, the militarization of city’s everyday life is accompanied by 
the division between “fortified cells” and “place of terror.”50 The relations of surveillance, repression, and 
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segregation were manifested in the post-911 New York City where some people were denied access to 
certain public spaces and increasing measures of security and surveillance were applied to control urban 
public life. The fear of terrorist attack legitimates a new spatiality of separateness that has contributed to 
the construction of social inequality and enforced social boundaries between different groups.     
The restriction of public access to Park Row has greatly affected the post-911 economic 
revitalization of Chinatown, and yet despite this, the city is eager to promote tourism as a driving force for 
community development. In 2004, the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC) and the 
September 11th Fund launched a campaign known as “Exploring Chinatown,” intending to rebuild the 
community’s economy. In the advertising campaign, “colorful stores” and “diverse and delicious food” 
were highlighted as the most attractive attributes of the neighborhood.51 The campaign slogan “SEE 
Chinatown”— as in “Shop, Eat, Explore”52 – reveals Chinatown as a spectacle for the tourist 
consumption. As part of the campaign, LMDC, 911 Foundation, and New York Tourism Company 
sponsored the construction of the Chinatown Tourist Information Center (figure 67). The structure is 
located at a triangle plot bounded by Canal and Baxter Street. Painted in red and topped with an oversized 
golden dragon, the center was evidently designed to mainly serve non-Chinese tourists, since its 
information materials were printed in English. However, in actuality Chinese tourists have consisted of 
more than half of the visitors.53 In addition to the exotic-looking tourist information kiosk, a Chinatown 
gateway was also proposed as a means of reinforcing the distinctive characteristics of the ethnic 
neighborhood. The Chinese community has made efforts to build a gateway for a long time, beginning in 
1979, when the CCBA coordinated with the city government and other related agencies. The gateway was 
proposed for the intersection of Chatham Square and Park Row, a busy entry to the Chinatown. The 
proposed arch would be 84-feet wide and 25-feet tall, embellished with a plaque proclaiming “The World 
is for All,” a famous saying by Sun Yat-sen that also appeared in the Chinatown gateways in Chicago and 
San Francisco. The proposal, however, was denied by the city government because of the intense 
opposition  
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Figure 67: The tourist kiosk is located at the divider between Canal, Baxter, and Walker Streets. It is part 
of the Explore Chinatown Campaign to promote the area as a tourism attraction. (Source: 
http://www.gallagherstravels.com/newsflash/chinatownnyc/). 
 
of the non-Chinese residents who argued that the construction site was located outside the Chinatown 
territory and would cause traffic congestion by attracting large numbers of tourists. In 1992, Hunter 
College Neighborhood Planning Workshop revisited the gateway idea and recommended three possible 
locations for its construction: the entrance into Chinatown from the Manhattan Bridge, Chatham Square, 
and the triangle of land bounded by Canal, Center, and Baxter Streets. They emphasized “entry” and 
“visibility” as key criteria for selecting the sites for the gateway. 54 It was not until 2003, with the great 
impact of 9/11 attack on the economy and tourism of the Chinatown, that the CCBA decided to push the 
gateway project. In a letter to Mayor Michael Bloomberg, the CCBA exclaimed that “San Francisco, 
Washington, DC, Montreal, Vancouver, Melbourne, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Boston… all have 
beautiful Gateway Arches that reflect Chinese culture… and serve as centerpieces for local tourism,” 
while “New York City has none!”55 In response to the CCBA’s request, the City Council provided 
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$250,000 for construction, but the total cost of the gateway construction was estimated to be about 
$1,500,000.Thus although the project was perceived as a landmark that would propel Chinatown’s 
revival, it turned out to be very difficult for the community leaders to find funds to match those provided 
by the City Council.56 In addition, Chinatown residents showed no enthusiasm for the gateway project. In 
the community workshop meetings held in 2003, community members opposed the gateway idea and 
emphasized the “visual authenticity” of the quarter, arguing against the schemes that “emphasized tourists 
over residents.”57
In the last three decades, New York’s Chinatown has turned to commercialism and tourism, which 
were already established as part of the local cultures as the result of urban transformations. After 911, in a 
context of regressive economic development, efforts to reinvent the neighborhood involved a 
commitment to tourism and, particularly, the dedication to the production of specific community images 
to attract tourists. Neighborhood improvements, such as the revitalization of the pavilion in Columbus 
Park in 2007, have been staged as efforts to enhance the quality of life for Chinatown residents. Such 
improvements are beneficial, but they are also instruments for capitalist control of the production of space 
by creating a desired image of the ethnic neighborhood for sale to the tourist and real estate market. The 
ethnic leaders and the city officials are still trying to resurrect the idea of the Chinatown gateway for the 
same reasons that they are marketing the ethnic imagery of Chinatown. Like other poor neighborhoods in 
New York, Chinatown suffered a social and economic crisis after 911. In a sense, the search for a local 
identity has become the foundation for new strategies of community redevelopment, especially when the 
older belief that the successful restructuring of low-income neighborhood should depend on displacement 
of working-class, marginal community identities has been recently challenged by a globalized economy 
that accommodates a variety of profitable and specialized places.
 Without community support and the short of funding, the CCBA’s proposal for the 
Chinatown Gateway now has limited prospects for success. 
58
 
 
Conclusions 
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New York’s Chinatown is facing competition from the nearby neighborhoods in Lower East Side 
and other Chinatowns emerging elsewhere in the city. The Chinatown in Flushing, which has the 
appellation of “Little Taipei,” attracts those who immigrated from Taiwan and mainland China. For them, 
Flushing is more hospitable because Mandarin is the dominant language there. Another Chinatown in 
Brooklyn, stretching from 50th to 62nd Street on Eighth Avenue, is a relatively small and new Chinatown 
that is connected to the Manhattan Chinatown by subway and a tour bus run by the Chinese. Many 
Chinese working in the Manhattan Chinatown choose to live in the Brooklyn Chinatown because the rents 
are relatively low there. In addition to these new Chinatowns, the commercial development in Little Italy 
and the Lower East Side has also drawn some attention away from the Manhattan Chinatown. Thus in 
order to sustain the Chinatown as a profitable and thriving ethnic community in the changing political 
economy of the city, efforts to reinvent neighborhood stress the production of a specific and unique image 
that would attract new investment in the community. Despite the official attempts to  cast Chinatown in 
an essentialized ethnic image, place identity emerges from the array of specialized interests that are 
grounded on the lived experience of the community. These interests are diverse and changing and can be 
contested because of the emergence of new social units, such as the Fujianese immigrants whose values 
and view of reality are very different from the early immigrants who settled in the Chinatown and 
defended the traditional structures of power and a system of beliefs that was produced from a political 
regime of the past. The growth of new immigrant communities challenged the social and political 
framework that had supported the traditional constitutions and created a new linkage between the 
formation of social identity and the constitution of territories.  
In 1992, Manhattan Borough formed a Chinatown Tourism Council to market Chinatown as a 
tourist attraction. Not only targeted to western tourists, the tourist establishments in Chinatown also 
advertised in Chinese-language newspapers in Canada, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Hong Kong. 
Transnational tourism and businesses became central to the community redevelopment as they were 
embedded through time in various layers of community life. A productive economy based on real-estate 
development and transnational financial services caused Chinatown to be treated as a purely financial 
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asset by the private and public sectors. The disjunction between a neoliberal ideology of neutral space and 
free-market globalization, and the local issues of social reproduction became noticeably contested in the 
Chinatown through the local struggles over housing, zoning, and landscape changes. The official efforts 
of maintaining authority in land-use planning and the manipulation of distinction and ethnic identity 
played a seminal role in the ongoing processes of capital accumulation. As observed by Jan Lin, 
“ethnicity has a greater resilience and gravity in arenas of economic, political, and cultural interaction” 
through the opportunities created by the development of global capitalism.59
 
 The local agents who were 
active in promoting the globalization of regional economy likewise sought to restructure the built 
environment of Chinatown to accommodate a variety of transnational endeavors. Thus during a period of 
rapid restructuring, Chinatown has become a strategic site in organizing the transnational activities of 
capital circulations and cultural exchanges.   
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 Conclusions  
 
The examination of landscape changes in the U.S. Chinatowns under the forces of urban 
redevelopment opens a window to the intricate relations between landscape, ethnicity, and urban 
economy and politics. The agenda for urban development that prioritizes the rationale of capital 
accumulation and the dominant social and cultural ideology led to the contested process of landscape 
construction and identity-making in the Chinatowns. Exploring the role of race and ethnicity in the 
making of urban forms provides a critical understanding of the complicated processes through which 
place is imagined and constructed. The three Chinatowns examined in this study were not only subject to 
the overarching economic restructuring in the national scale, but also were constructed out of a particular 
local and regional context. From the 1950s to 70s, the national crisis of deindustrialization and the 
declining urban economy facilitated a shift of urban policy that sought to regenerate devalued land and 
encourage growth in the service and consumption economies. As the first wave of urban renewal relied on 
the urban renewal bulldozer to eradicate or isolate the urban “slums,” Chinatowns in the major cities 
experienced various degrees of exclusion and marginalization. In each case, as examined in this study, 
Chinatowns faced the pressure of dislocation and gentrification. The rhetoric of slum clearance was a 
powerful apparatus that fortified the geography of segregation based on race and class. It also served as an 
instrument of power that continued to contain the colored bodies in the subordinated spaces.   
In San Francisco, community activism fighting for low-income housing and recreation spaces 
nurtured the political power of resistance. The organized resistance against spatial orders imposed from 
“above”, with varied success, helped to develop the Chinatown community as a political unity that 
challenged the dominant agenda of urban redevelopment. The Third World Strikes at California and 
University of California at Berkeley in 1968 and 1969 established California as the center of Asian 
American political activism. Motivated by the local political culture, San Francisco’s Chinatown 
community showed great effort and success in protecting the low-income Chinese immigrants from being 
further marginalized by the process of urban redevelopment. In Chicago, however, the resistance was 
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relatively minor. Instead, the community leaders helped to fuel a pocket of gentrification within the 
Chinatown under the rhetoric of “self-help” and the stereotype of the “model minority.” In the 1930s, 
Paul Siu pioneered a study of the Chinese immigrants in his dissertation at the University of Chicago, 
which was published as The Chinese Laundryman in 1987. Siu’s book conceptualized the “sojourner” 
mentality of the Chinese immigrants based on the methodological tool of social types and assimilation 
theory.1
These differences among the three Chinatowns, located on the west coast, the midwest, and east 
coast, have helped to imagine and shape the Asian bodies and Asian places in distinctive ways. The 
particular regional history, culture, politics, and economy facilitated the unique embeddedness of 
Chinatown in the evolving urban system and its various responses to the challenges generated by the 
processes of urban redevelopment. The variations that arose from the particular regional institutions were 
also manifested in the practice of reinventing Chinatown and especially of making the built environment 
visibly “Chinese.”  Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, there has been a shift in urban renewal strategies 
from the bulldozer to the development of incipient revitalization spaces.
 His idea of the sojourners and their subsequent assimilation constituted the core of the “self-help” 
and “model minority” discourses, which perpetuated the Chinese immigrants as Others. In New York’s 
Chinatown, community redevelopment was closely tied to overseas investment and a successful enclave 
economy was built on thriving transnational financial and commercial exchanges. But at the same time, 
city-imposed public projects and the planning policies that emphasized commercial development over 
housing, and an upper-circuit economy over a lower-circuit economy, led to conflicts among city 
government, overseas Chinese investors, and local residents. Underlying the urban redevelopment 
strategies was the insistence that Chinatown, as a slum, had to be enhanced through outside capital 
investment and economic growth.  
2 The urban forms represented by 
the immigrant communities, although not viewed as belonging to an advanced economy, have been 
associated with the image projected of the global city as multicultural, tolerant, and democratic. In 
contrast with the early struggles of Chinatown residents over land-use changes generated by exclusive 
urban planning, the new wave of urban renewal advocated a liberal-pluralist formula of inclusion that 
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emphasizes the cities, especially the global cities, as iconic centers of diversity and democracy. The way 
that ethnic diversity is celebrated, however, is not significantly different from the historical discourse of 
ethnic tourism, for the practice of “Othering” is still central in the process, even though difference might 
be celebrated rather than denigrated.3 In addition, the emphasis on the distinctiveness of Chinese enclaves 
in North America also easily reinforces the stereotype of the places by defining special place qualities 
with selective history and cultural elements. Although there are many different cultural strategies of urban 
economic development, the common element in all these strategies is that “they reduce the multiple 
dimensions and conflicts of culture to a coherent visual representation.”4 In Chinatown, ethnic culture as 
a “way of life” is transferred into “cultural products” that can be sold and consumed in the global market.5
In San Francisco, for example, tourism has played an essential role in urban transformation. By a 
variety of measures, San Francisco is one of the most popular urban tourist destinations in the United 
States. In 1985, San Francisco’s tourism industry generated $130 million in local taxes, which was 13 
percent of the city’s general receipts. Surveys collected by the San Francisco Convention and Visitors 
Bureau indicated that visual perceptions of the urban environment and sensory dimensions of leisure 
experiences were the most attractive features of the tourist landscape in San Francisco. Moreover, tourists 
also stated that they enjoyed the political culture that was characterized by cross-cutting alliances among 
class, race, and sexuality and great tolerance to diversity.
 
In the process, a simplified identity of “Chineseness” is forged through the less contested notion of 
“culture” rather than the controversial area of politics and economy.    
6 The dominant obsession of visual appeals that 
are ethnic and unique drove the process of “Orientalization” of San Francisco’s Chinatown. However, for 
Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans, the back regions of the quarter such as Stockton Street 
remained an authentic living environment providing the particular social and cultural infrastructures for 
the ethnic groups. In a similar way, the City of Chicago also emphasized visitor trade as a way to enhance 
the city’s position as the national center of convention and tourism. The development and refurbishment 
of cultural attractions such as art museums, restaurants, theatres, and sports stadiums were among the 
strategies to realize the re-invention of the city.7 Since the 1970s, Chicago’s Chinatown has consciously 
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incorporated an Oriental theme in its architecture and parks, which emphasized the visual representations 
and motifs reflecting Chinese tradition. But underlying the cultural layer of the exotic structures was not 
only the desire to protect the dominant socio-political interests of the society, but also a strategy to 
enhance the current value of the community. The promotion of the “model minority” imagery prompted 
efforts to build middle- and upper-income housing to attract wealthy Chinese and Chinese professionals 
into the Chinatown. It also led to the further segregation of poor immigrants. 
In contrast with the Chinatowns in San Francisco and Chicago, New York’s Chinatown showed 
much less “self-Orientalization.” Though a few buildings followed the exotic designs that prevailed in 
other Chinatowns, the dominant physical space conveys an alternative sense of “authenticity” by focusing 
on the actual needs of the community members. The degree of freedom that New York’s Chinatown 
enjoyed for not being constrained by an ostentatious expression of ethnic culture was partially determined 
by the unique economic conditions of the community. The overseas capital investment and the thriving 
industries of garment shops and restaurants halved the importance of tourism in the community’s 
economy. The pressing needs for affordable housing and public health also emphasized practicality in the 
built environment. But meanwhile, intra-ethnic conflicts and divisions in the community produced a 
symbolic landscape that reflected the shifting terrain of ethnic pride and power within the community. As 
homeland politics were transformed into tensions within Chinatown, the expression of ethnic identity 
became very sensitive to the pursuit of present commercial and political interests.  
In a sense, the three urban Chinatowns showed significant variations for exploring the new fields 
of power in cultural representation. They contextualized ethnicity in the local particularities, revealing a 
variety of endeavors in creating the landscape of ethnicity. But at the same time, the Chinatowns are 
interconnected in many ways. The major traditional family and regional associations, for instance, hold 
annual conferences in each major Chinatown by turns in order to assert their political connections there. 
And some manufacturing enterprises in large Chinatowns have an almost monopolistic grip on the 
provisioning of Chinatown restaurants, grocery, and gift shops all over the country. The economic and 
socio-cultural network has been deeply entrenched among the different Chinatowns, which generated a 
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significant foundation for the empowerment of the ethnic group. In 1992, the Chinatown Resource Center 
in San Francisco issued Chinatown USA Report: planning and development in American Chinatowns. 
The report provides a critical insight of the common issues and neighborhood problems among American 
Chinatowns such as housing shortage, traffic congestion, and lack of recreational space. It also analyzes 
the role of the civic institutions in Chinatown formations by pointing out that the prevalent vision for 
revitalization sees Chinatown as a “capital city” constituting an important part of the city and regional 
economy.8
“Chinatown should have an attractive environment that encourages tourism and economic prosperity and 
at the same time, remains a desirable and affordable place to live; Chinatown becomes an integral part of 
mainstream society and yet remains distinctive cultural heritage and identity; Balancing the need for 
aggressive growth and neighborhood preservation while contending with the constraints of spatial 
resources and available monetary resources.” 
 It says that Chinatowns present and future should share the following features: 
The passage reveals the major dilemmas for the future development of Chinatown including the 
threat of gentrification, politics of cultural identity, and the spatial constraints. With the fast growth of 
tourism and commercial activities, Chinatown has increasing become a place of leisure and recreation, 
wherein the creation of a marketable environment of consumption produces an ahistorical and “depthless” 
landscape.9 It reconstitutes the spatial distribution of class and offers scant opportunities for poor Chinese 
immigrants to move up the social scale. . Meanwhile, the frequent circulations and global exchanges have 
produced new cultural identity and community space in the Chinese Diasporas. As for the Chinese 
immigrants, back and forth movements and electronic communication generate a new conception of 
home, which in the new context can be multiple and dynamic.10 Thus, there is a significant dimension to 
the discussion of cultural identity in that transnational perspective is adopted in this research to emphasize 
that immigrant communities sustain and are affected by the multi-stranded social relations between both 
host and home societies. The transnational processes challenge the narratives of transmigrant 
communities grounded on the rigid confines of nation-states.  In the process, nation-states still play 
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pivotal roles in identity formation of transmigrants. But at the same time, Chinese Diasporas also 
contribute to and are being reconfigured within the global construction of deterritorized nation-states.  
As the Chinese American community becomes increasingly diverse, it would be difficult and 
sometimes misleading to generalize about the political and social positions of Chinese Americans as a 
group. The transnational connectivity opens up new social spaces for Chinese Americans and Chinese 
immigrants to renegotiate and restructure the local identities, power discourses, and the racial relations in 
the host society, which for many has become the home society. Although in many ways historic 
Chinatown is no longer the sole focus of Chinese American life, it remains an important site in 
articulating Chinese American identity and their transnational political, economic, and cultural life. 
Especially for low-skilled Chinese immigrants, Chinatown continues to function as a major living 
community that provides working opportunities and social networks. The historic urban Chinatowns 
survived in the waves of urban redevelopment and engaged itself in a widening circle of socio-political 
actions. The distinct ethnic landscapes of these Chinatowns are important in themselves and for what they 
represent about social processes, but they are also important indicators of the dialogical processes across 
racial and cultural difference, generating the new fields of power in both local and global context. Their 
significance lies in the rich history and particular political and social status that has endured into the new 
century and does not seem to be affected by the emergence of satellite or suburban Chinatowns.  
The examination of the landscape practices and spatial struggles of Chinatown in the process of 
urban redevelopment indicates the complicated processes in which the discourse of race and ethnicity 
continued to play a significant role in the making of urban space. Urban redevelopment is an instrument 
to enhance the socio-economic vitality of the cities, but it is also far more than that. It promotes a new 
mode of governance and citizenship that redefines racial/ethnic difference and social relations through the 
regulation of minority space. As such, the questions for the Chinatowns in the new century is whether any 
of them can step out of the often narrow and selective concepts of ethnicity and culture and embrace the 
widening circle of transnational actions and a broadened experience of the Chinese immigrants and 
Chinese Americans. 
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